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Gitea Open Source Git Server · Vulnerability

cve-program · severity unknownEUVD CVSS 3.1 7.1 CVSS 3.1 · 134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0 · Secondary 7.1 HIGHCVSS_V3 Publisher rating MODERATEFixed by gitea.dev 1.27.0osv · severity unknownFixed by gitea.dev 1.27.0KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-58416

Published

Fork-PR Actions task can read a third private repository via the collaborative-owner branch (missing fork-PR guard)

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2026-58151

Published

Fork-PR Actions task can read a third private repository via the collaborative-owner branch (missing fork-PR guard)

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-58416

Published

Fork-PR Actions task can read a third private repository via the collaborative-owner branch (missing fork-PR guard)

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-fj8v-hjwv-qm88

Published

### Summary `GetActionsUserRepoPermission` (`models/perm/access/repo_permission.go`) decides whether an Actions task token may access a target repo. Its cross-repo branches each enforce a fork-PR discriminator — **except the collaborative-owner branch**, which is missing the `!task.IsForkPullRequest` guard that its sibling has. As a result, when a private repo **B** lists owner **A** as a collaborative owner, an **attacker-controlled fork pull-request** workflow whose base repo is owned by A is granted code-read on B — i.e. the fork's YAML can clone a third private repository it has no rights to. ### Details ```go // models/perm/access/repo_permission.go (v1.26.2), in GetActionsUserRepoPermission if checkSameOwnerCrossRepoAccess(ctx, taskRepo, repo, task.IsForkPullRequest) { // passes isForkPR -> denies forks return maxPerm, nil } ... if taskRepo.IsPrivate { // <-- NO IsForkPullRequest check here actionsUnit := repo.MustGetUnit(ctx, unit.TypeActions) if actionsUnit.ActionsConfig().IsCollaborativeOwner(taskRepo.OwnerID) { return maxPerm, nil // grants code-read to target repo B } } ``` The sibling same-owner path correctly denies fork PRs: ```go func checkSameOwnerCrossRepoAccess(ctx, taskRepo, targetRepo, isForkPR bool) bool { if isForkPR { return false // Fork PRs are never allowed cross-repo access to other private repositories. } ... } ``` `taskRepo` = the repo whose workflow is running (the PR's base repo A); `repo` = the target being cloned (B). `IsCollaborativeOwner(taskRepo.OwnerID)` asks "does target B's Actions config trust A's owner for cross-repo read?" When B trusts ownerA, the branch returns `maxPerm` (code-read) **even when `task.IsForkPullRequest` is true** — i.e. when the executing YAML is the fork's, not A's. Every sibling enforces the fork-PR discriminator; except for this branch: `checkSameOwnerCrossRepoAccess` denies forks; `ComputeTaskTokenPermissions` (`models/actions/token_permissions.go`) only clamps the token *ceiling* to read-only for fork/cross-repo (its own comment notes the access *decision* is in `GetActionsUserRepoPermission`, so it