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better-auth before 1.6.2 OAuth State Validation Bypass

CVSS 4.0 6.0 MEDIUMCVSS 3.1 5.3 MEDIUMEUVD CVSS 4.0 6.0 CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary 6.0 MEDIUMCVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 5.3 MEDIUMCVSS_V3 Publisher rating MODERATEFixed by better-auth 1.6.2KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-67335

Published

better-auth versions before 1.6.2 fail to validate the OAuth state parameter against the stored nonce when using cookie-backed state storage without PKCE. Attackers can forge the state parameter and supply an attacker-controlled authorization code to create authenticated sessions bound to the attacker's external identity or persistently link attacker accounts to victim profiles.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2026-51852

Published

better-auth versions before 1.6.2 fail to validate the OAuth state parameter against the stored nonce when using cookie-backed state storage without PKCE. Attackers can forge the state parameter and supply an attacker-controlled authorization code to create authenticated sessions bound to the attacker's external identity or persistently link attacker accounts to victim profiles.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-67335

Published

better-auth versions before 1.6.2 fail to validate the OAuth state parameter against the stored nonce when using cookie-backed state storage without PKCE. Attackers can forge the state parameter and supply an attacker-controlled authorization code to create authenticated sessions bound to the attacker's external identity or persistently link attacker accounts to victim profiles.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-wxw3-q3m9-c3jr

Published

### Am I affected? Users are affected if all of the following are true: - The application uses `better-auth` at a version below `1.6.2` (or `@better-auth/sso` paired with such a version). - `betterAuth({ account: { storeStateStrategy } })` is set to `"cookie"`. The default `"database"` is not affected. - The application wires at least one OAuth provider through `genericOAuth({ config })` with `pkce: false`, or it supplies a custom `getToken` or `tokenUrl` that does not require the stored `codeVerifier`. Stock social providers with PKCE on are not affected. - The provider returns arbitrary `code` values to the configured callback URL. If users are on `[email protected]` or later, they are not affected. Fix: 1. Upgrade to `[email protected]` or later (current stable is `1.6.10`). 2. If users cannot upgrade, see workarounds below. ### Summary In `parseGenericState`, the cookie branch decrypted the `oauth_state` cookie and validated expiry, but did not compare the incoming OAuth `state` query parameter to the nonce that `generateGenericState` issued at sign-in. Any callback to `/api/auth/oauth2/callback/<providerId>` that arrived with a forged `state` and any `code` was therefore accepted as long as the browser still held a live `oauth_state` cookie. With `pkce: false` (or any `getToken` path that does not enforce a code-verifier round-trip), an attacker who forced the victim to deliver an attacker-controlled authorization code to the callback would mint a session bound to the attacker's external identity in the victim's browser. Account-linking flows behaved the same way, binding the attacker's external account to an authenticated victim row. ### Details The cookie branch of `parseGenericState` did not compare the cookie's stored nonce to the incoming `state` parameter. The database branch (the default) was not affected because the verification row is keyed by `state` and the lookup itself enforces equality. The fix re-binds the cookie to the nonce: `generateGenericState` writes `oauthState: state` into the encrypted payload before storage, and `parseGenericState` rejects when `parsedData.oauthState !== state`. The same primitive covers every caller (`generic-oauth`, social, account-link, oauth-proxy passthrough, OIDC SSO, SAML relay state). ### Patches Fixed in `[email protected]` via [PR #8949](https://github.com/better-auth/better-auth/pull/8949) (commit `9deb7936a`, merged 2026-04-09). The cookie branch of `parseGenericState` now rejects when the encrypted payload's nonce does not match the incoming `state` parameter; the database branch gained a defense-in-depth equality check. ### Workarounds If users cannot upgrade immediately: - **Switch `storeStateStrategy` back to `"database"`** (the default). This closes the cookie-only bypass without a code change. - **Enable `pkce: true`** on every affected `genericOAuth` provider. The `codeVerifier` is the missing primitive that the attacker cannot supply. ### Impact - **Forced-login (CSRF on OAuth callback)**: the attacker forces the victim's browser into an authenticated session bound to the attacker's external identity, allowing the attacker to observe the victim's actions inside the application. - **Persistent account linking**: account-link flows bind the attacker's external account to the victim's authenticated row, granting persistent access until the link is removed. ### Credit Reported by @Jvr2022 via private advisory disclosure, and by @alavesa (PatchPilots audit) via the public duplicate [issue #8897](https://github.com/better-auth/better-auth/issues/8897). ### Resources - [CWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/352.html) - [CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/345.html) - [CWE-287: Improper Authentication](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/287.html) - [RFC 6749 §10.12: Cross-Site Request Forgery](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6749#section-10.12) - [RFC 7636: Proof Key for Code Exchange](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7636)

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

Exploitation and risk

Source status

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cve-program · CVE-2026-67335

Published

better-auth before 1.6.2 OAuth State Validation Bypass

better-auth versions before 1.6.2 fail to validate the OAuth state parameter against the stored nonce when using cookie-backed state storage without PKCE. Attackers can forge the state parameter and supply an attacker-controlled authorization code to create authenticated sessions bound to the attacker's external identity or persistently link attacker accounts to victim profiles.

