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Denial of service in quinn-proto when using `Endpoint::retry()`

CVSS 3.1 7.5 HIGHEUVD CVSS 3.1 7.5 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 7.5 HIGHCVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary 7.5 HIGHCVSS_V3 CVSS_V4 Publisher rating HIGHFixed by quinn-proto 0.11.7CVSS_V3 Fixed by quinn-proto 0.11.7KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2024-45311

Published

Quinn is a pure-Rust, async-compatible implementation of the IETF QUIC transport protocol. As of quinn-proto 0.11, it is possible for a server to `accept()`, `retry()`, `refuse()`, or `ignore()` an `Incoming` connection. However, calling `retry()` on an unvalidated connection exposes the server to a likely panic in the following situations: 1. Calling `refuse` or `ignore` on the resulting validated connection, if a duplicate initial packet is received. This issue can go undetected until a server's `refuse()`/`ignore()` code path is exercised, such as to stop a denial of service attack. 2. Accepting when the initial packet for the resulting validated connection fails to decrypt or exhausts connection IDs, if a similar initial packet that successfully decrypts and doesn't exhaust connection IDs is received. This issue can go undetected if clients are well-behaved. The former situation was observed in a real application, while the latter is only theoretical.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2024-2878

Published

Quinn is a pure-Rust, async-compatible implementation of the IETF QUIC transport protocol. As of quinn-proto 0.11, it is possible for a server to `accept()`, `retry()`, `refuse()`, or `ignore()` an `Incoming` connection. However, calling `retry()` on an unvalidated connection exposes the server to a likely panic in the following situations: 1. Calling `refuse` or `ignore` on the resulting validated connection, if a duplicate initial packet is received. This issue can go undetected until a server's `refuse()`/`ignore()` code path is exercised, such as to stop a denial of service attack. 2. Accepting when the initial packet for the resulting validated connection fails to decrypt or exhausts connection IDs, if a similar initial packet that successfully decrypts and doesn't exhaust connection IDs is received. This issue can go undetected if clients are well-behaved. The former situation was observed in a real application, while the latter is only theoretical.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2024-45311

Published

Quinn is a pure-Rust, async-compatible implementation of the IETF QUIC transport protocol. As of quinn-proto 0.11, it is possible for a server to `accept()`, `retry()`, `refuse()`, or `ignore()` an `Incoming` connection. However, calling `retry()` on an unvalidated connection exposes the server to a likely panic in the following situations: 1. Calling `refuse` or `ignore` on the resulting validated connection, if a duplicate initial packet is received. This issue can go undetected until a server's `refuse()`/`ignore()` code path is exercised, such as to stop a denial of service attack. 2. Accepting when the initial packet for the resulting validated connection fails to decrypt or exhausts connection IDs, if a similar initial packet that successfully decrypts and doesn't exhaust connection IDs is received. This issue can go undetected if clients are well-behaved. The former situation was observed in a real application, while the latter is only theoretical.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-vr26-jcq5-fjj8

Published

### Summary As of quinn-proto 0.11, it is possible for a server to `accept()`, `retry()`, `refuse()`, or `ignore()` an `Incoming` connection. However, calling `retry()` on an unvalidated connection exposes the server to a likely panic in the following situations: - Calling `refuse` or `ignore` on the resulting validated connection, if a duplicate initial packet is received - This issue can go undetected until a server's `refuse()`/`ignore()` code path is exercised, such as to stop a denial of service attack. - Accepting when the initial packet for the resulting validated connection fails to decrypt or exhausts connection IDs, if a similar initial packet that successfully decrypts and doesn't exhaust connection IDs is received. - This issue can go undetected if clients are well-behaved. The former situation was observed in a real application, while the latter is only theoretical. ### Details Location of panic: https://github.com/quinn-rs/quinn/blob/bb02a12a8435a7732a1d762783eeacbb7e50418e/quinn-proto/src/endpoint.rs#L213 ### Impact Denial of service for internet-facing server

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osv · RUSTSEC-2024-0373

Published

In 0.11.0, we overhauled the server-side `Endpoint` implementation to enable more careful handling of incoming connection attempts. However, some of the code paths that cleaned up state after connection attempts were processed confused the initial destination connection ID with the destination connection ID of a substantial package. This resulted in the internal `Endpoint` state becoming inconsistent, which could then lead to a panic. https://github.com/quinn-rs/quinn/commit/e01609ccd8738bd438d86fa7185a0f85598cb58f Thanks to [@finbear](https://github.com/finnbear) for reporting and investingating, and to [@BiagoFesta](https://github.com/BiagoFesta) for coordinating.

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Affected versions, risk and source history

cve-program · CVE-2024-45311

Published

quinn

Vendor product

Publisher's version information

Shown as published. These rules are not interpreted as NuGet package version ranges.

{
                    "vendor": "quinn-rs",
                    "product": "quinn",
                    "versions": [
                        {
                            "version": ">= 0.11.0, < 0.11.7",
                            "status": "affected"
                        }
                    ]
                }

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

euvd · EUVD-2024-2878

Published

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Sep 2, 2024, 4:45:39 PM

dateUpdated: Sep 3, 2024, 2:04:46 PM

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

nvd · CVE-2024-45311

Published

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Analyzed

Weakness classifications: CWE-670

Original publisher date fields

published: 2024-09-02T18:15:37.373

lastModified: 2026-06-17T07:54:00.150

1 source CPE criteria · context only
  • cpe:2.3:a:quinn_project:quinn:*:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*

The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

osv · GHSA-vr26-jcq5-fjj8

Published

quinn-proto

crates.io

SEMVER · introduced 0.11.0 → fixed 0.11.7

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

osv · RUSTSEC-2024-0373

Published

quinn-proto

crates.io

SEMVER · introduced 0.11.0 → fixed 0.11.7

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

ChangeIntel

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