does not neutralize the gap — it just makes the leak read-only); secrets (`models/secret/secret.go`) and the approval gate (`services/actions/notifier_helper.go`) both correctly key on `IsForkPullRequest`. **Reachability** — the runner clones target repo B over git-HTTP with the task token: `routers/web/repo/githttp.go` → `GetDoerRepoPermission(ctx, repoB, ActionsUser)` → `GetActionsUserRepoPermission(ctx, repoB, actionsUser, taskID)` with `IsForkPullRequest == true` → collaborative-owner branch returns code-read → `p.CanAccess(Read, code)` passes → private clone of B succeeds. (`CheckRepoScopedToken` in githttp is a no-op for the Actions token.) ### PoC Setup: private base repo A (`usera/repoA`), private third repo B (`userb/repoB`) with a planted `SECRET.txt`, B's Actions config trusting `usera` as a collaborative owner, and a genuine running fork-PR task token (`token_hash` computed with Gitea's own `HashToken`) presented as HTTP Basic. Requesting `GET /userb/repoB.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack`: | Condition (same fork-PR token) | HTTP | Meaning | |---|---|---| | anonymous (no token) | 401 | auth required | | token, A **public**, B trusts A | 404 | branch gated on `taskRepo.IsPrivate` ⇒ A public skips it | | token, A private, B has **no** collab-owner config | 404 | no trust ⇒ denied | | **token, A private, B trusts A (collab-owner)** | **200** | **`git clone` of private B succeeds** | | config removed / restored | 404 / 200 | deterministic | In the 200 case, `git clone` of private repo B succeeded and yielded its `SECRET.txt` — the full source of a third private repo the fork-PR author has no rights to. ### Impact Read-only confidentiality breach: discloses the full source of a *third* private repository (B) to an untrusted external fork-PR author. Read-only, not write/RCE. Preconditions (honest): 1. B is deliberately configured with a collaborative owner — but that is exactly the feature's intended use, so realistic for any deployment using it. 2. The fork PR's base repo A is itself private (the branch is gated on `taskRepo.IsPrivate`). Forking a private A already requires read on A, so this is a normal internal-contributor situation, not a weakening — the escalation is "read A (granted) → read a *different* private repo B (never granted)." 3. The fork-PR workflow must actually run — most realistically via an attacker who had one earlier PR approved (the "approved before" path in `ifNeedApproval`), after which fork PRs auto-run. ### Suggested remediation Add the same fork-PR guard the sibling path has (one line): ```go if taskRepo.IsPrivate && !task.IsForkPullRequest { actionsUnit := repo.MustGetUnit(ctx, unit.TypeActions) if actionsUnit.ActionsConfig().IsCollaborativeOwner(taskRepo.OwnerID) { return maxPerm, nil } } ``` This flips `Vuln_ForkPR_LeaksThirdPrivateRepo` to PASS, keeps `Control_NonFork_Allowed` PASS (legitimate collaborative-owner sharing still works), and leaves the existing `TestGetActionsUserRepoPermission` suite all green.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GO-2026-6052

