netfilter: ip6t_rt: fix zero-address non-strict match out-of-bounds read
Assessment
- Severity
- Moderate
- CVSS base score
- 5.1CVSS:3.1/
AV:L/ AC:L/ PR:H/ UI:N/ S:U/ C:L/ I:N/ A:H - Impact
- Not stated
- EPSS, next 30 days
- Not scored yet
- Public exploit code
- No Nuclei template lists it
- Exploitability
- Not assessed
- Publicly disclosed
- No
- Customer action
- Required: apply the update
- Component
- Mariner
- Weakness
- —
- Issued by
- Linux
- Published
- 20 Oct 2026 · October 2026
- Last revised
- 24 Oct 2026Information published.
- Attack vector
- LocalAV:L
- Attack complexity
- LowAC:L
- Privileges required
- HighPR:H
- User interaction
- NoneUI:N
- Scope
- UnchangedS:U
- Confidentiality
- LowC:L
- Integrity
- NoneI:N
- Availability
- HighA:H
Updates that fix it
0 KBsNo KB listed
MSRC lists no downloadable update, which usually means a service-side fix or a release-notes update. Check the MSRC advisory.
Affected products
1 affected product
- azl3 kernel 6.6.157.1-1 on Azure Linux 3.0
What changed
First observed 20 Oct 2026- 25 Oct 2026 · 07:41:18 UTC Last revised21 Oct 2026 18:34 UTC → 24 Oct 2026 14:50 UTC
- 23 Oct 2026 · 09:33:49 UTC Public exploit codeUnknown: exploit-code evidence is incomplete or retained → No Nuclei template listed
- 23 Oct 2026 · 09:33:49 UTC CISA KEVUnknown: catalog evidence is incomplete or retained → Not listed in the collected catalog
- 23 Oct 2026 · 09:33:49 UTC Source coverage: public-exploit-codeIncomplete → Current
- 23 Oct 2026 · 09:33:49 UTC Source coverage: first-epssIncomplete → Current
- 23 Oct 2026 · 09:33:49 UTC Source coverage: cisa-kevIncomplete → Current
- 23 Oct 2026 · 09:33:49 UTC Source coverage: msrc-cvrfIncomplete → Current
- 23 Oct 2026 · 08:31:50 UTC Public exploit codeNo Nuclei template listed → Unknown: exploit-code evidence is incomplete or retained
- 23 Oct 2026 · 08:31:50 UTC CISA KEVNot listed in the collected catalog → Unknown: catalog evidence is incomplete or retained
- 23 Oct 2026 · 08:31:50 UTC Source coverage: public-exploit-codeCurrent → Incomplete
- 23 Oct 2026 · 08:31:50 UTC Source coverage: first-epssCurrent → Incomplete
- 23 Oct 2026 · 08:31:50 UTC Source coverage: cisa-kevCurrent → Incomplete
Show 2 more recent changes
- 23 Oct 2026 · 08:31:50 UTCSource coverage: msrc-cvrf Current → Incomplete
- 21 Oct 2026 · 20:45:25 UTCLast revised 20 Oct 2026 01:03 UTC → 21 Oct 2026 18:34 UTC
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Explore global source statements, affected packages and advisory history for CVE-2026-98485. The catalog has a separate collection scope from Microsoft release records.
Collected exploitation and prediction evidence
Risk source coverageCISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.
No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.
cve-program · CVE-2026-98485
Publishednetfilter: ip6t_rt: fix zero-address non-strict match out-of-bounds read
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: ip6t_rt: fix zero-address non-strict match out-of-bounds read rt_mt6_check() permits rules to be configured with rtinfo->addrnr == 0 even when address matching (IP6T_RT_FST_MASK) is requested. In the IP6T_RT_FST_NSTRICT path, rt_mt6() evaluates packet routing addresses against rtinfo->addrs[i] and terminates backwards at the bottom of the loop: if (ipv6_addr_equal(ap, &rtinfo->addrs[i])) { i++; } if (i == rtinfo->addrnr) break; When addrnr is 0, if the first packet address matches rtinfo->addrs[0], i is incremented to 1. Because i is now strictly greater than addrnr (0), the loop termination condition (i == rtinfo->addrnr) is bypassed and will never be satisfied. If a crafted IPv6 packet contains matching routing addresses, i will advance past IP6T_RT_HOPS (16). The subsequent call to ipv6_addr_equal() reads beyond struct ip6t_rt, triggering UBSAN/KASAN out-of-bounds warnings or kernel panics. Fix this by: 1. Rejecting rules in rt_mt6_check() where IP6T_RT_FST_MASK is set but rtinfo->addrnr is zero. 2. In rt_mt6(), moving the termination condition (i < rtinfo->addrnr) into the for-loop header condition and removing the backwards break at the end of the loop body.
- Source published
- 18 Oct 2026 15:16:00 UTC
- Source modified
- 24 Oct 2026 14:09:02 UTC
- Observed here
- 24 Oct 2026 16:17:04 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
CVSS 3.1 · 7.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H