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hickory-resolver before 0.26.2 DNSSEC Validation Bypass

CVSS 4.0 8.7 HIGHCVSS 3.1 7.5 HIGHEUVD CVSS 4.0 8.7 CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary 8.7 HIGHCVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 7.5 HIGHCVSS_V3 Publisher rating HIGHFixed by hickory-resolver 0.26.2CVSS_V3 Fixed by hickory-resolver 0.26.2KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-93657

Published

hickory-resolver versions before 0.26.2 fail to propagate bogus DNSSEC proof states through the Resolver::lookup() and Resolver::lookup_ip() APIs, allowing invalid records to be returned as successful results. Attackers controlling the answering zone or positioned on the network path can have forged DNS records accepted as validated, bypassing DNSSEC authentication checks.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2026-82939

Published

hickory-resolver versions before 0.26.2 fail to propagate bogus DNSSEC proof states through the Resolver::lookup() and Resolver::lookup_ip() APIs, allowing invalid records to be returned as successful results. Attackers controlling the answering zone or positioned on the network path can have forged DNS records accepted as validated, bypassing DNSSEC authentication checks.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-93657

Published

hickory-resolver versions before 0.26.2 fail to propagate bogus DNSSEC proof states through the Resolver::lookup() and Resolver::lookup_ip() APIs, allowing invalid records to be returned as successful results. Attackers controlling the answering zone or positioned on the network path can have forged DNS records accepted as validated, bypassing DNSSEC authentication checks.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-5j98-2g5x-46v6

Published

When calling `Resolver::lookup()` or `Resolver::lookup_ip()` on a resolver with DNSSEC validation enabled, both methods return `Ok(...)` if DNSSEC validation fails. It is possible but very inconvenient to check the validation status of individual records. These methods should instead return an error when DNSSEC validation determines a response is bogus.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · RUSTSEC-2026-0514

Published

With DNSSEC validation enabled, `Resolver::lookup()` and `Resolver::lookup_ip()` returned `Ok` with the records even when validation found the response bogus. The result was only visible in each record's proof status, which callers had to inspect themselves. Applications that enable validation and treat a successful lookup as validated data would therefore accept forged or tampered answers from anyone who can answer or modify their DNS traffic. From 0.26.2 a lookup whose records are bogus fails with a "DNSSEC validation failed" error (`DnsError::DnssecBogus`), the error is not retried, and the hickory-server forwarder answers SERVFAIL for it.

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

Exploitation and risk

Source status

CISA KEV lists vulnerabilities known to be exploited. FIRST EPSS estimates the likelihood of exploitation in the next 30 days. An unavailable score does not mean zero risk.

Which CVEs have scores here?

This view includes predictions for CVE identifiers explicitly listed in public NuGet advisories. Microsoft release pages have their own prediction coverage. Check source status for the scope and latest checks.

No exploitation or prediction data is available here for these CVEs. This does not mean they are safe or unlikely to be exploited.

cve-program · CVE-2026-93657

Published

hickory-resolver before 0.26.2 DNSSEC Validation Bypass

hickory-resolver versions before 0.26.2 fail to propagate bogus DNSSEC proof states through the Resolver::lookup() and Resolver::lookup_ip() APIs, allowing invalid records to be returned as successful results. Attackers controlling the answering zone or positioned on the network path can have forged DNS records accepted as validated, bypassing DNSSEC authentication checks.

Source published
18 Sep 2026 14:23:20 UTC
Source modified
21 Sep 2026 20:51:40 UTC
Saved here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 4.0 · 8.7 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

CVSS 3.1 · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

euvd · EUVD-2026-82939

Published

hickory-resolver versions before 0.26.2 fail to propagate bogus DNSSEC proof states through the Resolver::lookup() and Resolver::lookup_ip() APIs, allowing invalid records to be returned as successful results. Attackers controlling the answ…

hickory-resolver versions before 0.26.2 fail to propagate bogus DNSSEC proof states through the Resolver::lookup() and Resolver::lookup_ip() APIs, allowing invalid records to be returned as successful results. Attackers controlling the answering zone or positioned on the network path can have forged DNS records accepted as validated, bypassing DNSSEC authentication checks.

