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Denial of service in quinn-proto when using `Endpoint::retry()`

CVSS 3.1 7.5 HIGHEUVD CVSS 3.1 7.5 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 7.5 HIGHCVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary 7.5 HIGHCVSS_V3 CVSS_V4 Publisher rating HIGHFixed by quinn-proto 0.11.7CVSS_V3 Fixed by quinn-proto 0.11.7KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2024-45311

Published

Quinn is a pure-Rust, async-compatible implementation of the IETF QUIC transport protocol. As of quinn-proto 0.11, it is possible for a server to `accept()`, `retry()`, `refuse()`, or `ignore()` an `Incoming` connection. However, calling `retry()` on an unvalidated connection exposes the server to a likely panic in the following situations: 1. Calling `refuse` or `ignore` on the resulting validated connection, if a duplicate initial packet is received. This issue can go undetected until a server's `refuse()`/`ignore()` code path is exercised, such as to stop a denial of service attack. 2. Accepting when the initial packet for the resulting validated connection fails to decrypt or exhausts connection IDs, if a similar initial packet that successfully decrypts and doesn't exhaust connection IDs is received. This issue can go undetected if clients are well-behaved. The former situation was observed in a real application, while the latter is only theoretical.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2024-2878

Published

Quinn is a pure-Rust, async-compatible implementation of the IETF QUIC transport protocol. As of quinn-proto 0.11, it is possible for a server to `accept()`, `retry()`, `refuse()`, or `ignore()` an `Incoming` connection. However, calling `retry()` on an unvalidated connection exposes the server to a likely panic in the following situations: 1. Calling `refuse` or `ignore` on the resulting validated connection, if a duplicate initial packet is received. This issue can go undetected until a server's `refuse()`/`ignore()` code path is exercised, such as to stop a denial of service attack. 2. Accepting when the initial packet for the resulting validated connection fails to decrypt or exhausts connection IDs, if a similar initial packet that successfully decrypts and doesn't exhaust connection IDs is received. This issue can go undetected if clients are well-behaved. The former situation was observed in a real application, while the latter is only theoretical.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2024-45311

Published

Quinn is a pure-Rust, async-compatible implementation of the IETF QUIC transport protocol. As of quinn-proto 0.11, it is possible for a server to `accept()`, `retry()`, `refuse()`, or `ignore()` an `Incoming` connection. However, calling `retry()` on an unvalidated connection exposes the server to a likely panic in the following situations: 1. Calling `refuse` or `ignore` on the resulting validated connection, if a duplicate initial packet is received. This issue can go undetected until a server's `refuse()`/`ignore()` code path is exercised, such as to stop a denial of service attack. 2. Accepting when the initial packet for the resulting validated connection fails to decrypt or exhausts connection IDs, if a similar initial packet that successfully decrypts and doesn't exhaust connection IDs is received. This issue can go undetected if clients are well-behaved. The former situation was observed in a real application, while the latter is only theoretical.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-vr26-jcq5-fjj8

Published

### Summary As of quinn-proto 0.11, it is possible for a server to `accept()`, `retry()`, `refuse()`, or `ignore()` an `Incoming` connection. However, calling `retry()` on an unvalidated connection exposes the server to a likely panic in the following situations: - Calling `refuse` or `ignore` on the resulting validated connection, if a duplicate initial packet is received - This issue can go undetected until a server's `refuse()`/`ignore()` code path is exercised, such as to stop a denial of service attack. - Accepting when the initial packet for the resulting validated connection fails to decrypt or exhausts connection IDs, if a similar initial packet that successfully decrypts and doesn't exhaust connection IDs is received. - This issue can go undetected if clients are well-behaved. The former situation was observed in a real application, while the latter is only theoretical. ### Details Location of panic: https://github.com/quinn-rs/quinn/blob/bb02a12a8435a7732a1d762783eeacbb7e50418e/quinn-proto/src/endpoint.rs#L213 ### Impact Denial of service for internet-facing server

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osv · RUSTSEC-2024-0373

Published

In 0.11.0, we overhauled the server-side `Endpoint` implementation to enable more careful handling of incoming connection attempts. However, some of the code paths that cleaned up state after connection attempts were processed confused the initial destination connection ID with the destination connection ID of a substantial package. This resulted in the internal `Endpoint` state becoming inconsistent, which could then lead to a panic. https://github.com/quinn-rs/quinn/commit/e01609ccd8738bd438d86fa7185a0f85598cb58f Thanks to [@finbear](https://github.com/finnbear) for reporting and investingating, and to [@BiagoFesta](https://github.com/BiagoFesta) for coordinating.