Published

Gitea: Fork-PR Actions task can read a third private repository via the collaborative-owner branch (missing fork-PR guard) in gitea.dev

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

Exploitation and risk

Source status

CISA KEV lists vulnerabilities known to be exploited. FIRST EPSS estimates the likelihood of exploitation in the next 30 days. An unavailable score does not mean zero risk.

Which CVEs have scores here?

This view includes predictions for CVE identifiers explicitly listed in public NuGet advisories. Microsoft release pages have their own prediction coverage. Check source status for the scope and latest checks.

No exploitation or prediction data is available here for these CVEs. This does not mean they are safe or unlikely to be exploited.

cve-program · CVE-2026-58416

Published

Fork-PR Actions task can read a third private repository via the collaborative-owner branch (missing fork-PR guard)

Fork-PR Actions task can read a third private repository via the collaborative-owner branch (missing fork-PR guard)

Source published
13 Aug 2026 16:44:46 UTC
Source modified
13 Aug 2026 18:37:50 UTC
Saved here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

euvd · EUVD-2026-58151

Published

Fork-PR Actions task can read a third private repository via the collaborative-owner branch (missing fork-PR guard)

Fork-PR Actions task can read a third private repository via the collaborative-owner branch (missing fork-PR guard)

Additional publisher context

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Aug 13, 2026, 4:44:46 PM

dateUpdated: Aug 13, 2026, 6:37:50 PM

1 related source bulletins · separate from aliases

WID-SEC-W-2026-2304: Gitea: Mehrere Schwachstellen

CVE-2026-58417 · CVE-2026-58420 · CVE-2026-58425 · CVE-2026-58427 · CVE-2026-58428 · CVE-2026-58429 · CVE-2026-58431 · CVE-2026-58432 · CVE-2026-58433 · CVE-2026-58434 · CVE-2026-58435 · CVE-2026-58436 · CVE-2026-58437 · CVE-2026-58438 · CVE-2026-58439 · CVE-2026-58440 · CVE-2026-58441 · CVE-2026-58442 · CVE-2026-58443 · CVE-2026-58444 · CVE-2026-58445 · CVE-2026-58507 · CVE-2026-58508 · CVE-2026-58510 · CVE-2026-58511 · CVE-2026-59763 · CVE-2026-59765 · CVE-2026-59766 · CVE-2026-23603 · CVE-2026-42931 · CVE-2026-50105 · CVE-2026-54481 · CVE-2026-55982 · CVE-2026-55984 · CVE-2026-55986 · CVE-2026-55987 · CVE-2026-56443 · CVE-2026-56654 · CVE-2026-56657 · CVE-2026-56750 · CVE-2026-56755 · CVE-2026-57886 · CVE-2026-57894 · CVE-2026-57897 · CVE-2026-58314 · CVE-2026-58416

Source published
Aug 13, 2026, 4:44:46 PM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Aug 13, 2026, 6:37:50 PM (timezone not stated)
Saved here
19 Nov 2026 17:49:04 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 7.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N

nvd · CVE-2026-58416

Published

Fork-PR Actions task can read a third private repository via the collaborative-owner branch (missing fork-PR guard)

Fork-PR Actions task can read a third private repository via the collaborative-owner branch (missing fork-PR guard)

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-280 · CWE-863

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-08-13T17:17:26.300

lastModified: 2026-08-26T16:53:48.300

Source published
13 Aug 2026 17:17:26 UTC
Source modified
26 Aug 2026 16:53:48 UTC
Saved here
25 Oct 2026 14:19:16 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · 134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0 · Secondary · 7.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N

osv · GHSA-fj8v-hjwv-qm88

Published

Gitea: Fork-PR Actions task can read a third private repository via the collaborative-owner branch (missing fork-PR guard)

