undici vulnerable to HTTP header injection via Set-Cookie percent-decoding

Impact: undici's cookie parser in parseSetCookie percent-decodes cookie values via qsUnescape, turning encoded sequences like %0D%0A, %00, %3B, and %3D into their literal byte equivalents. RFC 6265 §5.4 does not specify any decoding and browsers do not decode either. Applications that parse a Set-Cookie header and then forward the parsed value into a response header (proxies, middleware, SSR frameworks) become vulnerable to HTTP response header injection: an attacker-controlled upstream can inject arbitrary Set-Cookie, Location, or Cache-Control headers into the application's downstream response, enabling session fixation, open redirect, or cache poisoning. Affected applications are those that use undici's cookie parsing (parseSetCookie, parseCookie, getSetCookies) and forward the parsed cookie value into a response header. This was introduced in undici 7.0.0 via PR #3789. Patches: Upgrade to undici v6.26.0, v7.28.0 or v8.5.0. Workarounds: If upgrade is not immediately possible, do not forward values returned by parseSetCookie/parseCookie/getSetCookies directly into response headers; sanitize the value first to strip or reject CR, LF, NUL, ;, and = bytes.

Impact: undici's cookie parser in parseSetCookie percent-decodes cookie values via qsUnescape, turning encoded sequences like %0D%0A, %00, %3B, and %3D into their literal byte equivalents. RFC 6265 §5.4 does not specify any decoding and browsers do not decode either. Applications that parse a Set-Cookie header and then forward the parsed value into a response header (proxies, middleware, SSR frameworks) become vulnerable to HTTP response header injection: an attacker-controlled upstream can inject arbitrary Set-Cookie, Location, or Cache-Control headers into the application's downstream response, enabling session fixation, open redirect, or cache poisoning. Affected applications are those that use undici's cookie parsing (parseSetCookie, parseCookie, getSetCookies) and forward the parsed cookie value into a response header. This was introduced in undici 7.0.0 via PR #3789. Patches: Upgrade to undici v6.26.0, v7.28.0 or v8.5.0. Workarounds: If upgrade is not immediately possible, do not forward values returned by parseSetCookie/parseCookie/getSetCookies directly into response headers; sanitize the value first to strip or reject CR, LF, NUL, ;, and = bytes.

Impact: undici's cookie parser in parseSetCookie percent-decodes cookie values via qsUnescape, turning encoded sequences like %0D%0A, %00, %3B, and %3D into their literal byte equivalents. RFC 6265 §5.4 does not specify any decoding and browsers do not decode either. Applications that parse a Set-Cookie header and then forward the parsed value into a response header (proxies, middleware, SSR frameworks) become vulnerable to HTTP response header injection: an attacker-controlled upstream can inject arbitrary Set-Cookie, Location, or Cache-Control headers into the application's downstream response, enabling session fixation, open redirect, or cache poisoning. Affected applications are those that use undici's cookie parsing (parseSetCookie, parseCookie, getSetCookies) and forward the parsed cookie value into a response header. This was introduced in undici 7.0.0 via PR #3789. Patches: Upgrade to undici v6.26.0, v7.28.0 or v8.5.0. Workarounds: If upgrade is not immediately possible, do not forward values returned by parseSetCookie/parseCookie/getSetCookies directly into response headers; sanitize the value first to strip or reject CR, LF, NUL, ;, and = bytes.

## Impact undici's cookie parser in `parseSetCookie` percent-decodes cookie values via `qsUnescape`, turning encoded sequences like `%0D%0A`, `%00`, `%3B`, and `%3D` into their literal byte equivalents. RFC 6265 §5.4 does not specify any decoding and browsers do not decode either. Applications that parse a `Set-Cookie` header and then forward the parsed value into a response header (proxies, middleware, SSR frameworks) become vulnerable to HTTP response header injection: an attacker-controlled upstream can inject arbitrary `Set-Cookie`, `Location`, or `Cache-Control` headers into the application's downstream response, enabling session fixation, open redirect, or cache poisoning. Affected applications are those that use undici's cookie parsing (`parseSetCookie`, `parseCookie`, `getSetCookies`) and forward the parsed cookie value into a response header. This was introduced in undici 7.0.0 via [#3789](https://github.com/nodejs/undici/pull/3789). ## Patches Upgrade to undici v6.27.0, v7.28.0 or v8.5.0. ## Workarounds If upgrade is not immediately possible, do not forward values returned by `parseSetCookie`/`parseCookie`/`getSetCookies` directly into response headers; sanitize the value first to strip or reject CR, LF, NUL, `;`, and `=` bytes.