CVE-2026-93657

hickory-resolver before 0.26.2 DNSSEC Validation Bypass

CVSS 4.0 8.7 HIGHCVSS 3.1 7.5 HIGHEUVD CVSS 4.0 8.7 CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary 8.7 HIGHCVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 7.5 HIGHCVSS_V3 Publisher rating HIGHFixed by hickory-resolver 0.26.2CVSS_V3 Fixed by hickory-resolver 0.26.2KEV status unknown

Original advisory

cve-program · CVE-2026-93657

Published

hickory-resolver versions before 0.26.2 fail to propagate bogus DNSSEC proof states through the Resolver::lookup() and Resolver::lookup_ip() APIs, allowing invalid records to be returned as successful results. Attackers controlling the answering zone or positioned on the network path can have forged DNS records accepted as validated, bypassing DNSSEC authentication checks.

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euvd · EUVD-2026-82939

Published

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nvd · CVE-2026-93657

Published

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osv · GHSA-5j98-2g5x-46v6

Published

When calling `Resolver::lookup()` or `Resolver::lookup_ip()` on a resolver with DNSSEC validation enabled, both methods return `Ok(...)` if DNSSEC validation fails. It is possible but very inconvenient to check the validation status of individual records. These methods should instead return an error when DNSSEC validation determines a response is bogus.

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osv · RUSTSEC-2026-0514

Published

With DNSSEC validation enabled, `Resolver::lookup()` and `Resolver::lookup_ip()` returned `Ok` with the records even when validation found the response bogus. The result was only visible in each record's proof status, which callers had to inspect themselves. Applications that enable validation and treat a successful lookup as validated data would therefore accept forged or tampered answers from anyone who can answer or modify their DNS traffic. From 0.26.2 a lookup whose records are bogus fails with a "DNSSEC validation failed" error (`DnsError::DnssecBogus`), the error is not retried, and the hickory-server forwarder answers SERVFAIL for it.

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Affected versions, risk and source history

Exploitation and risk

Source status

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Risk history

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Advisory history

13 saved versions

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12 Nov 2026 15:18:33 UTC

hickory-resolver: Resolver::lookup() and Resolver::lookup_ip() APIs obscure DNSSEC validation failures

osv · GHSA-5j98-2g5x-46v6 · Published

12 Nov 2026 15:18:33 UTC