Additional publisher context

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Sep 18, 2026, 2:23:20 PM

dateUpdated: Sep 21, 2026, 8:51:40 PM

4 related source bulletins · separate from aliases

RHSA-2026:85848: Red Hat Security Advisory: rust-sequoia-sq security update

CVE-2026-93599 · CVE-2026-93657

RHSA-2026:86891: Red Hat Security Advisory: RHOAI 3.5.2 - Red Hat OpenShift AI

CVE-2024-14029 · CVE-2026-13697 · CVE-2026-15679 · CVE-2026-15789 · CVE-2026-18427 · CVE-2026-19534 · CVE-2026-37237 · CVE-2026-49825 · CVE-2026-49855 · CVE-2026-54284 · CVE-2026-56859 · CVE-2026-59296 · CVE-2026-59893 · CVE-2026-62243 · CVE-2026-62384 · CVE-2026-63209 · CVE-2026-63374 · CVE-2026-66007 · CVE-2026-68494 · CVE-2026-68497 · CVE-2026-69097 · CVE-2026-69112 · CVE-2026-69152 · CVE-2026-69243 · CVE-2026-69244 · CVE-2026-71281 · CVE-2026-71491 · CVE-2026-73417 · CVE-2026-73502 · CVE-2026-73508 · CVE-2026-73646 · CVE-2026-75838 · CVE-2026-75899 · CVE-2026-75931 · CVE-2026-75975 · CVE-2026-76098 · CVE-2026-76169 · CVE-2026-76172 · CVE-2026-76222 · CVE-2026-76905 · CVE-2026-77354 · CVE-2026-77874 · CVE-2026-78676 · CVE-2026-78677 · CVE-2026-78679 · CVE-2026-78682 · CVE-2026-79674 · CVE-2026-79675 · CVE-2026-80205 · CVE-2026-81722 · CVE-2026-81724 · CVE-2026-81725 · CVE-2026-81726 · CVE-2026-81727 · CVE-2026-82397 · CVE-2026-82417 · CVE-2026-84292 · CVE-2026-84375 · CVE-2026-84381 · CVE-2026-84382 · CVE-2026-84394 · CVE-2026-84428 · CVE-2026-84445 · CVE-2026-84469 · CVE-2026-84504 · CVE-2026-84782 · CVE-2026-84961 · CVE-2026-85124 · CVE-2026-85152 · CVE-2026-85525 · CVE-2026-86332 · CVE-2026-87776 · CVE-2026-87817 · CVE-2026-87819 · CVE-2026-88029 · CVE-2026-88031 · CVE-2026-89425 · CVE-2026-91990 · CVE-2026-93348 · CVE-2026-93599 · CVE-2026-93657 · CVE-2026-93749 · CVE-2026-96749 · CVE-2026-96775 · CVE-2026-102925 · CVE-2026-102930 · CVE-2026-102937 · CVE-2026-102938 · CVE-2026-102990 · CVE-2026-104851 · CVE-2026-104852 · CVE-2026-104861 · CVE-2026-104873

RHSA-2026:87410: Red Hat Security Advisory: RHOAI 2.25.12 - Red Hat OpenShift AI

CVE-2024-12224 · CVE-2025-14920 · CVE-2025-14921 · CVE-2025-14924 · CVE-2025-14925 · CVE-2025-14926 · CVE-2025-14927 · CVE-2025-14928 · CVE-2025-14929 · CVE-2025-14930 · CVE-2025-61726 · CVE-2025-61729 · CVE-2026-5241 · CVE-2026-5497 · CVE-2026-6734 · CVE-2026-8643 · CVE-2026-9697 · CVE-2026-11822 · CVE-2026-11824 · CVE-2026-12151 · CVE-2026-12860 · CVE-2026-15143 · CVE-2026-15574 · CVE-2026-15679 · CVE-2026-15925 · CVE-2026-16221 · CVE-2026-18427 · CVE-2026-18446 · CVE-2026-18949 · CVE-2026-19481 · CVE-2026-19484 · CVE-2026-19534 · CVE-2026-25681 · CVE-2026-25960 · CVE-2026-27136 · CVE-2026-28390 · CVE-2026-28684 · CVE-2026-31812 · CVE-2026-32283 · CVE-2026-33186 · CVE-2026-33805 · CVE-2026-33811 · CVE-2026-33814 · CVE-2026-34993 · CVE-2026-39821 · CVE-2026-39852 · CVE-2026-39892 · CVE-2026-40682 · CVE-2026-41178 · CVE-2026-42502 · CVE-2026-42561 · CVE-2026-44431 · CVE-2026-44432 · CVE-2026-44660 · CVE-2026-44705 · CVE-2026-45820 · CVE-2026-47219 · CVE-2026-48526 · CVE-2026-48710 · CVE-2026-48746 · CVE-2026-49114 · CVE-2026-49825 · CVE-2026-49855 · CVE-2026-50559 · CVE-2026-54283 · CVE-2026-54399 · CVE-2026-54428 · CVE-2026-55831 · CVE-2026-55833 · CVE-2026-56121 · CVE-2026-56746 · CVE-2026-56819 · CVE-2026-56853 · CVE-2026-56858 · CVE-2026-56859 · CVE-2026-56860 · CVE-2026-56862 · CVE-2026-58059 · CVE-2026-59296 · CVE-2026-59879 · CVE-2026-59884 · CVE-2026-59885 · CVE-2026-59886 · CVE-2026-59899 · CVE-2026-62243 · CVE-2026-62384 · CVE-2026-63209 · CVE-2026-63374 · CVE-2026-65898 · CVE-2026-65918 · CVE-2026-66007 · CVE-2026-67213 · CVE-2026-67214 · CVE-2026-67312 · CVE-2026-68494 · CVE-2026-68497 · CVE-2026-68770 · CVE-2026-69097 · CVE-2026-69112 · CVE-2026-69152 · CVE-2026-69153 · CVE-2026-69243 · CVE-2026-69244 · CVE-2026-71281 · CVE-2026-73086 · CVE-2026-73088 · CVE-2026-73089 · CVE-2026-73415 · CVE-2026-73417 · CVE-2026-73502 · CVE-2026-73508 · CVE-2026-73620 · CVE-2026-73622 · CVE-2026-73623 · CVE-2026-73624 · CVE-2026-73625 · CVE-2026-73627 · CVE-2026-73646 · CVE-2026-75838 · CVE-2026-75899 · CVE-2026-75931 · CVE-2026-75975 · CVE-2026-76098 · CVE-2026-76169 · CVE-2026-76172 · CVE-2026-76222 · CVE-2026-76905 · CVE-2026-77354 · CVE-2026-77874 · CVE-2026-78676 · CVE-2026-78677 · CVE-2026-78679 · CVE-2026-78682 · CVE-2026-79674 · CVE-2026-79675 · CVE-2026-80205 · CVE-2026-81722 · CVE-2026-81724 · CVE-2026-81727 · CVE-2026-82397 · CVE-2026-82417 · CVE-2026-84292 · CVE-2026-84375 · CVE-2026-84394 · CVE-2026-84428 · CVE-2026-84445 · CVE-2026-84469 · CVE-2026-84504 · CVE-2026-84782 · CVE-2026-84961 · CVE-2026-85124 · CVE-2026-85152 · CVE-2026-85525 · CVE-2026-86049 · CVE-2026-86332 · CVE-2026-87776 · CVE-2026-87817 · CVE-2026-87819 · CVE-2026-88029 · CVE-2026-88031 · CVE-2026-89418 · CVE-2026-89425 · CVE-2026-91777 · CVE-2026-91990 · CVE-2026-92599 · CVE-2026-93599 · CVE-2026-93657 · CVE-2026-93749 · CVE-2026-96749 · CVE-2026-102831 · CVE-2026-102925 · CVE-2026-102930 · CVE-2026-102937 · CVE-2026-102938 · CVE-2026-103262 · CVE-2026-104851 · CVE-2026-105744

