Ech0 before 4.4.3 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in the validateWebhookURL function (webhook_setting_service.go), which only validates literal IP addresses via net.ParseIP() and fails to reject hostnames that DNS-resolve to private or internal IPs (e.g., 169.254.169.254.nip.io). An attacker with admin privileges can create a webhook with such a hostname to bypass validation and cause the server to make requests to internal services, cloud metadata endpoints, and private network resources. The issue is fixed in 4.4.3.
Ech0 before 4.4.3 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in the validateWebhookURL function (webhook_setting_service.go), which only validates literal IP addresses via net.ParseIP() and fails to reject hostnames that DNS-resolve to private or internal IPs (e.g., 169.254.169.254.nip.io). An attacker with admin privileges can create a webhook with such a hostname to bypass validation and cause the server to make requests to internal services, cloud metadata endpoints, and private network resources. The issue is fixed in 4.4.3.
Ech0 before 4.4.3 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in the validateWebhookURL function (webhook_setting_service.go), which only validates literal IP addresses via net.ParseIP() and fails to reject hostnames that DNS-resolve to private or internal IPs (e.g., 169.254.169.254.nip.io). An attacker with admin privileges can create a webhook with such a hostname to bypass validation and cause the server to make requests to internal services, cloud metadata endpoints, and private network resources. The issue is fixed in 4.4.3.
## Summary
The `validateWebhookURL` function in `webhook_setting_service.go` attempts to block webhooks targeting private/internal IP addresses, but only checks literal IP strings via `net.ParseIP()`. Hostnames that DNS-resolve to private IPs (e.g., `169.254.169.254.nip.io`, `10.0.0.1.nip.io`) bypass all checks, allowing an admin to create webhooks that make server-side requests to internal network services and cloud metadata endpoints.
## Details
The vulnerability is in `validateWebhookURL` (`internal/service/setting/webhook_setting_service.go:180-199`):
```go
func validateWebhookURL(rawURL string) error {
parsed, err := url.Parse(rawURL)
// ...
host := strings.ToLower(parsed.Hostname())
if host == "" || host == "localhost" || strings.HasSuffix(host, ".local") {
return errors.New(commonModel.INVALID_WEBHOOK_URL)
}
if ip := net.ParseIP(host); ip != nil { // <-- returns nil for hostnames
if ip.IsLoopback() || ip.IsPrivate() || ip.IsLinkLocalMulticast() ||
ip.IsLinkLocalUnicast() || ip.IsUnspecified() {
return errors.New(commonModel.INVALID_WEBHOOK_URL)
}
}
return nil // hostname passes all checks unchecked
}
```
`net.ParseIP("169.254.169.254.nip.io")` returns `nil` because it is not a literal IP address. The entire private IP check block is skipped, and the function returns `nil` (valid).
Both HTTP clients that execute webhook requests use standard `http.Client` / `http.Transport` with no custom `DialContext` to verify resolved IPs:
- **TestWebhook** (`webhook_setting_service.go:169`): `&http.Client{Timeout: 5 * time.Second}`
- **Dispatcher** (`dispatcher.go:51-58`): `&http.Client{...Transport: &http.Transport{...}}` — no custom dialer
The `Dispatcher.HandleObservation` (`dispatcher.go:67-81`) iterates all active webhooks and dispatches without re-validating URLs, so a stored malicious webhook triggers SSRF on every application event.
**Execution flow:**
1. Admin calls POST `/api/webhook` with URL `http://169.254.169.254.nip.io/latest/meta-data/`
2. `CreateWebhook` → `validateWebhookURL` → `net.ParseIP` returns nil → passes validation
3. Webhook stored in database with `is_active: true`
4. On any echo event → `Dispatcher.HandleObservation` → `Dispatch` → `SendWithRetry` → DNS resolves `169.254.169.254.nip.io` to `169.254.169.254` → POST to cloud metadata endpoint
## PoC
```bash
# Step 1: Create a webhook targeting cloud metadata via DNS rebinding
curl -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/webhook \
-H 'Authorization: Bearer <admin-jwt>' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"name":"ssrf-probe","url":"http://169.254.169.254.nip.io/latest/meta-data/","secret":"","is_active":true}'
# Step 2: Trigger SSRF via test endpoint
curl -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/webhook/<webhook-id>/test \
-H 'Authorization: Bearer <admin-jwt>'
# The server makes an HTTP POST to 169.254.169.254 (AWS metadata).
# net.ParseIP("169.254.169.254.nip.io") returns nil, skipping all IP checks.
# Delivery status and error messages reveal connectivity information.
# For internal network scanning:
# http://10.0.0.1.nip.io:8080/
# http://127.0.0.1.nip.io:6379/
# With is_active:true, every application event automatically dispatches
# to the SSRF target via Dispatcher.HandleObservation (no re-validation).
```
## Impact
- **Cloud metadata access:** An admin can reach cloud instance metadata endpoints (AWS `169.254.169.254`, GCP, Azure) to steal IAM credentials, instance identity tokens, and configuration data.
- **Internal network probing:** Webhooks can scan internal services by observing delivery status (`success`/`failed`) and error messages, mapping internal network topology.
- **Persistent SSRF:** Active webhooks fire on every application event via the Dispatcher, creating ongoing SSRF without further admin interaction.
- **Scope escalation:** Impact escapes the application's security boundary to affect internal infrastructure, despite the application explicitly attempting to prevent this.
## Recommended Fix
Replace the hostname-only check with a custom `net.Dialer` that resolves DNS and validates the resolved IP before connecting. Apply this to both HTTP clients:
```go
import "net"
func safeDialContext(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {
host, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
ips, err := net.DefaultResolver.LookupIPAddr(ctx, host)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
for _, ip := range ips {
if ip.IP.IsLoopback() || ip.IP.IsPrivate() || ip.IP.IsLinkLocalUnicast() ||
ip.IP.IsLinkLocalMulticast() || ip.IP.IsUnspecified() {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("resolved IP %s is not allowed", ip.IP)
}
}
dialer := &net.Dialer{Timeout: 5 * time.Second}
return dialer.DialContext(ctx, network, addr)
}
// Use in both TestWebhook and Dispatcher:
client := &http.Client{
Timeout: 5 * time.Second,
Transport: &http.Transport{
DialContext: safeDialContext,
},
}
```
This ensures resolved IPs are checked against the private range blocklist regardless of hostname used.
Ech0 has SSRF via DNS Resolution Bypass in Webhook URL Validation in github.com/lin-snow/ech0.
NOTE: The source advisory for this report contains additional versions that could not be automatically mapped to standard Go module versions.
(If this is causing false-positive reports from vulnerability scanners, please suggest an edit to the report.)
The additional affected modules and versions are: github.com/lin-snow/ech0 before v4.4.3.
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Aug 25, 2026, 11:33:32 AM
dateUpdated: Aug 29, 2026, 11:48:00 AM
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-918
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-08-25T12:16:35.390
lastModified: 2026-08-31T20:50:15.927
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.