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

Exploitation and risk

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Advisory history

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15 Nov 2026 03:42:09 UTC

Quinn is a pure-Rust, async-compatible implementation of the IETF QUIC transport protocol. As of quinn-proto 0.11, it is possible for a server to `accept()`, `retry()`, `refuse()`, or `ignore()` an `Incoming` connection. However, calling `r…

euvd · EUVD-2024-2878 · Published

13 Nov 2026 02:22:27 UTC

Quinn is a pure-Rust, async-compatible implementation of the IETF QUIC transport protocol. As of quinn-proto 0.11, it is possible for a server to `accept()`, `retry()`, `refuse()`, or `ignore()` an `Incoming` connection. However, calling `r…

euvd · EUVD-2024-2878 · Published

11 Nov 2026 01:32:49 UTC

Quinn is a pure-Rust, async-compatible implementation of the IETF QUIC transport protocol. As of quinn-proto 0.11, it is possible for a server to `accept()`, `retry()`, `refuse()`, or `ignore()` an `Incoming` connection. However, calling `r…

euvd · EUVD-2024-2878 · Published

9 Nov 2026 01:06:04 UTC

Quinn is a pure-Rust, async-compatible implementation of the IETF QUIC transport protocol. As of quinn-proto 0.11, it is possible for a server to `accept()`, `retry()`, `refuse()`, or `ignore()` an `Incoming` connection. However, calling `r…

euvd · EUVD-2024-2878 · Published

7 Nov 2026 00:31:08 UTC

Quinn is a pure-Rust, async-compatible implementation of the IETF QUIC transport protocol. As of quinn-proto 0.11, it is possible for a server to `accept()`, `retry()`, `refuse()`, or `ignore()` an `Incoming` connection. However, calling `r…

euvd · EUVD-2024-2878 · Published

4 Nov 2026 23:58:44 UTC

Quinn is a pure-Rust, async-compatible implementation of the IETF QUIC transport protocol. As of quinn-proto 0.11, it is possible for a server to `accept()`, `retry()`, `refuse()`, or `ignore()` an `Incoming` connection. However, calling `r…

euvd · EUVD-2024-2878 · Published

2 Nov 2026 22:59:45 UTC

Quinn is a pure-Rust, async-compatible implementation of the IETF QUIC transport protocol. As of quinn-proto 0.11, it is possible for a server to `accept()`, `retry()`, `refuse()`, or `ignore()` an `Incoming` connection. However, calling `r…

euvd · EUVD-2024-2878 · Published

31 Oct 2026 22:07:11 UTC

Quinn is a pure-Rust, async-compatible implementation of the IETF QUIC transport protocol. As of quinn-proto 0.11, it is possible for a server to `accept()`, `retry()`, `refuse()`, or `ignore()` an `Incoming` connection. However, calling `r…

euvd · EUVD-2024-2878 · Published

29 Oct 2026 21:17:12 UTC

Quinn is a pure-Rust, async-compatible implementation of the IETF QUIC transport protocol. As of quinn-proto 0.11, it is possible for a server to `accept()`, `retry()`, `refuse()`, or `ignore()` an `Incoming` connection. However, calling `r…

euvd · EUVD-2024-2878 · Published

27 Oct 2026 20:50:25 UTC

Quinn is a pure-Rust, async-compatible implementation of the IETF QUIC transport protocol. As of quinn-proto 0.11, it is possible for a server to `accept()`, `retry()`, `refuse()`, or `ignore()` an `Incoming` connection. However, calling `r…

euvd · EUVD-2024-2878 · Published

25 Oct 2026 00:17:28 UTC

Quinn is a pure-Rust, async-compatible implementation of the IETF QUIC transport protocol. As of quinn-proto 0.11, it is possible for a server to `accept()`, `retry()`, `refuse()`, or `ignore()` an `Incoming` connection. However, calling `r…

nvd · CVE-2024-45311 · Published

24 Oct 2026 13:19:54 UTC

Denial of service in quinn-proto when using `Endpoint::retry()`

osv · GHSA-vr26-jcq5-fjj8 · Published

23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC

Denial of service in quinn-proto when using `Endpoint::retry()`

cve-program · CVE-2024-45311 · Published

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