openSUSE-SU-2026:11923-1: openai-codex-0.158.0-1.1 on GA media

CVE-2026-91986 · CVE-2026-93657

Source published
Sep 18, 2026, 2:23:20 PM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Sep 21, 2026, 8:51:40 PM (timezone not stated)
Saved here
11 Nov 2026 17:05:46 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

EUVD CVSS 4.0 · 8.7 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

nvd · CVE-2026-93657

Published

hickory-resolver versions before 0.26.2 fail to propagate bogus DNSSEC proof states through the Resolver::lookup() and Resolver::lookup_ip() APIs, allowing invalid records to be returned as successful results. Attackers controlling the answ…

hickory-resolver versions before 0.26.2 fail to propagate bogus DNSSEC proof states through the Resolver::lookup() and Resolver::lookup_ip() APIs, allowing invalid records to be returned as successful results. Attackers controlling the answering zone or positioned on the network path can have forged DNS records accepted as validated, bypassing DNSSEC authentication checks.

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-347

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-09-18T15:17:22.190

lastModified: 2026-09-22T20:53:07.383

Source published
18 Sep 2026 15:17:22 UTC
Source modified
22 Sep 2026 20:53:07 UTC
Saved here
25 Oct 2026 16:19:28 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 8.7 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

osv · GHSA-5j98-2g5x-46v6

Published

hickory-resolver: Resolver::lookup() and Resolver::lookup_ip() APIs obscure DNSSEC validation failures

When calling `Resolver::lookup()` or `Resolver::lookup_ip()` on a resolver with DNSSEC validation enabled, both methods return `Ok(...)` if DNSSEC validation fails. It is possible but very inconvenient to check the validation status of individual records. These methods should instead return an error when DNSSEC validation determines a response is bogus.

Source published
5 Oct 2026 22:54:35 UTC
Source modified
12 Nov 2026 14:40:54 UTC
Saved here
12 Nov 2026 15:18:33 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

Publisher rating · HIGH

osv · RUSTSEC-2026-0514

Published

`Resolver::lookup` and `lookup_ip` returned records that failed DNSSEC validation

With DNSSEC validation enabled, `Resolver::lookup()` and `Resolver::lookup_ip()` returned `Ok` with the records even when validation found the response bogus. The result was only visible in each record's proof status, which callers had to inspect themselves. Applications that enable validation and treat a successful lookup as validated data would therefore accept forged or tampered answers from anyone who can answer or modify their DNS traffic. From 0.26.2 a lookup whose records are bogus fails with a "DNSSEC validation failed" error (`DnsError::DnssecBogus`), the error is not retried, and the hickory-server forwarder answers SERVFAIL for it.

Source published
3 Sep 2026 12:00:00 UTC
Source modified
12 Nov 2026 14:30:06 UTC
Saved here
12 Nov 2026 15:18:33 UTC
Source terms
OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 12 Nov 15:26 UTC · 274 of 275 readable · 272 fully read · documentation 469/469 current