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Gitea Open Source Git Server · Vulnerability

cve-program · severity unknownEUVD CVSS 3.1 7.5 CVSS 3.1 · 134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0 · Secondary 7.5 HIGHCVSS_V4 Publisher rating LOWFixed by gitea.dev 1.27.0osv · severity unknownFixed by gitea.dev 1.27.0KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-58438

Published

Cross-repository IDOR in issue-dependency removal lets an attacker tamper with and comment on private repos they cannot access

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2026-58165

Published

Cross-repository IDOR in issue-dependency removal lets an attacker tamper with and comment on private repos they cannot access

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-58438

Published

Cross-repository IDOR in issue-dependency removal lets an attacker tamper with and comment on private repos they cannot access

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-xv9x-fj9g-vj6h

Published

### Details `RemoveDependency` in `routers/web/repo/issue_dependency.go` takes a `removeDependencyID` form parameter identifying the other issue by its global numeric ID, and fetches it with `issues_model.GetIssueByID(ctx, depID)` - no repository or permission check at all. It then calls `issues_model.RemoveIssueDependency(ctx, ctx.Doer, issue, dep, depType)` (`models/issues/dependency.go`), which deletes the dependency join row and then writes a comment referencing the removal, attributed to the calling user, onto the dependency record. The sibling function in the very same file, `AddDependency`, does this correctly when the two issues are in different repos (which `ALLOW_CROSS_REPOSITORY_DEPENDENCIES`, on by default, permits): ```go if issue.RepoID != dep.RepoID { if !setting.Service.AllowCrossRepositoryDependencies { ... } depRepoPerm, err := access_model.GetDoerRepoPermission(ctx, dep.Repo, ctx.Doer) if !depRepoPerm.CanReadIssuesOrPulls(dep.IsPull) { return // you can't see this dependency } } ``` `RemoveDependency` has no equivalent block at all - it goes straight from resolving `dep` by ID to deleting the link, regardless of which repo `dep` lives in or whether the caller can see it. I confirmed this same code is present in the current latest release, v1.26.4. ### PoC Prerequisites: an account with write access to issues on some repo `ownerA/repoA`, and the global numeric issue ID of an issue in a private repo `repoB` that is (or was) legitimately dependency-linked to one of the attacker's issues in `repoA` (cross-repo dependencies are commonly used between related public/private repos, and `ALLOW_CROSS_REPOSITORY_DEPENDENCIES` defaults to enabled). ```bash curl -s -b "gitea_session=$ATTACKER_SESSION_COOKIE" -X POST \ --data-urlencode "removeDependencyID=<repoB_issue_global_id>" \ --data-urlencode "dependencyType=blockedBy" \ "https://TARGET_HOST/ownerA/repoA/issues/N/dependency/delete" # Expected: the dependency link is deleted and a "removed dependency" comment # authored by the attacker is added to the repoB issue, even though the # attacker has no read access to repoB. ``` ### Impact This is a cross-repository IDOR / broken access control issue. An attacker can tamper with issue-tracking state (dependency relationships) and inject an attacker-authored comment into a private repository they cannot otherwise read or write to, crossing a trust boundary the "add" path explicitly enforces. Impact is bounded - it requires an existing dependency link and discloses no repository content - but it is a genuine unauthorized-write primitive across a private-repo boundary. ### Fix Add the same cross-repo permission check used in `AddDependency` (`access_model.GetDoerRepoPermission(ctx, dep.Repo, ctx.Doer).CanReadIssuesOrPulls(dep.IsPull)`) to `RemoveDependency` before allowing the deletion to proceed when `issue.RepoID != dep.RepoID`. **If possible, please apply for a CVE number when publishing. I would greatly appreciate it.**

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osv · GO-2026-6085

Published

Gitea: Cross-repository IDOR in issue-dependency removal lets an attacker tamper with and comment on private repos they cannot access in gitea.dev

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

cve-program · CVE-2026-58438

Published

Gitea Open Source Git Server

Vendor product

Publisher's version information

Shown as published. These rules are not interpreted as NuGet package version ranges.

{
                    "vendor": "Gitea",
                    "product": "Gitea Open Source Git Server",
                    "versions": [
                        {
                            "version": "0",
                            "lessThanOrEqual": "1.26.4",
                            "status": "affected",
                            "versionType": "semver"
                        }
                    ],
                    "defaultStatus": "unaffected"
                }

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

euvd · EUVD-2026-58165

Published

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Aug 13, 2026, 4:44:53 PM

dateUpdated: Aug 14, 2026, 8:03:20 PM

1 related source bulletins · separate from aliases

WID-SEC-W-2026-2304: Gitea: Mehrere Schwachstellen

CVE-2026-58417 · CVE-2026-58420 · CVE-2026-58425 · CVE-2026-58427 · CVE-2026-58428 · CVE-2026-58429 · CVE-2026-58431 · CVE-2026-58432 · CVE-2026-58433 · CVE-2026-58434 · CVE-2026-58435 · CVE-2026-58436 · CVE-2026-58437 · CVE-2026-58438 · CVE-2026-58439 · CVE-2026-58440 · CVE-2026-58441 · CVE-2026-58442 · CVE-2026-58443 · CVE-2026-58444 · CVE-2026-58445 · CVE-2026-58507 · CVE-2026-58508 · CVE-2026-58510 · CVE-2026-58511 · CVE-2026-59763 · CVE-2026-59765 · CVE-2026-59766 · CVE-2026-23603 · CVE-2026-42931 · CVE-2026-50105 · CVE-2026-54481 · CVE-2026-55982 · CVE-2026-55984 · CVE-2026-55986 · CVE-2026-55987 · CVE-2026-56443 · CVE-2026-56654 · CVE-2026-56657 · CVE-2026-56750 · CVE-2026-56755 · CVE-2026-57886 · CVE-2026-57894 · CVE-2026-57897 · CVE-2026-58314 · CVE-2026-58416

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

nvd · CVE-2026-58438

Published

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-862

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-08-13T17:17:27.807

lastModified: 2026-08-26T16:53:48.300

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

osv · GHSA-xv9x-fj9g-vj6h

Published

gitea.dev

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0 → fixed 1.27.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

osv · GO-2026-6085

Published

gitea.dev

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0 → fixed 1.27.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 20 Nov 21:09 UTC · 274 of 275 readable · 270 fully read · documentation 469/469 current