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hickory-resolver before 0.26.2 DNSSEC Validation Bypass

CVSS 4.0 8.7 HIGHCVSS 3.1 7.5 HIGHEUVD CVSS 4.0 8.7 CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary 8.7 HIGHCVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 7.5 HIGHCVSS_V3 Publisher rating HIGHFixed by hickory-resolver 0.26.2CVSS_V3 Fixed by hickory-resolver 0.26.2KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-93657

Published

hickory-resolver versions before 0.26.2 fail to propagate bogus DNSSEC proof states through the Resolver::lookup() and Resolver::lookup_ip() APIs, allowing invalid records to be returned as successful results. Attackers controlling the answering zone or positioned on the network path can have forged DNS records accepted as validated, bypassing DNSSEC authentication checks.

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euvd · EUVD-2026-82939

Published

hickory-resolver versions before 0.26.2 fail to propagate bogus DNSSEC proof states through the Resolver::lookup() and Resolver::lookup_ip() APIs, allowing invalid records to be returned as successful results. Attackers controlling the answering zone or positioned on the network path can have forged DNS records accepted as validated, bypassing DNSSEC authentication checks.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-93657

Published

hickory-resolver versions before 0.26.2 fail to propagate bogus DNSSEC proof states through the Resolver::lookup() and Resolver::lookup_ip() APIs, allowing invalid records to be returned as successful results. Attackers controlling the answering zone or positioned on the network path can have forged DNS records accepted as validated, bypassing DNSSEC authentication checks.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-5j98-2g5x-46v6

Published

When calling `Resolver::lookup()` or `Resolver::lookup_ip()` on a resolver with DNSSEC validation enabled, both methods return `Ok(...)` if DNSSEC validation fails. It is possible but very inconvenient to check the validation status of individual records. These methods should instead return an error when DNSSEC validation determines a response is bogus.

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osv · RUSTSEC-2026-0514

Published

With DNSSEC validation enabled, `Resolver::lookup()` and `Resolver::lookup_ip()` returned `Ok` with the records even when validation found the response bogus. The result was only visible in each record's proof status, which callers had to inspect themselves. Applications that enable validation and treat a successful lookup as validated data would therefore accept forged or tampered answers from anyone who can answer or modify their DNS traffic. From 0.26.2 a lookup whose records are bogus fails with a "DNSSEC validation failed" error (`DnsError::DnssecBogus`), the error is not retried, and the hickory-server forwarder answers SERVFAIL for it.

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Affected versions, risk and source history

Related advisories and sources

Publishers link these advisories through the identifiers shown below. A shared identifier or date alone does not tell you whether your software is affected or whether the advisories describe the same cause.

CVE-2026-93657 · CVE overview and exploitation status

EUVD-2026-82939

GHSA-884w-h442-q7ph

GHSA-5j98-2g5x-46v6

RUSTSEC-2026-0514

cve-program · CVE-2026-93657

euvd · EUVD-2026-82939

nvd · CVE-2026-93657

osv · GHSA-5j98-2g5x-46v6

osv · RUSTSEC-2026-0514

Related changes

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