Source published
1 Aug 2026 12:22:17 UTC
Source modified
3 Aug 2026 15:38:08 UTC
Saved here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 4.0 · 6.0 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

CVSS 3.1 · 5.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

euvd · EUVD-2026-51852

Published

better-auth versions before 1.6.2 fail to validate the OAuth state parameter against the stored nonce when using cookie-backed state storage without PKCE. Attackers can forge the state parameter and supply an attacker-controlled authorizati…

better-auth versions before 1.6.2 fail to validate the OAuth state parameter against the stored nonce when using cookie-backed state storage without PKCE. Attackers can forge the state parameter and supply an attacker-controlled authorization code to create authenticated sessions bound to the attacker's external identity or persistently link attacker accounts to victim profiles.

Additional publisher context

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Aug 1, 2026, 12:22:17 PM

dateUpdated: Aug 3, 2026, 3:38:08 PM

Source published
Aug 1, 2026, 12:22:17 PM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Aug 3, 2026, 3:38:08 PM (timezone not stated)
Saved here
17 Nov 2026 17:42:30 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

EUVD CVSS 4.0 · 6.0 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

nvd · CVE-2026-67335

Published

better-auth versions before 1.6.2 fail to validate the OAuth state parameter against the stored nonce when using cookie-backed state storage without PKCE. Attackers can forge the state parameter and supply an attacker-controlled authorizati…

better-auth versions before 1.6.2 fail to validate the OAuth state parameter against the stored nonce when using cookie-backed state storage without PKCE. Attackers can forge the state parameter and supply an attacker-controlled authorization code to create authenticated sessions bound to the attacker's external identity or persistently link attacker accounts to victim profiles.

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-287

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-08-01T13:17:04.403

lastModified: 2026-09-08T20:34:34.997

Source published
1 Aug 2026 13:17:04 UTC
Source modified
8 Sep 2026 20:34:34 UTC
Saved here
25 Oct 2026 15:18:51 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 6.0 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 5.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

osv · GHSA-wxw3-q3m9-c3jr

Published

Better Auth: OAuth callback accepts mismatched `state` when cookie-backed state storage is used without PKCE

### Am I affected? Users are affected if all of the following are true: - The application uses `better-auth` at a version below `1.6.2` (or `@better-auth/sso` paired with such a version). - `betterAuth({ account: { storeStateStrategy } })` is set to `"cookie"`. The default `"database"` is not affected. - The application wires at least one OAuth provider through `genericOAuth({ config })` with `pkce: false`, or it supplies a custom `getToken` or `tokenUrl` that does not require the stored `codeVerifier`. Stock social providers with PKCE on are not affected. - The provider returns arbitrary `code` values to the configured callback URL. If users are on `[email protected]` or later, they are not affected. Fix: 1. Upgrade to `[email protected]` or later (current stable is `1.6.10`). 2. If users cannot upgrade, see workarounds below. ### Summary In `parseGenericState`, the cookie branch decrypted the `oauth_state` cookie and validated expiry, but did not compare the incoming OAuth `state` query parameter to the nonce that `generateGenericState` issued at sign-in. Any callback to `/api/auth/oauth2/callback/<providerId>` that arrived with a forged `state` and any `code` was therefore accepted as long as the browser still held a live `oauth_state` cookie. With `pkce: false` (or any `getToken` path that does not enforce a code-verifier round-trip), an attacker who forced the victim to deliver an attacker-controlled authorization code to the callback would mint a session bound to the attacker's external identity in the victim's browser. Account-linking flows behaved the same way, binding the attacker's external account to an authenticated victim row. ### Details The cookie branch of `parseGenericState` did not compare the cookie's stored nonce to the incoming `state` parameter. The database branch (the default) was not affected because the verification row is keyed by `state` and the lookup itself enforces equality. The fix re-binds the cookie to the nonce: `generateGenericState` writes `oauthState: state` into the encrypted payload before storage, and `parseGenericState` rejects when `parsedData.oauthState !== state`. The same primitive covers every caller (`generic-oauth`, social, account-link, oauth-proxy passthrough, OIDC SSO, SAML relay state). ### Patches Fixed in `[email protected]` via [PR #8949](https://github.com/better-auth/better-auth/pull/8949) (commit `9deb7936a`, merged 2026-04-09). The cookie branch of `parseGenericState` now rejects when the encrypted payload's nonce does not match the incoming `state` parameter; the database branch gained a defense-in-depth equality check. ### Workarounds If users cannot upgrade immediately: - **Switch `storeStateStrategy` back to `"database"`** (the default). This closes the cookie-only bypass without a code change. - **Enable `pkce: true`** on every affected `genericOAuth` provider. The `codeVerifier` is the missing primitive that the attacker cannot supply. ### Impact - **Forced-login (CSRF on OAuth callback)**: the attacker forces the victim's browser into an authenticated session bound to the attacker's external identity, allowing the attacker to observe the victim's actions inside the application. - **Persistent account linking**: account-link flows bind the attacker's external account to the victim's authenticated row, granting persistent access until the link is removed. ### Credit Reported by @Jvr2022 via private advisory disclosure, and by @alavesa (PatchPilots audit) via the public duplicate [issue #8897](https://github.com/better-auth/better-auth/issues/8897). ### Resources - [CWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/352.html) - [CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/345.html) - [CWE-287: Improper Authentication](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/287.html) - [RFC 6749 §10.12: Cross-Site Request Forgery](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6749#section-10.12) - [RFC 7636: Proof Key for Code Exchange](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7636)

Source published
15 May 2026 17:33:40 UTC
Source modified
2 Aug 2026 03:56:45 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

Publisher rating · MODERATE

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 19 Nov 09:03 UTC · 273 of 275 readable · 269 fully read · documentation 469/469 current