### Summary `GetActionsUserRepoPermission` (`models/perm/access/repo_permission.go`) decides whether an Actions task token may access a target repo. Its cross-repo branches each enforce a fork-PR discriminator — **except the collaborative-owner branch**, which is missing the `!task.IsForkPullRequest` guard that its sibling has. As a result, when a private repo **B** lists owner **A** as a collaborative owner, an **attacker-controlled fork pull-request** workflow whose base repo is owned by A is granted code-read on B — i.e. the fork's YAML can clone a third private repository it has no rights to. ### Details ```go // models/perm/access/repo_permission.go (v1.26.2), in GetActionsUserRepoPermission if checkSameOwnerCrossRepoAccess(ctx, taskRepo, repo, task.IsForkPullRequest) { // passes isForkPR -> denies forks return maxPerm, nil } ... if taskRepo.IsPrivate { // <-- NO IsForkPullRequest check here actionsUnit := repo.MustGetUnit(ctx, unit.TypeActions) if actionsUnit.ActionsConfig().IsCollaborativeOwner(taskRepo.OwnerID) { return maxPerm, nil // grants code-read to target repo B } } ``` The sibling same-owner path correctly denies fork PRs: ```go func checkSameOwnerCrossRepoAccess(ctx, taskRepo, targetRepo, isForkPR bool) bool { if isForkPR { return false // Fork PRs are never allowed cross-repo access to other private repositories. } ... } ``` `taskRepo` = the repo whose workflow is running (the PR's base repo A); `repo` = the target being cloned (B). `IsCollaborativeOwner(taskRepo.OwnerID)` asks "does target B's Actions config trust A's owner for cross-repo read?" When B trusts ownerA, the branch returns `maxPerm` (code-read) **even when `task.IsForkPullRequest` is true** — i.e. when the executing YAML is the fork's, not A's. Every sibling enforces the fork-PR discriminator; except for this branch: `checkSameOwnerCrossRepoAccess` denies forks; `ComputeTaskTokenPermissions` (`models/actions/token_permissions.go`) only clamps the token *ceiling* to read-only for fork/cross-repo (its own comment notes the access *decision* is in `GetActionsUserRepoPermission`, so it does not neutralize the gap — it just makes the leak read-only); secrets (`models/secret/secret.go`) and the approval gate (`services/actions/notifier_helper.go`) both correctly key on `IsForkPullRequest`. **Reachability** — the runner clones target repo B over git-HTTP with the task token: `routers/web/repo/githttp.go` → `GetDoerRepoPermission(ctx, repoB, ActionsUser)` → `GetActionsUserRepoPermission(ctx, repoB, actionsUser, taskID)` with `IsForkPullRequest == true` → collaborative-owner branch returns code-read → `p.CanAccess(Read, code)` passes → private clone of B succeeds. (`CheckRepoScopedToken` in githttp is a no-op for the Actions token.) ### PoC Setup: private base repo A (`usera/repoA`), private third repo B (`userb/repoB`) with a planted `SECRET.txt`, B's Actions config trusting `usera` as a collaborative owner, and a genuine running fork-PR task token (`token_hash` computed with Gitea's own `HashToken`) presented as HTTP Basic. Requesting `GET /userb/repoB.git/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack`: | Condition (same fork-PR token) | HTTP | Meaning | |---|---|---| | anonymous (no token) | 401 | auth required | | token, A **public**, B trusts A | 404 | branch gated on `taskRepo.IsPrivate` ⇒ A public skips it | | token, A private, B has **no** collab-owner config | 404 | no trust ⇒ denied | | **token, A private, B trusts A (collab-owner)** | **200** | **`git clone` of private B succeeds** | | config removed / restored | 404 / 200 | deterministic | In the 200 case, `git clone` of private repo B succeeded and yielded its `SECRET.txt` — the full source of a third private repo the fork-PR author has no rights to. ### Impact Read-only confidentiality breach: discloses the full source of a *third* private repository (B) to an untrusted external fork-PR author. Read-only, not write/RCE. Preconditions (honest): 1. B is deliberately configured with a collaborative owner — but that is exactly the feature's intended use, so realistic for any deployment using it. 2. The fork PR's base repo A is itself private (the branch is gated on `taskRepo.IsPrivate`). Forking a private A already requires read on A, so this is a normal internal-contributor situation, not a weakening — the escalation is "read A (granted) → read a *different* private repo B (never granted)." 3. The fork-PR workflow must actually run — most realistically via an attacker who had one earlier PR approved (the "approved before" path in `ifNeedApproval`), after which fork PRs auto-run. ### Suggested remediation Add the same fork-PR guard the sibling path has (one line): ```go if taskRepo.IsPrivate && !task.IsForkPullRequest { actionsUnit := repo.MustGetUnit(ctx, unit.TypeActions) if actionsUnit.ActionsConfig().IsCollaborativeOwner(taskRepo.OwnerID) { return maxPerm, nil } } ``` This flips `Vuln_ForkPR_LeaksThirdPrivateRepo` to PASS, keeps `Control_NonFork_Allowed` PASS (legitimate collaborative-owner sharing still works), and leaves the existing `TestGetActionsUserRepoPermission` suite all green.

Source published
21 Jul 2026 20:40:03 UTC
Source modified
22 Jul 2026 21:11:34 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

Publisher rating · MODERATE

osv · GO-2026-6052

Published

Gitea: Fork-PR Actions task can read a third private repository via the collaborative-owner branch (missing fork-PR guard) in gitea.dev

Gitea: Fork-PR Actions task can read a third private repository via the collaborative-owner branch (missing fork-PR guard) in gitea.dev

Source published
22 Jul 2026 20:36:35 UTC
Source modified
22 Jul 2026 21:00:28 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 20 Nov 21:09 UTC · 274 of 275 readable · 270 fully read · documentation 469/469 current