Gitea Open Source Git Server · Vulnerability
cve-program · CVE-2026-58438
PublishedCross-repository IDOR in issue-dependency removal lets an attacker tamper with and comment on private repos they cannot access
Read the publisher's advisoryeuvd · EUVD-2026-58165
PublishedCross-repository IDOR in issue-dependency removal lets an attacker tamper with and comment on private repos they cannot access
Read the publisher's advisorynvd · CVE-2026-58438
PublishedCross-repository IDOR in issue-dependency removal lets an attacker tamper with and comment on private repos they cannot access
Read the publisher's advisoryosv · GHSA-xv9x-fj9g-vj6h
Published### Details `RemoveDependency` in `routers/web/repo/issue_dependency.go` takes a `removeDependencyID` form parameter identifying the other issue by its global numeric ID, and fetches it with `issues_model.GetIssueByID(ctx, depID)` - no repository or permission check at all. It then calls `issues_model.RemoveIssueDependency(ctx, ctx.Doer, issue, dep, depType)` (`models/issues/dependency.go`), which deletes the dependency join row and then writes a comment referencing the removal, attributed to the calling user, onto the dependency record. The sibling function in the very same file, `AddDependency`, does this correctly when the two issues are in different repos (which `ALLOW_CROSS_REPOSITORY_DEPENDENCIES`, on by default, permits): ```go if issue.RepoID != dep.RepoID { if !setting.Service.AllowCrossRepositoryDependencies { ... } depRepoPerm, err := access_model.GetDoerRepoPermission(ctx, dep.Repo, ctx.Doer) if !depRepoPerm.CanReadIssuesOrPulls(dep.IsPull) { return // you can't see this dependency } } ``` `RemoveDependency` has no equivalent block at all - it goes straight from resolving `dep` by ID to deleting the link, regardless of which repo `dep` lives in or whether the caller can see it. I confirmed this same code is present in the current latest release, v1.26.4. ### PoC Prerequisites: an account with write access to issues on some repo `ownerA/repoA`, and the global numeric issue ID of an issue in a private repo `repoB` that is (or was) legitimately dependency-linked to one of the attacker's issues in `repoA` (cross-repo dependencies are commonly used between related public/private repos, and `ALLOW_CROSS_REPOSITORY_DEPENDENCIES` defaults to enabled). ```bash curl -s -b "gitea_session=$ATTACKER_SESSION_COOKIE" -X POST \ --data-urlencode "removeDependencyID=<repoB_issue_global_id>" \ --data-urlencode "dependencyType=blockedBy" \ "https://TARGET_HOST/ownerA/repoA/issues/N/dependency/delete" # Expected: the dependency link is deleted and a "removed dependency" comment # authored by the attacker is added to the repoB issue, even though the # attacker has no read access to repoB. ``` ### Impact This is a cross-repository IDOR / broken access control issue. An attacker can tamper with issue-tracking state (dependency relationships) and inject an attacker-authored comment into a private repository they cannot otherwise read or write to, crossing a trust boundary the "add" path explicitly enforces. Impact is bounded - it requires an existing dependency link and discloses no repository content - but it is a genuine unauthorized-write primitive across a private-repo boundary. ### Fix Add the same cross-repo permission check used in `AddDependency` (`access_model.GetDoerRepoPermission(ctx, dep.Repo, ctx.Doer).CanReadIssuesOrPulls(dep.IsPull)`) to `RemoveDependency` before allowing the deletion to proceed when `issue.RepoID != dep.RepoID`. **If possible, please apply for a CVE number when publishing. I would greatly appreciate it.**
Read the publisher's advisoryosv · GO-2026-6085
PublishedGitea: Cross-repository IDOR in issue-dependency removal lets an attacker tamper with and comment on private repos they cannot access in gitea.dev
Read the publisher's advisoryAffected versions, risk and source history
Exploitation and risk
Source statusCISA KEV lists vulnerabilities known to be exploited. FIRST EPSS estimates the likelihood of exploitation in the next 30 days. An unavailable score does not mean zero risk.
Which CVEs have scores here?
This view includes predictions for CVE identifiers explicitly listed in public NuGet advisories. Microsoft release pages have their own prediction coverage. Check source status for the scope and latest checks.
No exploitation or prediction data is available here for these CVEs. This does not mean they are safe or unlikely to be exploited.
