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Ended in the last 7 days

53 incidents · newest first

Sun 13 Sep1

  • GitHub Incident with several GitHub Services last seen 10:44 UTC unknown

    Posted 13 Sep 09:16 UTCUpdated 25d ago

    GitHub

    On September 13, 2026, between 08:43 and 10:44 UTC, GitHub experienced degraded availability across approximately 28 services, including Issues, Pull Requests, Actions, Codespaces, Pages, Notifications, Code Scanning, Git LFS, and new account signup. At peak, 8.8% of requests to create GitHub App installation access tokens failed. Token issuance for Actions workflows was also affected, impacting approximately 4% of workflows during the incident time frame. Creating issues through the web interface failed for about 96% of attempts, and signup failures were above 90%. The cause was an internal data-cleanup job that began writing to a shared database cluster at 07:33 UTC. That cluster stores permission data read on nearly every authenticated request. The safeguard that was pacing the background job watched only one health signal — how far the database replicas were lagging — and that signal stayed low the whole time. It did not account for the load building on the primary itself, so the job kept writing while the primary quietly ran toward its limit. When the primary ran out of available connections, requests that needed it could not complete. First, there was no quick timeout on these database calls, so request handlers waited on the stalled database instead of failing fast, and the shared request-handling capacity degraded into site-wide errors. Second, a retry loop around token creation kept re-sending the writes that were already failing, which held the database saturated rather than letting it recover. Monitoring declared the incident at 08:50 UTC, but due to the broad i…

    5 earlier updates
    1. 13 Sep 10:28 UTCUpdatePull Requests is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.
    2. 13 Sep 10:26 UTCUpdateWe have reduced load on this cluster with internal load-shedding and are seeing signs of recovery but continue to monitor
    3. 13 Sep 09:36 UTCUpdateWe're seeing increased database replication delays on collab which is causing increased error rates in authorization endpoints and follow-on increased error rates across the system - we are investigating
    4. 13 Sep 09:25 UTCUpdateActions is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.
    5. 13 Sep 09:16 UTCInvestigatingWe are investigating reports of degraded availability for API Requests, Issues, Pages and Pull Requests
    Around it2 other incidents at the same time · 5 earlier incidents

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    Earlier incidents in the 14 days before

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Tue 6 Oct17

Mon 5 Oct11

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An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 9 Oct 00:35 UTC · 215 of 216 readable · documentation 387/387 current