cve-program · CVE-2026-58438
PublishedCross-repository IDOR in issue-dependency removal lets an attacker tamper with and comment on private repos they cannot access
Cross-repository IDOR in issue-dependency removal lets an attacker tamper with and comment on private repos they cannot access
- Source published
- 13 Aug 2026 16:44:53 UTC
- Source modified
- 14 Aug 2026 20:03:20 UTC
- Saved here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
euvd · EUVD-2026-58165
PublishedCross-repository IDOR in issue-dependency removal lets an attacker tamper with and comment on private repos they cannot access
Cross-repository IDOR in issue-dependency removal lets an attacker tamper with and comment on private repos they cannot access
Additional publisher context
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Aug 13, 2026, 4:44:53 PM
dateUpdated: Aug 14, 2026, 8:03:20 PM
1 related source bulletins · separate from aliases
WID-SEC-W-2026-2304: Gitea: Mehrere Schwachstellen
CVE-2026-58417 · CVE-2026-58420 · CVE-2026-58425 · CVE-2026-58427 · CVE-2026-58428 · CVE-2026-58429 · CVE-2026-58431 · CVE-2026-58432 · CVE-2026-58433 · CVE-2026-58434 · CVE-2026-58435 · CVE-2026-58436 · CVE-2026-58437 · CVE-2026-58438 · CVE-2026-58439 · CVE-2026-58440 · CVE-2026-58441 · CVE-2026-58442 · CVE-2026-58443 · CVE-2026-58444 · CVE-2026-58445 · CVE-2026-58507 · CVE-2026-58508 · CVE-2026-58510 · CVE-2026-58511 · CVE-2026-59763 · CVE-2026-59765 · CVE-2026-59766 · CVE-2026-23603 · CVE-2026-42931 · CVE-2026-50105 · CVE-2026-54481 · CVE-2026-55982 · CVE-2026-55984 · CVE-2026-55986 · CVE-2026-55987 · CVE-2026-56443 · CVE-2026-56654 · CVE-2026-56657 · CVE-2026-56750 · CVE-2026-56755 · CVE-2026-57886 · CVE-2026-57894 · CVE-2026-57897 · CVE-2026-58314 · CVE-2026-58416
- Source published
- Aug 13, 2026, 4:44:53 PM (timezone not stated)
- Source modified
- Aug 14, 2026, 8:03:20 PM (timezone not stated)
- Saved here
- 19 Nov 2026 17:49:28 UTC
- Source terms
- ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
nvd · CVE-2026-58438
PublishedCross-repository IDOR in issue-dependency removal lets an attacker tamper with and comment on private repos they cannot access
Cross-repository IDOR in issue-dependency removal lets an attacker tamper with and comment on private repos they cannot access
Additional publisher context
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-862
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-08-13T17:17:27.807
lastModified: 2026-08-26T16:53:48.300
- Source published
- 13 Aug 2026 17:17:27 UTC
- Source modified
- 26 Aug 2026 16:53:48 UTC
- Saved here
- 25 Oct 2026 14:19:16 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 3.1 · 134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0 · Secondary · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
osv · GHSA-xv9x-fj9g-vj6h
PublishedGitea: Cross-repository IDOR in issue-dependency removal lets an attacker tamper with and comment on private repos they cannot access
### Details `RemoveDependency` in `routers/web/repo/issue_dependency.go` takes a `removeDependencyID` form parameter identifying the other issue by its global numeric ID, and fetches it with `issues_model.GetIssueByID(ctx, depID)` - no repository or permission check at all. It then calls `issues_model.RemoveIssueDependency(ctx, ctx.Doer, issue, dep, depType)` (`models/issues/dependency.go`), which deletes the dependency join row and then writes a comment referencing the removal, attributed to the calling user, onto the dependency record. The sibling function in the very same file, `AddDependency`, does this correctly when the two issues are in different repos (which `ALLOW_CROSS_REPOSITORY_DEPENDENCIES`, on by default, permits): ```go if issue.RepoID != dep.RepoID { if !setting.Service.AllowCrossRepositoryDependencies { ... } depRepoPerm, err := access_model.GetDoerRepoPermission(ctx, dep.Repo, ctx.Doer) if !depRepoPerm.CanReadIssuesOrPulls(dep.IsPull) { return // you can't see this dependency } } ``` `RemoveDependency` has no equivalent block at all - it goes straight from resolving `dep` by ID to deleting the link, regardless of which repo `dep` lives in or whether the caller can see it. I confirmed this same code is present in the current latest release, v1.26.4. ### PoC Prerequisites: an account with write access to issues on some repo `ownerA/repoA`, and the global numeric issue ID of an issue in a private repo `repoB` that is (or was) legitimately dependency-linked to one of the attacker's issues in `repoA` (cross-repo dependencies are commonly used between related public/private repos, and `ALLOW_CROSS_REPOSITORY_DEPENDENCIES` defaults to enabled). ```bash curl -s -b "gitea_session=$ATTACKER_SESSION_COOKIE" -X POST \ --data-urlencode "removeDependencyID=<repoB_issue_global_id>" \ --data-urlencode "dependencyType=blockedBy" \ "https://TARGET_HOST/ownerA/repoA/issues/N/dependency/delete" # Expected: the dependency link is deleted and a "removed dependency" comment # authored by the attacker is added to the repoB issue, even though the # attacker has no read access to repoB. ``` ### Impact This is a cross-repository IDOR / broken access control issue. An attacker can tamper with issue-tracking state (dependency relationships) and inject an attacker-authored comment into a private repository they cannot otherwise read or write to, crossing a trust boundary the "add" path explicitly enforces. Impact is bounded - it requires an existing dependency link and discloses no repository content - but it is a genuine unauthorized-write primitive across a private-repo boundary. ### Fix Add the same cross-repo permission check used in `AddDependency` (`access_model.GetDoerRepoPermission(ctx, dep.Repo, ctx.Doer).CanReadIssuesOrPulls(dep.IsPull)`) to `RemoveDependency` before allowing the deletion to proceed when `issue.RepoID != dep.RepoID`. **If possible, please apply for a CVE number when publishing. I would greatly appreciate it.**
- Source published
- 21 Jul 2026 20:36:59 UTC
- Source modified
- 27 Jul 2026 17:11:41 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N
Publisher rating · LOW
osv · GO-2026-6085
PublishedGitea: Cross-repository IDOR in issue-dependency removal lets an attacker tamper with and comment on private repos they cannot access in gitea.dev
Gitea: Cross-repository IDOR in issue-dependency removal lets an attacker tamper with and comment on private repos they cannot access in gitea.dev
- Source published
- 27 Jul 2026 15:32:45 UTC
- Source modified
- 27 Jul 2026 17:00:26 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.